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INTERNATIONAL COERCION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF WAR
MYRES S. McDOUGALt
FLORENTINO P, FELICIANOi-I
THE importance today to every human being of community control of inter-
national coercion needs no pedant's footnotes to bestow upon it a sense of
reality. The increasingly rapid multiplication and diffusion of weapons capable
of shattering the globe, the most recent successful orbiting of artificial satel-
lites and launching of guided and ballistic missiles of intercontinental reach,'
the continued, if decelerated, hostile polarization of power in the world arena,
the ever more precarious equilibrium between the polar opponents, the high
and still rising levels in tension and expectations of comprehensive violence-
all these and many other aspects of the contemporary world arena magnify
with chilling insistence, even for the willful blind, the urgent need for
rational inquiry into the potentialities and limitations of our inherited prin-
ciples and procedures for controlling violence between peoples and for the
invention and establishment of more effective alternatives in principles and
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This is the first in a series of articles upon the law of war. The second article, "The
Initiation of Coercion: A Multi-Temporal Analysis," appears in the April 1958 issue of
the American Journal of International Law. Subsequent articles will deal with the various
major problems of the law of war from the resort to coercion, through the regulation
of combat and noncombat situations, to the termination of coercion. The first portion of
this Article, outlining in relative detail the processes of coercion and decision, is designed
as an introduction to the whole series; the second portion offers a brief survey of some
of the more important general policies relating to each of the major problems.
1. On the implications of artificial satellites and missiles for international security, see
Berkner, Earth Satellites and Foreign Policy, 36 FoREIGN AFF. 221 (1958) ; Davidon,
The Modern Roman Circus, 13 Bums. ATomic ScINTIsTs 331 (1957) ; Rabinowitch, After
Missiles and Satellites, Vhat?, 13 id. at 346. Preliminary inquiry into certain anticipated
problems of community control is made in McDougal & Lipson, Perspectives for a Law
of Outer Space, 52 AM. J. INT'L L. 407 (1958).
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procedures.2 This urgent need-not far removed, if at all, from that of simple
survival-when considered in relation to the rising demands of people all
over the world, whatever the perspectives of their rulers, for the securing
of all their values by peaceful procedures, free from coercion and violence,
confronts students of international law with unparalleled challenge and op-
portunity.
To meet this challenge, legal scholars unfortunately still much too often
speak from one or the other of two contrasting attitudes, both destructive
in high degree of efforts to clarify principles and procedures appropriate to
a world public order honoring human dignity. The first of these attitudes,
expressed in the accents of ultrasophistication and disenchantment, affirms
that man's destructive impulses and instruments of violence have escaped all
bounds and that little or nothing can be done by law either to control inter-
national coercion or to minimize the destruction of values once violence erupts.
The contrasting attitude, manifested in continuing high deference to certain
inherited terms of art, affirms an excess of faith in technical concepts and rules,
divorced from contexts and procedures, as determinants of decision and ex-
hibits much too little concern for the clarification of policies in detailed con-
texts and for the search for new principles and procedures. It will require
but brief illustration to indicate the inadequacies of each of these attitudes
and to emphasize the need for an alternative approach.
The first attitude, that of cynical disenchantment with law, may be illus-
trated by reference to certain writers who take what they describe as a
"realistic" attitude toward the possibilities of legal regulation of coercion and
violence among states. Emphasizing the "unlimited forces" that total war
unleashes and pointing to the fearful potentialities of modern weapons, Judge
de Visscher insists that "in its essence the problem of control [of such
weapons] is wholly political" and adds:
"The new weapons of mass destruction have revolutionized all the data
of war, and it is above all for this reason that the jurists will be well
advised to waste no further time in what some of them still persist in
calling the 'restatement' of the laws of war. To try to adapt these laws
to the new conditions is not only labor absolutely lost; it is an enter-
prise that in certain of its aspects may be dangerous, as was demonstrated
by the indefinite extension given in the second world war to the notion of the
2. This need has not gone unacknowledged in the more recent literature. See, e.g.,
STONE, LEAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CoNFLICr xxxi-lv (1954) (hereinafter cited
as STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS) ; de Luna, Fundamentacin del Derecho Internacional, 60
RLVisTA DE DEREcHo INTERNACIONAL 210 (Cuba 1952); Downey, Revision of the Rules
of Warfare, 43 PRoc. Am. SocY INT'L L. 102 (1949) ; Kunz, The Laws of War, 50 Amt. J.
INT'L L. 313 (1956) ; Kunz, The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War and the Urgent
Necessity for Their Revision, 45 id. at 37 (1951); Lauterpacht, The Problem of the
Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 360 (1952); Phillips, Air Warfare
and Law, 21 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 311, 395, 415 (1953). See also Pound, Potentials for
World Stability in the Field of Law, in PROSPECTS FOR WORLD STABILITY 5 (PROC. INST.
WoRL AFFAIRS, 26th Sess. 1949).
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military objective. There is better work to be done today than picking
up the fragments of an obsolete body of rules."8
The attitude here exhibited may be only a particular piece of the contemporary
disillusionment which characteristically minimizes the actual and potential
function of law in the world power process, exaggerates the role of naked
power and deprecates continuing concern with legal principles and pro-
cedures as legalism-as an "intoxication with moral abstractions" and as
one of the "great sources of weakness and failure" in foreign policy.4 Even
so distinguished a humanitarian as Dr. Fenwick has given candid expression
to such attitudes:
"The laws of war belong to a past age and except for a few minor
matters of no consequence, it is futile to attempt to revive them ...
Let's face the facts. War has got beyond the control of law, other
than the elementary law of humanity, if that can be discovered among
the ruins of devastated cities." 5
"Gone, and it is to be hoped, gone forever is the naive belief that it is
possible to draft new laws of war for new wars . ..."6
The most obvious inadequacy in this attitude is that, because of its compre-
hensive deprecation of the role of authority, it offers no real alternative
3. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 293 (Corbett
transl. 1957). For comparable pessimism expressed after the first World War, see The
League of Nations and the Laws of War, 1 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 109 (1920-21).
4. See MORGENTHAU, IN DEFEs OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST 4, 101 (1951); cf.
KENNAN, AmERrcAx DIPLOMACYr 1900-1950, 95 (1951): "I see the most serious fault of
our past policy formulation to lie in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic
approach to international problems. This approach was like a red skein through our
foreign policy of the last fifty years. It has in it something of the old emphasis on arbitra-
tion treaties, something of the Hague Conferences and schemes for universal disarmament,
something of the more ambitious American concepts of the role of international law, some-
thing of the League of Nations and the United Nations, something of the Kellogg Pact,
something of the idea of a universal 'Article 51' pact, something of the belief in World
Law and World Government. . . . It is the belief that it should be possible to suppress
the chaotic and dangerous aspirations of governments in the international field by the
acceptance of some system of legal rules and restraints."
For criticism of Professors Mforgenthau and Kennan's position, see McDougal, Law
and Power, 46 AM. J. INT'L L. 102 (1952). See also CORBETT, MORALS, LAW AND POWER
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 2-16 (1956); Oliver, Reflections on Two Recent Develop-
ments Affecting the Function of Law it the International Comnnity, 30 TEXAS L. REV.
815 (1952).
For comparable underestimations of the function of legal principles and rules, see
SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS 203 (2d rev. ed. 1951) : "In a society in which power
is the overriding consideration, it is the primary function of laws to assist in maintaining
the supremacy of force and the hierarchies established on the basis of power and to lend
to such system the respectability and sanctity of law. In a variety of ways, international
law serves these purposes." For brief comment, see McDougal, Dr. Schwarzenberger's
Power Politics, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 115 (1953).
5. 43 PROC. Am. SOc'Y INT'L L. 110 (1949) (Fenwick).
6. Fenwick, The Progress of International Law, 79 HAGUE ACADEmIE DE DROIT INTER-
NATIONAL, REcUEO DES COURS (hereinafter cited as HAGUE RECUEIL) 5, 63 (1951).
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to naked force in an era in which the unrestrained exercise of such force
against peoples threatens the very continuance of the human species. It is,
of course, possible that the future may, as the world explodes in the holocaust
of unlimited nuclear war, prove these writers to have been correct. Such
pyrrhic vindication will, however, appeal to few, and for the scholar who
cherishes both human life and human dignity, such a possibility can scarcely
be permitted to deter renewed efforts to clarify the principles and procedures
of a world public order in which human life and dignity may be made more
secure. Fortunately, history does disclose a few examples of eras in which
appropriate organizing principles and procedures were achieved, in contexts
of sustaining effective power, for the restraint of generalized violence and for
the minimization, in at least modest degree, of barbarism in conflict.7 There
has yet to be demonstrated any inner necessity in either human nature or the
nature of htiman society that makes it inherently impossible for men to dis-
cover and employ policies and institutions for harnessing the new instruments
of destruction to the purposes of order rather than to their final mutual obliter-
ation.8
The second attitude, that of overoptimistic faith in the efficacy of technical
legal concepts and rules, is exemplified in the continued emphasis, evident in
much of the contemporary literature of the law of war, on normative-ambigu-
ous 9 definitions and formulations and in the common underlying assumption
7. Europe during the greater part of the nineteenth century is the most frequently
cited example, as to which see 1 WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 361-62, 639, 653-55 (1942).
8. See MAY, A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR AND PEACE chapters 1, 2, 9 (1943),
whose main thesis is that "war and peace are basically and fundamentally the products
of the types of social conditioning that have occurred in the large masses of people of
the leading nations of the world." Id. at vii. Pear, The Psychological Study of Tensions
and Conflict, in THE NATURE OF CONFLICT 118, 131. (1957), points out that the view which
posits an "innate, independent, instinctual disposition of man" toward aggression is not
supported by more recent studies on psychology, social psychology and comparative
ethnology. 2 WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 1224 (1942) : "The attitude conducive to peace
is neither that popularly attributed to the ostrich, which denies the possibility of war, nor
that of the cynic, who considers war inevitable, but that of the rational man who appraises
the opinions and conditions tending to war and the direction of human effort which at a
given point in history might prevent it." Cf. TENSIONS THAT CAUSE WARS 17 (Cantril
ed. 1950) : "To the best of our knowledge, there is no evidence to indicate that wars are
necessary and inevitable consequences of 'human nature' as such." See also KUNEBERG,
TENSIONS AFFECTING INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING c. 5 (1950); HUMAN NATURE AND
ENDURING PEACE chapters 2-4, 26 (Murphy ed. 1945) ; WRIGHT, PROBLEMS OF STABILITY
AND PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 129, 146-47 (1954); Almond, Anthropology,
Political Behaviour, and International Relations, 2 WORLD POLITICS 277 (1950) ; Cook,
Democratic Psychology and a Democratic World Order, 1 id. at 553 (1949) ; de Luna,
Es La Guerra Inevitable?, 8 REvISTA ESPANOLA DE DERECHO INTFRNACIONAL 11 (1955);
Malinowski, War-Past, Present, and Future, in WAR AS A SOCIAL INSTITUTION 21-31
(Clarkson & Cochran ed. 1941) ; Pear, Peace, War and Culture Patterns, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
FACTORS OF WAR AND PEACE 21-45 (Pear ed. 1950).
9. A statement is "normative-ambiguous" when its terms make indiscriminate reference
to the events to which decision-makers respond, to the policies which are assumed to guide
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that certain predetermined "legal consequences" attach to and automatically
follow-independently of policy objectives, factual conditions and value con-
sequences as perceived by determinate decision-makers-from such definitions
and formulations. This overemphasis on formal concepts and rules begins with
the customary definition of war as a "legal state" or "condition" and extends
through all ancillary concepts. The conception of war offered by Professor
Hyde is representative:
"War may in a broad sense be fairly described as a condition of armed
hostility between States. . . A state of war is a legal condition of
affairs dealt with as such, and so described both by participants and
non-participants. It may exist prior to the use of force."10
The formulation by Lord McNair is even more explicit illustration:
"An important point ... which, I think any good definition must bring
out, is that war is a state or condition of affairs, not a mere series of
acts of force. It is a state of affairs to which International Law attaches
certain far-reaching consequences, and it is by reason of those conse-
quences that it is necessary, as a matter of practie rather than of
speculation, to define the state of affairs giving rise to them ...
Moreover, Peace and War are mutually exclusive; there is no half-way
house. . . There are many measures of redress falling short of war,
but the state of the relations between the State by whom and the State
against whom such measures are taken continues to be peace until
by one or both of them it is converted into war."1'
More recently, Professor Tucker has written:
"War--or the resort to armed force-is an action constituting a legal
status defined by law. This status consists in bringing into operation
certain rights and duties as between the belligerent states."' 12
The primary difficulty with all these definitions, 13 and the comparable
expressions of subsidiary concepts, 14 consists in the fact that they not only
and justify decision and to the decisions ("legal consequences") themselves. Such state-
ments commonly attempt in a single reference to describe past decisions, to predict future
decisions and to state what future decisions ought to be. Further exposition of normative-
ambiguity may be found in Lasswell & McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy:
Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 266-67 (1943).
10. 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 1686 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
11. McNair, The Legal Meaning of War, and the Relation of War to Reprisals, 11
TRANSACT. GRoT. Soc'y 29, 33 (1926).
12. TuclER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 9 (1957).
13. See the definitions collected in Eagleton, The Attempt to Define War, 291 INT'L
CoNc. 237, 258 (1933); Green, Armed Conflict, War, and Self-Defense, 6 ARcHIV DES
V6LKERRECHTS 387 (1957) ; McNair, supra note 11, at 31-32; Ronan, English and Ameri-
can Courts and the Definition of War, 31 Am. J. INT'L L. 642 (1937).
14. On "neutrality," see, e.g., ORVIK, THE DECLINE OF NEUTRALITY 1914-1941, 11
(1953) : "Neutrality signifies primarily a nation's status of non-participation in hostilities
when other countries are at war. Yet in international law a neutral state also undertakes
certain duties and claims certain rights." See also TUCKER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 196.
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attempt to refer at once to both "facts" and asserted "legal consequences,"
to both the time-space events of coercion and the responses of authoritative
decision-makers to such events, but also purport to break each of the two
distinguishable processes of factual coercion and of legal decision into the
illusorily simple and dichotomous categories of "war" and "peace."
This conception of sharp discrimination between the "state of war" and
the "state of peace," each with its distinctive and mutually exclusive sets
of world prescriptions, is as ancient as Cicero's "inter bellum et pacem nihil
est medium," upon which Grotius relied.15 It is, however, no new thought
that this dichotomy is hardly a faithful reflection of the fluid and complex
process of coercion in the contemporary world arena or of the equally complex
process of legal authority. By resting on such an oversimplification, the
legal scholar frequently compounds many particular confusions: he does
violence to the great variety and differing intensities of the events in the
coercion process, 16 obscures the creative role of the authoritative decision-
maker in responding to such events, removes from the focus of his attention
many important variables which in fact affect decision, and confuses the
fundamental policies, differing as the events of coercion differ, for the secur-
ing of which the public order of the world community establishes and main-
tains authoritative decision-makers.
Some recognition that the classical twofold categorization of the process
of coercion has but minimal correspondence to contemporary realities in the
interactions of states is apparent in the work of a number of modem
scholars. This recognition is perhaps most explicit in Professor Jessup's
recent recommendation that a new "legal state of intermediacy," a "third
status" intermediate between war and peace, be recognized and elaborated
in international law as a means of bridging the gap between traditional
15. 2 GROTIus, DE JURE BELLI Ac PAcIs 832 (Kelsey transl. 1925). For more recent
formulations of this dichotomy, see Lord Macnaghten, in Janson v. Dreifontein Consol.
Mines, Ltd., [1902] A.C. 484,497-98; STOWELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 491 (1931) ; 2 Twiss,
THE LAW OF NATIONS 49 (2d rev. ed. 1875).
16. OsGooD, Lim WAR: THE CHALLENGE TO AmERICAN STRATEGY 20 (1957),
offers lucid exposition of this point: "[I]t would be a mistake to regard war as a single,
simple, uniform entity or as an independent thing in itself, to which one applies a wholly
different set of rules and considerations than properly apply to other forms of international
conflict. It is more realistic in the light of the complex and multifarious nature of inter-
national conflict to regard war as the upper extremity of a whole scale of international
conflict of ascending intensity and scope. All along this scale one may think of sovereign
nations asserting their wills in conflict with other nations by a variety of military and non-
military means of coercion, but no definition can determine precisely at what point in the
scale conflict becomes 'war.' In this sense, war is a matter of degree, which itself contains
different degrees of intensity and scope." See HARTmANN, THE RELATIONS OF NATIONS 41-42
(1957); STRAusz-Hup & PossoNY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 41-45 (2d ed. 1954);
WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 10-12 (1942). Description of processes of conflict between
social units or systems in terms of continua between polar extremes is almost common-
place in contemporary sociology. See, e.g., Bernard, The Sociological Study of Conflict,
in THE NATURE OF CONrIcr 33, 44-45 (1957).
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concept and contemporary practice and of avoiding confusion in policy.17
The set of events which Professor Jessup would designate as "intermediacy"
would be characterized by a "basic condition of hostility and strain" or
"tension" between the opposing participants, by issues of "so fundamental
and deep-rooted a character that no solution of a single tangible issue could
terminate [the hostility]" and by "reluctance" of both sides "to resort to
war."' 8 Professor Jessup did not detail the legal consequences of inter-
mediacy but did suggest that, in the third state, conduct "which would not
be peaceful and yet would be short of . . . 'total war' " would be permis-
sible.19
The proposal of Professor Jessup is not without precedent. A decade
earlier, Dr. Schwarzenberger called attention to the fact that the "doctrine
of the alternative character of war and peace" minimized or ignored the
"reality of state practice."'20 States, he pointed out, have frequently applied
against each other more or less limited amounts of coercion, military and
nonmilitary, while continuing to maintain "peaceful relations" and denying
that a "state of war" existed. Such noncomprehensive uses of force, com-
monly denominated "measures short of war," are incompatible, Dr. Schwar-
zenberger urged, with both the states of peace and war and have "created
rules pertaining neither to those of peace or war, but constituting a status
mixtus."2' 1 Thus, he would, like Professor Jessup, recognize three instead of
two "states of typical legal relations betveen states": a "state of peace" where
states are limited in their mutual contentions to the use of economic and
political power, a "status mixtus" where these forms of power are supple-
mented by the use of military power and a "state of war" where states
use "all available forms of power. '22
17. Jessup, Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status Between Peace
and War?, 48 Am. J. INT'L L. 98 (1954) ; Jessup, Intermediacy, 23 NORDISK TmssYaIsT
FOR INTERNATIONAL RET 16 (1953).
18. Id. at 18-19.
19. Id. at 24.
20. Schwarzenberger, Jis Pacis Ac Belli?, 37 Amt. J. INT'L L. 460 (1943) ; cf. STONE,
LEGAL CONTROLS xxxiv, xxxvi-xxvii, who speaks of a condition of " 'neither peace nor
war' which dominates our actual world" and of the "'normality' of this condition of 'no
peace-no war.'" See also Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International
Law, 87 HAGuE REcUEIL 195, 327-28 (1955).
21. Schwarzenberger, Jus Pacis Ac Belli?, 37 Am. J. INT'L L. 460, 474 (1943).
"Forcible measures short of war" have always been a source of annoyance to those concerned
with tidy categorizations. For earlier suggestions about a "state of reprisals" intermediate
between peace and war, see GROB, THE RE,_ATviTY OF WAR AND PEACE 124-40 (1949);
HINDMA ESH, FORCE IN PEACE 91 (1933). Expressions such as quasi-war, imperfect war,
partial war and partial hostilities reflect the same difficulties of classification; they are
roughly equivalent to state of reprisals. See 7 MooRE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §§
1101-02 (1906) ; 3 WHARTONT, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 333 (2d ed. 1887).
22. Schwarzenberger, Jus Pacis Ac Belli?, 37 Am. J. INT'L L. 460, 474 (1943). Coln-
parc KoTzscH, THE CONCEPT OF WAR IN CONTEMPORARY HISTORY AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW 241 (1956), who apparently regards recognition of a "legal state of intermediacy" as
1958]
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A major purpose of this essay is to suggest that the events of interstate
coercion and the flow of decisions about coercion are even more complex
than the modern literature has so far explicitly recognized and that a method
of analysis more comprehensive and flexible than either dichotomy or tri-
chotomy seems necessary if clarity in fundamental conceptions and ration-
ality in decision-making are to be promoted. It would seem open to doubt
whether a trichotomy which makes simultaneous and undifferentiated refer-
ence both to facts of the greatest variety and to responses which various
decision-makers for varied purposes make to varying constellations of such
facts is any more apt than a dichotomy of similar reference to lead to con-
sequential insight and policy clarification.
An adequate theory for the analysis of practices and decisions must start
with .manageable conceptions of, and a careful distinguishing between, the
factual process of international coercion and the process of authoritative
decision by which the public order of the world community endeavors to
regulate such process of coercion. Each of those two distinguishable pro-
cesses has its own participants, seeking different objectives, acting by differ-
ent methods and being affected by differing conditions. Appropriate analysis
of the process of coercion may make possible intellectual isolation of the
major, recurring types of problems which raise common identifiable issues
of policy and which involve common patterns of conditioning factors. Such
analysis may also enable avoidance of the preoccupation with exercises in
derivation and legal syntactics in which scholars have unfortunately often
engaged with minimum reference to the actualities of coercion and violence
among states. An appropriate analysis of the process of authoritative de-
cision may permit, with respect to recurring problems, the more careful
observation and comparison through time of past trends in decisions, identi-
fication of the more important factors which have influenced and shaped
decision, delineation and appraisal of the policies which have been sought
in decisions, and projection of future probabilities of decision. And, finally,
from such analysis may emerge alternatives in the formulation and applica-
tion of policy 23 better designed to promote a world public order embodying the
undesirable on the ground that "legal thinking would degenerate into political arbitrari-
ness without the confining walls of the firmly established distinction between war and
peace." More accurately, "legal thinking" based on the distinction has been used to sup-
port political arbitrariness. See the statement of a North Korean representative at the
Korean armistice talks at Panmunjom in connection with the North Korean proposal that
the Soviet Union be included in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission: "Is your
[the United Nations] side now in a state of war with the Soviet Union? If not, how can
your side deny that the Soviet Union is a neutral nation apart from the two belligerents ?"
Quoted in Jessup, Should International Law Recognize an Intermediate Status Between
Peace and War., 48 AM. J. IN T' L. 98-99 (1954). See also Joy, How COMMuNIsTs
NEGOTIATE 90-101 (1955).
23. Some amplification of these intellectual tasks which the authors regard as indis-
pensable to policy-oriented inquiry may be found in Lasswell, The Political Science of
Science, 50 Am. PoL Sci. REv. 961, 977-78 (1956) ; Lasswell & McDougal, supra note 9,
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values commonly characterized as those of human dignity in a society of free-
dom and abundance.24
THE PROCESS OF COERCION
The factual process of coercion 25 across state boundaries may be usefully
described, in broadest generalization, in terms of certain participants apply-
ing to each other coercion of alternately accelerating and decelerating intensity,
for a whole spectrum of objectives, by methods which include the employment of
all available instruments of policy, and under all the continually changing
conditions of a world arena.2 6 In the course of this seamless process of
action and reaction, and as an integral part of it, participants also continu-
at 212-14; McDougal, El Derecho Internacional Como Ciencia Politica, 3 RrvisTA DE
DERECHo Y CIENCIAS SOCIALES 142, 149-50 (1956-57); McDougal, Law as a Process of
Decision: A Policy-Oriented Approach to Legal Study, 1 NATURAL LAw FORUM 53,
58-59 (1956) ; McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conwep-
tion, 82 HAGUE RECUEIL 137, 140-41 (1953).
24. For indication, in some detail, of the reference assigned to such values, see LAss-
wELL & McDOUGAL, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF A FRE SocIr: STUDIES IN LAW, SCIENCE
AND POLICY pt. 3, pp. 1-39 (mimeographed -materials, Yale Law School 1954); Bebr,
International Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, 29 PHI. L.J. 307, 314-28 (1954) ;
LASSWELL, Democratic Character, in THE POLITCAL WRITINGS OF HAROLD D. LASSWELL
465 (1951); Lasswell & Mcflougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 217-26 (1943) ; McDougal, International
Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 HAGUE RECUEIL 137, 188-91
(1953); McDougal & Leighton, The Rights of Man in the World Community: Constitu-
tional Illusions Versus Rational Action, 59 YALE L.J. 60-72 (1949).
25. We think of "process" as a complex of interacting variable factors moving through
time; its principal connotation is that of continual change in relationships over a time
period. See EASTON, THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 172-75 (1953); SNYDER, BRUCK & SAPIN,
DECISION-MAKING AS AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 54 (1954).
"Coercion" is used to refer to a high degree of constraint exercised by means of any or
all of the various instruments of policy, see text at note 73 infra, and with respect to all
values. Other terms used below are "force" and "violence." Unless otherwise indicated,
the reference of "force" is to the infliction of severe deprivations of the value well-being
through uses of the military instrument. "Violence" is used to refer to the most intense
attacks on well-being by means of military weapons. In this connection, see LASSWELL &
KAPLAN, POWVER AND SOCIETY 76, 90, 97-102 (1950).
26. For fuller description of these categorizations, see McDougal, International Law,
Power and Policy: A Contemporary Conception, 82 HAGUE REcuamn 137, 165-79 (1953).
Compare the categories which Talcott Parsons regards as necessary for the "minimum
differentiation of structural elements" in an "action frame of reference": "ends, means,
conditions and norms," PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION 732 (1937), and
those employed to describe processes of conflict by Professor Wright, International Con-
flict and the United Nations, 10 WoRLD PoiTes 24 (1957). See also WRIGHT, THE
STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 531-67 (1955); Wright, The Value for Conflict
Resolution of a General Discipline of International Relations, 1 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION
3 (1957). For a brief survey of contemporary efforts to describe, in mathematical terms,
social systems in processes of conflict and war, see Bernard, supra note 16, at 63-73. See
also the notational matrix scheme adopted in STRAUsz-HuPt & PossoNY, INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 45-49 (2d ed. 1954).
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ously assert against each other many varying claims respecting the lawful-
ness or unlawfulness of the various coercive practices employed by and
against them, invoking in support of their respective claims both world
prescriptions and world public opinion.
Participants
The historic participants in this process are customarily and summarily
described as the attacking and target states and their respective allies. 2'
For purposes of precision in description, however, as well as for the appli-
cation of certain sanctioning procedures such as those providing for criminal
liability,, one must frequently go behind the institutional abstraction "state"
and refer to the effective decision-makers, the officials or representatives,
political, military or otherwise, and members of the participating states.28
Recently the officials of international governmental organizations have be-
come formal and effective participants in this same process. The officials of
third states, while seeking to avoid direct roles in the process of coercion,
commonly take active part in the assertion of claims and counterclaims about
the lawfulness or unlawfulness of various exercises of coercion; to this
extent, they too should be listed as participants.
Nor does this list exhaust the groups and entities who in varying measure
27. For a typology, grounded on system analysis, of states as national actors in the
international system, see KAPLAN, SYSTE-M AND PROCESS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 54-
56 (1957). See also Wright, International Conflict and the United Nations, 10 WoR.LD
PoLiIcs 24, 34-37 (1957) ; Wright, Design for a Research Project on International Con-
flicts and the Factors Caui.ng Their Aggravation or Amelioration, 10 WESTERN POL Q.
263, 267-69 (1957).
28. See SNYDER, BRUCK & SAPIN, op. cit. supra note 25, at 35-54, for a suggested
framework for studies of states as decision-making units in the international arena. See
also SNYDER & FURNISs, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: FORMULATION, PRINCIPLES, AND
PROGRAMS 89-134 (1954) ; Easton, An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems, 9
WORLD POLITICS 383 (1957).
The concept of the elite, or top effective decision-makers, is of obvious relevance in the
determination of individual criminal responsibility under international law. The tribunal
in the High Command Trial, 12 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMItNALS 69-70 (1949),
said: "It is not a person's rank or status, but his power to shape or influence the policy
of his state, which is the relevant issue for determining his criminality under the charge
of Crimes against Peace. . . . Those who commit the crime are those who participate
at the policy making level in planning, preparing, or in initiating war. After war is
initiated, and is being waged, the policy question then involved becomes one of extending,
continuing or discontinuing the war. The crime at this stage likewise must be committed
at the policy making level." See also the Krupp Trial, 10 id. at 127-28 (1949) ; I. G. Farben
Trial, 10 id. at 37-38; THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE NuREMMG TRIBUNAL-
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 58-61 (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN 4/5) (1949) (memorandum sub-
mitted by the Secretary-General). Recent elite studies include: DE SoLA POOL, SATELLITE
GENERALS: A STUDY OF MILITARY ELITES IN THE SOVIET SPHERE (1955); LASSWEU.,
LERNER & ROTrrwELL, THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF ELITES (1952); LERNER, THE NAZI
ELITE (1951); MILLS, THE POWER ELITE (1956); NORTH, KUOMINTANG AND CHINESE
COMMUNIST ELITES (1952); SCHUELLER, THE POLT BURO (1951).
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effectively participate in the world power process and hence in the process of
coercion. A fuller listing would include those whom Dr. Schwarzenberger
called "the minor members of the international cast"2 9 : transnational political
parties, pressure groups, private associations and the individual person.3 0
Since the inception of the modern state system, however, states have been,
and in all probability will remain in the calculable future, the major and
most significant participants in the international coercion process; they are
ordinarily possessed of the greatest organized bases of power. Thus, states
and organizations of states must remain as the principal focus of inquiry.
The other participant groups and entities frequently either act through the
state or function as instrumentalities of state policy.
Objectives
The objectives of states participating in this process of coercion may, like
those of any actor in any system of action, be most broadly characterized
in terms of a maximization postulate: any particular participant acts
to maximize certain or all of its values in relation to the other participants
in the world arena.31 Such objectives embrace, in most general statement,
all the characteristic value demands of nation-states, including the demand to
protect and expand their own bases of power and other values and to weaken
or disintegrate the bases and values of those defined as enemies or potential ene-
mies. 32 On another level of abstraction, the objectives of any participant may be
generalized as a demand that the enemy accept certain terms with respect
to specified policies and accordingly alter its previous behavior 3a-for instance,
withdrawal or abstention from a hostile policy or projected policy, or affirma-
tive adoption of some policy demanded by the acting participant.3 4
29. SCHWARZENBERGER, PowER POLITICS 126-46 (2d rev. ed. 1951).
30. See McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Con-
ception, 82 HAGUE RECUEIL 137, 174, 237-56 (1953). These groups and entities, as well
as states and international organizations, are of course but specialized roles which the
individual human being creates for himself in satisfying, or attempting to satisfy, his value
demands. For comprehensive study of the extent to which the individual, through such
groups and entities, effectively participates in the world power process, see JEFFElREs, THE
INDIVIDUAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (unpublished thesis in Yale Law Library 1954).
31. See LASSWELL & KAPLAN, POWER AND SocIErY 69-70 (1950).
32. See, generally, KAPLAN, op. cit. supra note 27, at 149-65; HARTmANN, THE RELA-
TIONS OF NATIONS 68-82 (1957) ; MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 35-79 (2d rev.
ed. 1954); SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS 126-46 (2d rev. ed. 1951); SPYKMAN,
A.mxucA's STRATEGY IN WoRLD POLITICS 17-19 (1942); STRAuSz-HUp- & PossoNY,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1-21 (2d ed. 1954); Jessup, Ends and Means of American
Foreign Policy, in INTERNATIONAL SABILITY AND PROGRESS 11-21 (1957); Nitze, Aims
and Methods of United States Foreign Policy, 13 Bmr.. AToIic SCIENTISTS 292 (1957).
33. "The object on the part of each belligerent is to break down the resistance of the
other to the terms which he requires for peace." 2 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 53
(1907).
34. The descriptive categories abstention, withdrawal, co-operation, modification and
reconstruction are suggested by Lasswell, Political Factors in the Formulation of National
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A typology of the more particular demands of contending participants
might perhaps be constructed on the basis of a number of possible criteria,
such as the dominant value or values sought, the position assigned to par-
ticular demands in an order of priority established for the allocation of means
and the time dimension of objectives as "long-term" or "short-term."3 ; Such
a typology, while useful for descriptive and historical study, does not seem
essential for the purpose of clarifying fundamental legal policy. What is
necessary is a mode of characterizing the specific objectives of participants
which relates them more precisely to variables which do and should affect
the prescription and application of authority-a set of categories which may
and should be relevant in the making of community decisions about the
permissible or nonpermissible character of the coercion exercised to secure
such objectives. A few tentative categorizations may be suggested.
Consequentiality
At least three dimensions of consequentiality are relevant: the importance
and number of values affected, the extent to which such values are affected
and the number of participants whose values are so affected. A participant
may demand from another many values or only one or a few and may seek
to affect such values drastically and substantially or only to a modest degree.
A participant's objectives may relate to and affect the power and other
values of only one nation-state or of a number of nation-states. They may
even include a demand for a monopoly of power or other values from the
rest of the world community. The demands of participants may thus be of
almost infinite variety in degree of consequentiality; in terms of polar op-
posites, the possible range is from the most limited to the most compre-
hensive. More concretely, the spectrum of particular demands asserted
through coercion may range from such limited ones as the payment of a debt
owed by the target state or its nationals 36 or the temporary passage of
troops through its territory,37 through the relinquishment of the target state's
Strategy, 6 NAvAL WAR COLLEGE Ray. 19, 34-35 (1954). They are intended to describe the
responses sought by strategists in nation-states. For elaboration and illustration of this
mode of categorizing objectives, see McDouGAL & LAsswELL, WoRLD CoMMUNITY AND
LAW: A CONF.PORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW c. 3 (mimeographed materials, Yale Law
School 1955).
35. SNYDER, Bnucx & SAPiN, op. cit. supra note 25, at 60.
36. The blockade of Venezuela by British, German and Italian warships in 1902-03,
for example, was imposed as a result of the failure of the Venezuelan government to pay
certain claims of nationals of the blockading powers. See Venezuelan Preferential Case,
1 Scorr, HAGUE COURT REPORTS 55 (1916); 6 MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
§ 967, at 586-94 (1906).
37. In 1914, in its ultimatum to the Belgian government, Germany demanded permission
for German troops to march through Belgian territory, promising in return that "when
peace was concluded... Belgium and all its possessions should be protected to the fullest
extent, that its territory should be evacuated, and that if Belgium would preserve an attitude
of friendly neutrality towards Germany, the German government would engage to pay
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control over a specific portion of its territory 38 or acceptance of certain
limitations on its freedom of decision-making, 39 to the complete absorption
of the target state,40 the annihilation of its people 4 and the establishment of
a universal empire.42
Inclusiveness or Exclusiveness
The reference of the categorization suggested here is both to the degree of
participation admitted in the sharing of the values demanded and to the de-
gree of comprehensiveness of the identification system, the definition or inter-
pretation of "self," in the name of which value demands are made.43 The
demands of a participant may be exclusive and made on its own behalf
purely and simply; the "self" system may be restrictively defined to include
only the demanding participant's "primary self." Demands may, on the other
cash for all supplies needed by the German troops and would indemnify her for all damage
caused." 2 GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WOIRLD WAR 188 (1920).
38. The Soviet-Finnish war in 1939 was preceded by a demand of the Soviet govern-
ment for a thirty-year "lease" of certain islands in the Gulf of Finland and the cession
of certain areas at the head of the Gulf, the islands and areas totaling 2761 sq. kms., in
exchange for Soviet territory on the Finnish border with an area of 5529 sq. kms. These
demands were apparently prompted by Soviet concern over the security of Leningrad. See
THE FINNISH BLUE Boox: THE DEVELOPMENT OF FINNISH-SovIET RELATIONS DURING
THE AUTUMN OF 1939 INCLUDING THE OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS AND THE PEACE TREATY OF
MARCH 12, 1940, 13-19 (1940).
39. The Anglo-Soviet intervention in Iran in 1941 compelled the Shah's government
to accept, among other things, the stationing of Allied forces in Iranian territory for the
duration of the war and Allied control over means of communication and transportation
in Iran, and to undertake "not to adopt in [its] relations with foreign countries an attitude
... inconsistent with the alliance" forced on it by Britain and the Soviet Union. 'The Iranian
government continued to exist and its functions, except in the particulars specified in the
treaty of alliance, were not displaced. The text of the treaty is found in 6 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 249-52 (1942). See, generally, KIRK, THE MIDDLE EAST IN THE WAR, SURVEY
OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1939-1946, 129-41 (1952); LENCZOWSKI, RussIA AND THE
WEST IN IRAN, 1918-1948: A STUDY IN BIG-PowER RIvALRY 167-92 (1949).
40. The seizure and incorporation of Austria by Nazi Germany in 1938 is illustrative.
For a brief recounting of the events leading up to the annexation of Austria, see Judgment
of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremburg, in NAzI CONSPIRACY AND AooaES-
SION 17-24 (1947).
41. This is exemplified by the Nazi German policies toward the civilian population in
Poland and the Soviet Union. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg found
that "the evidence shows that at any rate in the east, the mass murders and cruelties were not
committed solely for the purpose of stamping out opposition or resistance to the German
occupying forces. In Poland and the Soviet Union these crimes were part of a plan
to get rid of whole native populations by expulsion and annihilation, in order that their
territory could be used for colonization by Germans." Id. at 66-67.
42. Among those who have attempted, after Rome, to re-establish a universal empire
are the Hohenstaufen, the Hapsburgs, Louis XIV, Napoleon, the Kaiser, Mussolini and
Hitler. 2 WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 966 (1942).
43. On identification or "self' systems, see LASSWELL & KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIET
11-13, 30-31 (1950).
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hand, be more inclusive and be asserted on behalf of a greater or lesser number
of other participants-even on behalf of "humanity" in general or the entire
world community; other participants are, for the time being at least, made
components of the expanded structure of the claimant's "self." Whether
the value demands pressed by any participant in any particular instance of
coercion are in fact, and not merely in the propagandist's word, inclusive
and the extent to which they are so, are, of course, matters for empirical
investigation. History exhibits no dearth of examples of states seeking
exclusive values by coercion; wars of conquest and self-aggrandizement-
in our own century, the Abyssinian adventure of Fascist Italy,44 Japan's
wars in Manchuria,45 China and southeast "Asia,46 and Nazi Germany's wars
in Europe 47 -- are only the most obvious ones. Perhaps the clearest recent
instance of relatively inclusive demands asserted forcefully is the United
Nations' enforcement action in Korea. Comparable instances may be found
in the last century in the collective action of the Great Powers in Europe to
restore the balance of power that Napoleonic France had disturbed,4 8 and
in the "humanitarian interventions" designed to compel the Ottoman Sub-
lime Porte to stop the persecution and massacre of its Christian subjects.49
44. See 2 SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1935: ABYSSINIA AND ITALY (Royal
Institute of Int'l Affairs 1936). The Committee of Six created by the Council of the
League of Nations found that the "Italian Government... resorted to war in disregard
of its covenants under Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations." LEAGUE OF
NATIONS OFF. J., 16th yr. 1223-25 (1935).
45. See, generally, SURvEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1931, 430-505 (Royal In-
stitute of Int'l Affairs 1932) ; SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1932, 432-67, 515-86
(Royal Institute of Int'l Affairs 1933); SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFARns 1933, 478-518
(Royal Institute of Int'l Affairs 1934). See also the Lytton Report which found that
there was "no question of Chinese responsibility" for "events since September 18, 1931."
This Report was adopted by the Assembly of the League of Nations on February 24, 1933.
See League of Nations Assembly Report on the Sino-Japanese Dispute, 27 AM. J. INT'L
L. 119, 147 (Supp. 1933).
46. See, generally, 1 SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1937, 154-305 (Royal Insti-
tute of Int'l Affairs 1938) ; The Far East 1942-1946, in SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1939-1946, 4-97 (Royal Institute of Int'l Affairs 1955); JONES, JAPAN'S NEW ORDER IN
EAST ASIA: ITS RISE AND FALL 1937-45 (1954); Horwitz, The Tokyo Trial, 465 INT'L
Conc. 475 (1950).
47. See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, in NAZI
CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 4-46 (1945).
48. See MOVROENTHAU, PoLiTics AMONG NATIONS 170-71 (2d rev. ed. 1954). 2
WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 749 (1942), emphasizes the relatively inclusive character of
balance of power policies. Cf. LAWRFNcE, PRINcIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 130-31 (7th
ed., Winfield 1928).
49. See STOWE.L, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 63-66 (1921). See also
HODGEs, THE DocTRINE OF INTERVENTION 87-96 (1915); 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 312-13 (8th ed., Lauterpacht 1955) (hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM-LAuTERPACHT) ;
THOMAS & THOMAS, NON-INTERvENTION 372-74 (1956). Garcia-Arias, La Intervenci6n
Internacional Por Causa de Humanidad, in FOUNDAPENTAL [sic] PROBLEMS OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW: FEsTscHRIrT FUR JEAN SPIROPOULOS 163 (1957), stresses the inclusive
nature of the purposes embodied in "humanitarian intervention."
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Extension or Conservation
A participant exercising coercion may be acting either to conserve and
defend values already enjoyed or to attack and acquire values held by
another. 0 Of course, in concrete situations of interstatal coercion, it may
be unusually hard to identify and distinguish demands of defense or "self-
preservation" from demands of attack or "self-extension"; vehemently pro-
claimed objectives of "self-preservation" may in fact disguise the most am-
bitious projects of "self-extension"; and the characterization of demands in
these terms is largely a function of the observer's definition of the material
time sequence within which initiation and response are to be distinguished
from each other. But difficult as it may be to draw a sharp line in theoretical
construction between conservation and extension, and as susceptible to ex-
travagant interpretation by partisan claimants as the distinction may be, the
distinction which the world public order has long emphasized in past pre-
scriptive formulation is important and will probably wisely continue to be
emphasized until the world community is much more effectively organized.
Relation to the Public Order of the Organized Community
A participant may be observed to be exercising coercion in support of
officials or organs of international governmental organizations or against
them. Categorization of participants' objectives in these terms of course
assumes that, in the particular instance of coercion considered, the decision-
making process in such organization was successfully activated and has
resulted in a decision, whether a formal "decision" or a "recommendation,"
with reference to which the objectives of specific participants may be ex-
amined for conformity or contrariety. So far as a participant other than
those originally involved in the situation of coercion is concerned, conformity
or contrariety to the decision would refer essentially to whether the new par-
50. Cf. the three-fold categorization adopted in HAAs & WHITING, DYNAmICS OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 59-69 (1956): "self-preservation," "self-extension" and "self-
abnegation"--a classification derived from Wolfers, The Pole of Power and the Pole of
Indifference, 4 WoRLD PoLITIcs 39, 50-63 (1951-52). See also MORGENTHAu, POLITICS
AMONG NATIONS 35-79 (2d rev. ed. 1954) : "policy of the status quo," "imperialism" and
"policy of prestige"; he concedes that the third is rarely sought for its own sake and is
much more frequently pursued in support of either the first or the second type of policy.
Characterization of objectives of contending participants in terms of extension or con-
servation of values is in line with contemporary sociological conceptualizations of conflict
which regard mutually exclusive or incompatible values as inevitable characteristics of
conflict. Incompatibility of values is conceived of as arising from "position scarcity"
and "resource scarcity." See Bernard, supra note 16, at 38, 41-42; Bernard, Parties and
Issues in Conflict, 1 J. CONFLICt RESOLUTION 111, 113 (1957); Mack & Snyder, The
Analysis of Social Conflict: Toward an Overview and Synthesis, 1 id. at 212, 218-19.
"Position scarcity" and "resource scarcity" are especially observable in the world arena
where the entire land surface of the globe, except the Arctic and the Antarctic areas, have
been so allocated among territorially based polities that extension of one polity must
always be at the expense of another.
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ticipant sided with the party determined, in the community decision, to be
exercising lawful defense or "police action" or with the party identified as
having impermissibly resorted to coercion. The action of the People's Re-
public of China, for instance, in joining the forces of the North Korean
authorities against the Republic of Korea and other members of the United
Nations, was an obvious contravention of the decision of the Security Council
embodied in its resolution of June 27, 1950, urging assistance to the Republic
of Korea.51 In such cases, to inquire into the concordance of a participant's
objectives with the world public order is implicitly to refer to that participant's
identification structure.
Conditions
The conditions under which participants resort to and exercise coercion
include all the variable and interacting component factors of a global power
process in a world arena.5 2 Such. variables-or, more precisely, the partici-
pants' "images" or estimations of them P- affect and influence both the expecta-
tions of the participants as to whether, in any given configuration of events, they
can more economically secure their objectives and value goals by coercion
than by persuasion, and their expectations of the level and techniques of coercion
required. A few of the more important variables on which an inquirer should
focus will be suggested.
The contemporary structure of the world arena, including the number,
power and posture of the participants is clearly of prime importance. Until
a few years ago, it was customary to present a picture of a world moving
rapidly toward the pattern of bipolarity, of power being more and more
rigidly structured around the hostile poles of two giant or "superpowers." 4
51. In resolution 498(V), Feb. 1, 1951, the General Assembly found "that the Central
People's Government of the People's Republic of China, by giving direct aid and assistance
to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities
against United Nations forces there has itself engaged in aggression in Korea." 1951 Y.B.
OF THE UNITED NATIoNs 224-25.
52. See Wright, Design for a Research Project on International Conflicts and the
Factors Causing Their Aggravation or Amelioration, 10 WESTERN POL. Q. 263, 269-70
(1957).
53. Cf. SNYDER, BRUCK & SAPIN, DECISION-MAKING AS AN APPROACH TO THE STUDY
OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 38 (1954).
54. See, e.g., GOODRICH & SImoNs, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE
OF INTERNATIONAL PEAcE AND SECURITY 23-44 (1955); LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS
FACES ECONOMiCS 15 (1945); MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 322-40 (2d rev.
ed. 1954); SCHWARZENBERGER, PoWER POLITICS 122-25 (2d rev. ed. 1951); SNYDER &
FuRNIss, AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: FORMULATION, PRINCIPLES AND PROGRAMS 579
(1954); WRIGHT, PROBLEMS OF STABILITY AND PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
76, 115, 235, 268 (1954) ; Buehrig, The United States, the United Nations and Bipolar
Politics, 4 INT'L ORGANizAnoN 573 (1950) ; de Luna, Fundamentaci6n del Derecho Inter-
nacional, 60 REvISTA DE D~aEcHO INTERNACIONAL 210, 230-34 (Cuba 1952); Fox, The
United Nations in the Era of Total Diplomacy, 5 INTL ORGANIZATIoN 265 (1951) ; Lass-
well, The Prospects of Cooperation in a Bipolar World, 15 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1948) ;
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In power and influence, all other nation-states were regarded as marginal or
submarginal in relation to either of the two superpowers, and as orienting or
tending to orient themselves firmly in policy and action toward one or the
other pole of power. Recently, some observers have been able to speak of a
"reversal," certainly at least of a deceleration, of the trend towards bipolar-
ism.mr Amorphous, fluctuating and unorganized groupings of "uncommitted"
states have appeared, which, by resisting pressures toward definitive align-
ment and becoming objects of competitive attention and blandishment on the
part of major powers mutually inhibited by approxiniately equivalent nuclear
capabilities, have acquired some mobility and freedom of action. 6 Whether,
or to what extent, a countertrend toward diversification of the patterns of
polarity has actually emerged is still hidden from sight. The basic fact remains,
however, that the two major powers continue to confront and engage each
other in hostile opposition, each seeking to match and balance every increment
of power achieved by the other. The arena of interaction is still a military one:
high levels of tension and insecurity and expectations both of catastrophic and
of limited violence continue to prevail and deeply affect the perspectives and
policies of all participants.57
Lasswell, The Interrelations of World Organization and Society, 55 YALE L.J. 889
(1946) ; Schwarzenberger, The Impact of the East-West Rift on International Law, 36
TRANSACT. GRoT. Sody 229, 231-32 (1950).
55. HAAS & WHITING, op. cit. supra note 50, at 530; RErTzEL, KAPLAN & COBLENz,
UNITED STATES FOREIGN PoLIcy 1945-1955, 317-18, 324, 425-26, 453-54, 457, 462 (1956).
See also Lippmann, Breakup of the Two-Power World, in FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL
POWER 777 (2d ed., Sprout & Sprout 1951) ; Morgenthau, Neutrality and Neutralisn, 11
Y.B. OF WORLD AFrAms 47, 67 (1957).
56. Ibid. Recently, simplification of the fluid political patterns or groupings in
the "uncommitted" Arab world has appeared: the creation of the United Arab Republic
by the union of Egypt and Syria under one president, one constitution and one flag, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 6, 1958, p. 1, col. 4, p. 5, cols. 1, 5; and the formation of the Arab Federal
State of Iraq and Jordan under one chief of state, id. Feb. 15, 1958, p. 2, col. 7, which
has been regarded by some observers as a possible counterweight to the United Arab
Republic, id. p. 2, col. 4. Each of the two new states has invited all other Arab states to
join it. Yemen has signed an agreement of federation with the United Arab Republic.
id. March 9, 1958, p. 19, col. 3. Earlier efforts to organize the Arab world centered
around the establishment of the Arab League. See AHEFD, REGIONALISM IN THE
MIDDLE EAST: THE ARAB LEAGUE (unpublished thesis in Yale Law Library 1955).
See also DiR, THE ARAB BLoc IN THE UNITED NATIONS chapters 4, 5 (1956).
On the Afro-Asian Bloc, particularly on the 1955 Bandung Conference, see KAMIN,
THE ASIAN-AFRICAN CONFERENCE, BANDUNG, INDONESIA, APRIL 1955 (1956); Parkin-
son, Bandung and the Underdeveloped Countries, 10 Y.B. OF WORLD AFFAMs 65 (1956).
57. "Precisely because national communities expect further international violence,
they seem to have resigned themselves to the recurrence of war ... Thus the expecta-
tion of future violence is part and parcel of political consciousness. As long as this
fatalistic mode of thought continues, no demonstration of interdependence can be ex-
pected to change national loyalties to devotion to a global system of values. Anticipation
of violence seems to breed continued acceptance of national values and interests and
not a desire to transcend them." HAAS & WHITING, op. cit. supra note 50, at 18-19. See
also WORLD TENSION-THE PSYCHOPATHOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Kisker
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The posture of each participant vis-a-vis every other participant is in-
fluenced, if not determined, by the relative inclusiveness or exclusiveness of
their identifications-their definition and redefinition of each other as, in vary-
ing degree, an ally or enemy or an "uncommitted." And the expectations of
each as to the continuing relative fighting capabilities-described in terms of
the combat "force-in-being," economic capacity, administrative competence,
motivation for war and defense and recuperative abilities 58--of itself, of its
allies, enemies and potential enemies, and of international policing agencies, are
written large in its formulation and execution of strategy. The range or
inclusiveness of a participant's identifications profoundly influence not only its
decisions about resort to coercion but also about the conduct of coercion.
Where a participant defines its opponent as an absolute enemy, one belonging
to a different mankind whose gods are utterly false and as such completely
excluded from its identification system, violence pitiless in its savagery may
be expected unless reprisals are feared. An eminent publicist, who anticipated
an insight furnished by contemporary studies on the sociology of war, wrote:
"It is almost a truism to say that the mitigation of war must depend
on the parties to it feeling that they belong to a larger whole than their
respective tribes or states, a whole in which the enemy too is comprised,
so that duties arising out of that larger citizenship are owed even to
him." 59
The expectations of participants as to the state of the technology and tech-
niques of coercion and violence available to themselves, their enemies and
potential enemies obviously weigh heavily in their estimation of the probable
costs of resorting or responding to coercion. The contemporary technology
of military violence has yielded basic-energy weapons and delivery systems
that perhaps have raised the possible costs of coercion to the annihilation of
entire nations and the conversion of large portions of their territories into
uninhabitable wastelands. Such may be the result of the type and degree of
destruction those weapon systems have made possible,60 the general vulner-
ed. 1951) ; LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY 52-74 (1935) ; Allport,
The Role of Expectancy, in TENSIONS THAT CAUSE WARS 43-78 (Cantril ed. 1950).
As to the possibilities of control of expectations of violence, see Lasswell, "Inevitable
War": A Problem in the Control of Long-Range Expectations, 2 WORLD POLITICS 1
(1949).
58. See KNORR, TE WAR POTENTIAL OF NATIONS (1956) ; STrAusz-Hupt & POSSONY,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 157-74 (2d ed. 1954) ; Knorr, Military Potential in the Nuclear
Age, in MILITARY POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 137-61 (Kaufmann ed. 1956) ; Knorr,
The Concept of Economic Potential for War, 10 WORLD POLITICS 49 (1957).
59. WESTLAKE, COLLECTED PAPERS ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 274 (Oppenheim
ed. 1914). See also MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 219 (2d rev. ed. 1954);
RENNr, WARFARE: THE RELATION OF WAR To SocIETY 20-21 (1939) ; SPEIER, SOCIAL ORDER
AND THE RISKS OF WAR C. 18 (1952).
60. In an exercise conducted by the Federal Civil Defense Administration in which
250 "dirty" nuclear or thermonuclear weapons representing 2,500 megatons, with damage
zones ranging from 3 to 5 miles, were "dropped" on cities, industrial targets and airfields
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ability to their use, the attractive possibilities they seem to offer of swiftly
overwhelming the enemy's will or ability to resist by shattering bombard-
ment of industrial and population centers and the expressed willingness of the
powers possessing them to carry out such massive nuclear bombardment."'
Modem weapons, particularly those capable of massive destruction, underscore
the enormous power differential between the major states who possess them
and the smaller ones who do not ;62 the distribution of these weapons at once
reflects and reinforces the structuring of power in the international arena.
Future developments in weaponry, presaged by artificial satellites and rocket
missiles, do not seem likely to reduce that differential.63  On the other
hand, should the possession of "space-weapons" become more widely diffused,
throughout the United States, "under a rather typical meteorological situation," the follow-
ing estimations of effects on the population (based on 1950 population figures) were made:
Dead Injured Uninjured
1st day 36,000,000 57,000,000 58,000,000
7th day 51,000,000 42,000,000 58,000,000
14th day 61,000,000 31,000,000 58,000,000
60th day 72,000,000 21,000,000 58,000,000
See Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Radiation of the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 92-96, 117-18 (1957); id. pt. 2, at 1539,
1549-63.
On the radiological effects on individuals of nuclear explosions, see Brues, Somatic
Effects of Radiation, 14 BuLL. ATOmic SCIENTISTS 12 (1958) ; Libby, Distribution and
Effects of Fall-Out, 14 id. at 27; Neuman, The Somatic Effects of Fission Products, 14 id.
at 15; Rotblat, Nuclear Weapons in War, 14 id. at 57.
On the genetic damage caused by atomic radiation, see Hearings, supra pt. 2, at 1564-
87, 1827-52; Crow, Genetic Effects of Radiation, 14 BULL. ATOmiC SCIENTISTS 19 (1958);
Muller, How Radiation Changes the Genetic Constitution, 11 id. at 329 (1955).
61. See, e.g., the British White Paper on Defense, Feb. 13, 1958, where the British
government declared that in case the Western Powers are attacked by the Soviet Union,
"even with conventional forces only," they would retaliate with strategic nuclear bombard-
ment. N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1958, p. 1, cols. 2-3. See also the note sent by the Soviet Union
to West Germany warning the latter that it would be a "veritable cemetery" in war if it
uses nuclear arms or permits such arms to be stationed in its territory. Id. April 28, 1957,
p. 1, col. 5, p. 27, cols. 1-2.
62. WRIGHT, PROnLEMS OF STABILI Y AND PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
74, 312-13 (1954); Wright, Modern Technology and the World Order, in TECHNOLOGY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 186 (Ogburn ed. 1949).
Surveys of the state of modem military weapon systems and techniques may be found
in BusH, MODERN ARS AND FREE MEN 12-47 (1949); Baldwin, The New Face of War,
12 BULL. ATo. ic SCIENTISTS 153 (1956).
63. A recent possibility is that of employing techniques of weather control and modifi-
cation as a weapon. Mr. H. T. Orville, Chairman, Advisory Committee on Weather Control,
is reported to have said that weather control could have results more disastrous than
atomic discoveries. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1958, p. 19, cols. 5-6. Dr. H. G. Houghton of
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has stated that "international control of weather
modification will be as essential to the safety of the world as control of nuclear energy
is now." Houghton, Other Aspects of Weather Modification: Present Pasition and Future
Possibilities of Weather Control, in 2 U.S. ADvisoRY COMM. ON WEATHER CONTROL,
FINAL REPORT 286, 288 (1957).
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even the ascertainment of the identity of the initiator of an attack may become
extremely difficult for the target-state.6 4
Improvements in the means of applying coercion have not, of course, been
limited to the field of military weapons. Refinements in the techniques of
economic pressure, and of propaganda and subversion, as well as relative
capability and vulnerability in respect of their use, form part of the complex
of factors conditioning participants' expectations of the value costs of exer-
cising coercion.
Attention may also be appropriately focused on the major trends observable
in the world social process which affect, and are themselves affected by, the
pursuit by nation-states of power and other values through coercion. 5 Among
the more obvious of these trends is the increase in frequency and intensity of
contact and interaction among peoples made possible by the modem inventions
in communication and transportation, which have drastically shrunk physical,
economic and strategic distances between states and fostered the rapid diffu-
sion and unification of material culture.66 This trend has in turn contributed
to and probably accelerated the rising unity of demand among peoples every-
where for wider participation in the production and sharing of all values and
for opportunity so to participate free from coercion and apprehensions of
coercion.67 A somewhat parallel trend. is manifested in the growing interde-
pendences of the same peoples in the attainment of their demanded values.68
64. Such a situation would present obvious difficulties in the determination of responsi-
bility for aggression. The Indian representative to the Sixth Committee pointed out that
"one of the key questions which arose in any attempt to define aggression was to find out
who had attacked first. In an atomic war, quick action gave a decisive advantage and it had
become extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine who had made the first move.
New developments in science had a tendency to alter old established notions, and had raised
new problems of great complexity." U.N. Doc. No. A/C.6/SR.52, at 13 (1957).
65. See Stone, International Law and Contemporary Social Trends: Some Reflections,
29 RocKY MT. L. REV. 149 (1957).
66. E.g., MENDE, WORLD POWER IN THE BALANCE c. 2 (1953); M ITRANY, PROGRESS
OF INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 101, 115 (1933); STALEY, WoRLD EcONOMY IN TRAN-
SITION 3-20 (1939); WoYTINSKY & WOYTINSKY, WORLD COMMERCE AND GOVERNMENTS
c. 7 (1955); 1 WIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 204-08 (1942); 2 id. at 1241-46; Angell,
International Communication and the World Society, in THE WORLD COMMUNITY 145
(Wright ed. 1948) ; Brown, Science, Technology and International Relations, in THE
CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 19 (1956); Hart, Technology
and the Growth of Political Areas, in TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 28
(Ogburn ed. 1949) ; Leigh, The Mass-Communications Inventions and International Re-
lations, in id. at 126; Ogburn, Aviation and International Relations, in id. at 86; Wright,
Modern Technology and the World Order, in id. at 174.
67. See, e.g., 1 WRIGHT, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A BALANCE SHEET 6
(1955); WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 170-81 (1942); Kirk, Mass Aspirations and Inter-
national Relations, in THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 1
(1956); Berle, The Peace of Peoples, 77 HAGUE RECUEIL 1 (1950) ; Lasswell, The Inter-
relations of World Organization and Society, 55 YALE L.J. 889, 903-08 (1946).
68. See EAGLETON, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT 7-12 (3d ed. 1957); EAGLET N, THE
FoRcss THAT SHAPE OUR FUTURE 9-29 (1945) ; HAAS & WHITING, DYNAMICS OF INTER-
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The fact of interdependence is exhibited in every value-institutional process:
power interacts with power throughout the world arena, with wealth, en-
lightenment, respect and every other value; wealth interacts with wealth, power
and all other values, and so on.69 The patterns and degrees of interdependences in
the international system, and the resulting aggravated sensitivity of the entire
structure of that system,70 must affect the estimates of participants of the
probable value costs of coercion and violence.
Increased interaction, expanding uniformity of material culture, rising
common demands and interdependence might be supposed to be leading
eventually toward a world of greater integration, freedom, peace and abund-
ance. The fact is, however, that there are at least equally conspicuous trends,
stimulated by chronic tensions, insecurity and expectations of violence, of ever
greater centralization and concentration of power within the state apparatus,
of increasingly comprehensive governmentalization and regimentation, of in-
tensifying politicization of all internal value processes.7 ' These trends, which
vitally affect many of the detailed policies of the law of war, may, by hardening
national frontiers into walls of insulation and thereby establishing conditions
which have been described as the "nationalization of truth" and the "breakdown
of human communication," 72 effectively counter and nullify the forces moving
toward integration and co-operation. The problem of regulating international
coercion and violence may well be, in its most fundamental aspect, one of con-
trolling, decelerating and reversing these fractionalizing trends.
NATIONAL RELATIONS 1-10 (1956); KALIjARvx, MODERN WORLD POLITIcs c. 8 (3d ed.
1953); LEvI, FUNDAMENTALS OF WORLD ORGANIZATION c. 3 (1950); MuIR, THE INTER-
DEPENDENT WORLD AND ITS PROBLEMS (1933) ; Commission To Study the Organization
of Peace, Fourth Report, 396 INT'L CONc. 97-101 (1944); Cole, International Economic
Interdependence, 369 id. at 240 (1941).
69. For detailed exposition, see McDOUGAL & LASSWELL, WoRLD COMMUNITY AND
LAW: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW c. 9 (mimeographed materials, Yale Law
School 1955).
70. "[T]he interdependence of all its parts makes the modern order much more
sensitive than a simpler form of economic organization. Indeed, the more minutely the
individual parts of a large mechanism fit into one another, and the more closely the single
elements are bound up together, the more serious are the repercussions of even the
slightest disturbance. . . [I]n the world economy of the present day overproduction
in one market becomes the misfortune of other markets. The political insanity of one
country determines the fate of others .. .since the interdependence of the modern social
organism transmits the effects of every maladjustment with increased intensity." MANN-
HEIM, MAN AND SocmTY IN AN AGE OF RECONSTRUCTION 50 (1950).
71. See LASSWELL, THE WORLD REVOLUTION OF OUR TIME 36-39 (1951) ; LASSWELL,
THE ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR 146-57 (1948); WRIGHT, PROBLEMS OF STA-
BILITY AND PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 150, 273-74, 300-01 (1954). See also
Ayala, Liberty, Security and Modern Technology, 2 INT'L Soc. SC. BULL. 326 (1950).
72. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS xli-xliii; Stone, Of Sociological Inquiries Concerning
International Law, in FOUNDAMENTAL [SiC] PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, FEST-
SCHRIFT FUR JEAN SPIROPOULOS 411, 414, 418-19 (1957); Stone, International Law and
International Society, 30 CAN. B. REv. 164, 170-71 (1952).
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Methods
The methods by which participants engage each other in coercion to effect
the realization of their objectives include all the contemporary instruments of
policy, employed in varying combination and sequence and with constantly
changing-not simply dichotomous-degrees of intensity. These instruments
or types of strategy may be conveniently categorized according to the distinc-
tive means employed: negotiation, words, goods or arms; and the distinctive
effects sought: the unity or disunity of elites or of masses, abundance or
scarcity, protection or destruction.73 The resulting categories permit distinction
between the diplomatic, the ideological, the economic and the military instru-
ments. Each of these instruments may obviously be used either singly or in
combination with any or all of the others to achieve the desired level of
coercion.
The diplomatic instrument has traditionally been concerned with the char-
acteristic channels and rituals of interelite or interofficial communications and
negotiations .7 4 The coercive impact of a use of diplomacy may be the direct
result of the content of the communication conveyed: the communication may
contain a threat of grievous deprivations, exemplified by Nazi Germany's threat
in 1939 to destroy Prague by bombardment from the air unless President Hacha
accepted immediate German occupation of the Czech state.7 5 It may, on the
other hand, be the net effect of complex diplomatic strategy designed to isolate
or encircle the target-state by securing from third states either agreements to
support the initiator-state 76 or by inducing them to withdraw or withhold sup-
port from the target.77 Some measure of coercion may perhaps also be achieved
by the denial or withdrawal of access to internal arenas of authority through
the refusal of recognition or the suspension or termination of diplomatic
relations. Here, however, the coercion effectively exerted on the target-state
may be so slight as to be largely "symbolic" and nominal.
73. McDouGAL & LASSWELL, WORLD COMMUNITY AND LAW: A CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW c. 9 (mimeographed materials, Yale Law School 1955).
74. See, generally, THE DIPLOMATS 1919-1939 (Craig & Gilbert ed. 1953) ; HAAS &
WHITING, op. cit. supra note 68, c. 7; MowAT, DIPLO MACY AND PEACE (1935); NICOLSON,
THE EVOLUTION OF DIPLOMATIC METHOD (1954); NICOLSON, DIPLOMACY (2d ed. 1950);
SATOW, A GUIDE TO DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE (4th ed. 1957); STRAusz-HuPt & PossoNY,
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS C. 10 (2d ed. 1954); WELLESLEY, DIPLOMACY IN FETTERS
(1944). On communist techniques of diplomacy, see NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS
(Dennett & Johnson ed. 1951) ; Joy, How COMMUNISTS NEGOTIATE (1955).
75. 3 SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1938,266-69 (Royal Institute of Int'l Affairs
1953), contains an account of Hacha's interview with Hitler.
76. E.g., the efforts of the French ambassador to Moscow in 1936-38 to secure a
tight military alliance between France and the Soviet Union to contain Nazi Germany.
THE DIPLOMATS 1919-1939, c. 18 (Craig & Gilbert ed. 1953).
77. The efforts of Premier Bulganin to weaken the NATO alliance by sending diplo-
matic notes to each of the members containing pointed reminders of their vulnerability
to nuclear retaliatory blows, which efforts apparently stimulated a "neutralist trend" among
some members, afford recent illustration. N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 1957, p. 34, cols. 1-2;
id. Dec. 18, 1957, p. 1, col. 7.
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The use of the ideological instrument commonly involves the selective
manipulation and circulation of symbols, verbal or nonverbal, calculated to
alter the patterns of identifications, demands and expectations of mass audi-
ences in the target-state and thereby to induce or stimulate politically signifi-
cant attitudes and behavior favorable to the initiator-state.78 It includes, in
combination with other instruments, all the techniques of propaganda, infiltra-
tion, subversion and coup d'itat which have been refined and developed to
such high efficiency as to have given rise to repeated proposals to condemn
their use for certain objectives as a distinct form or mode of aggression.79
The particular shape of ideological strategy will of course depend on the
definition of the target as ally, enemy or "uncommitted." Specific strategies
may include the creation and fomentation of attitudes oriented toward absten-
tion or withdrawal from a hostile policy or toward co-operation with or in-
corporation in the initiator state. They may also include the incitation of the
audience to the violent reconstruction of the elite structure or the decision-
making process in the target-state.8 0 The highly emotionalized appeals for the
overthrow and assassination of the King of Jordan which the Egyptian radio
and press directed to the Jordanian people are among the more recent instances
of such a strategy."- So-called "propaganda of the deed" may range from an
offer and shipment of relief goods in case of disaster to the carefully timed
announcement or demonstration of new weapons82
78. See MURTY, THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF THE IDEOLOGICAL INSTRUMENT
OF COERCION (unpublished thesis in Yale Law Library 1957) ; HAAS & WHITING, op. Cit.
supra note 68, c. 9; LASSwRLL, PROPAGANDA TECHNIQUE IN THE WORLD WAR (1927);
PROPAGANDA IN WAR AND CRISIS (Lerner ed. 1951) ; LERNER, SYKEwAR: PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE: AGAINST GERMANY, D-DAY TO V-E DAY (1949) ; LINEBARGER, PSYCHOLOGICAL
WARFARE (2d ed. 1954) ; SELZNICK, THE ORGANIZATIONAL WEAPON: A STUDY OF BOLSHE-
VIK STRATEGY AND TACTICS (1952); SPRIER, SOCIAL ORDER AND THE RISKS OF WAR
chapters 26, 27, 29, 32 (1952) ; STRAUsz-Hupk & POSSONY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
chapters 17-19 (2d ed. 1954) ; Ferreus, The Menace of Communist Psychological Warfare,
1 ORDis 97 (1957); Lasswell, Propaganda, 12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 521
(1934) ; Speier, International Political Communication: Elite v. Mass, 4 WORLD PoITICS
305 (1952).
79. See, e.g., the draft definition of aggression by the Soviet Union submitted to the
1956 Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression, U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.
77/L.13, annex II, at 1-3 (1957) (distinguishing between "indirect" and "ideological
aggression") ; the definition drafted by China, id. annex I, at 8-9; the definition submitted
by Bolivia to the 1953 Special Committee, id. annex I, at 10; the definition proposed by
the Philippines to Committee III of the Third Commission of the 1945 San Francisco
Conference, Secretary-General, Question of Defining Aggression, U.N. Doc. No. A/2211,
fI 115 (1952); and arts. 2(5), (6), Draft Code of Offenses Against the Peace and
Security of 'Mankind, International Law Comm'n, 3d Sess., Report, U.N. GEN. Ass.
OFF. REC., 6th Sess., Supp. No. 9, ff 9 (A/1858) (1951).
80. See MURTY, op. cit. supra note 78, chapters 2, 7.
81. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1957, p. 1, col. 4. The Egyptian appeals gave rise to
demonstrations in Damascus, Syria, by Palestine refugees calling for the death of the
King of Jordan. Id. Nov. 12, 1957, p. 1, col. 6.
82. See Brodie, Military Demonstration and Disclosure of New Weapons, 5 WORLD
POLITICS 281 (1953).
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The employment of economics as an instrument of coercive policy may, in
broad statement, be described as the management of access to a flow of
goods, services and money, as well as to markets, with the end of denying
the target-state such access while maintaining it for oneself. All the familiar
methods of economic warfare developed in the last two World Wars may be
included, such as the blocking or "freezing" of the target's assets; the imposi-
tion of import and export embargoes, total or selective; "blacklisting" of
foreign firms and individuals who deal with the target-state; drying up of
foreign supplies by preclusive buying; control of re-exportation from a non-
participant's territory; and control of shipping through selective admission to
credit, insurance, stores, fuel, port and repair facilities.8 3 These by no means
exhaust the available economic techniques of exercising coercion. The monetary
system of the target-state may be substantially impaired by skillful manipula-
tion of foreign exchange markets, withdrawal or refusal of credits, dumping
of large quantities of currency to compel the target-state to pay in gold, by
psychological methods calculated to cast doubt on the target-state's ability or
willingness to pay and by simple counterfeiting of its currency. 4 Other tech-
niques include the creation of artificial scarcity and high prices and the retarding
of technological development through cartelization schemes and the control of
patents,8 5 the refusal to grant loans or to pay for previous loans, and, of course,
the taking, expropriation or confiscation of enterprises and property of na-
tionals of the target country. In the last category, the most recent striking
example is the taking over or "supervision" of banks, factories, plantations,
commercial establishments and other properties of Dutch nationals by the
government of Indonesia,8 6 in apparent retaliation for the refusal of the Neth-
erlands to transfer sovereignty over West New Guinea. One other variety of
economic strategy that deserves particular mention is the granting or with-
holding of "foreign aid." Foreign aid programs may be provided with mechan-
isms of donor control: the initial grant of money, goods, technical assistance
or military arms, and the subsequent continuation of the flow, may be made
contingent upon the accommodation or co-ordination of the recipient's policies
with those of the donor.8 7 Foreign aid and foreign investment may also be
83. Detailed accounts of these techniques may be found in BAILEY, THE POLICY OF
THE UNITED STATES TOWARDS NEUTRALS, 1917-1918 (1942) ; BASCH, THE NEW EcoNoMic
WARFARE (1941) ; EINziG, EcONOMIc WARFARE 1939-1940 (1941) ; GORDON & DANGERFIELD,
THE HIDDEN WEAPON: THE STORY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE (1947); JACK, STUDIES IN
ECONOMIC WARFARE (1941) ; 1 MEDLIcOTT, THE ECONOMIC BLOCKADE (1952) ; RITCHIE,
THE NAVICERT SYSTEM DURING THE WORLD WAR (1938); SINEY, THE ALLIED BLOCK-
ADE OF GERMANY 1914-1916 (1957) ; Wu, ECONOMIC WARFARE (1952) ; .Medlicott, Eco-
nornic Warfare, in THE WAR AND THE NEUTRALS, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
1939-1946, 1-104 (Royal Institute of Int'l Affairs 1956).
84. STRAUSz-HUI't & PossoNY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 509-16 (2d ed. 1954).
85. Wu, EcoNoMIc WARFARE 146-84 (1952).
86. N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1957, p. 1, col. 3.
87. See HAAs & WHITING, DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 233-42 (1956).
See also the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act, 65 STAT. 644 (1951), 22 U.S.C. §
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managed to effect the penetration and perhaps the reorientation and eventual
capture of the economic and political structure of the recipient. 88
While substantial degrees of coercion may be achieved by the skilled utiliza-
tion of the diplomatic, ideological and economic instruments, the attainment of
the maximum intensity of coercion normally requires the supplementation of such
instruments with military force. Contemporary military weapons and weapon
systems are unique in at least two aspects. They present a wide spectrum of
degrees of destructive capability: in terms of the number of men one man can
kill by a single operation, the range is from one-to-one weapons such as
bayonets and pistols, to weapons of theoretically unlimited capability such as
thermonuclear explosives and biological weapons.8 9 The other aspect relates
to the high degree of mechanization and automatism of modern weapons,
presently exemplified par excellence in the long-range ballistic missile, and
to the tendencies toward the "depersonalization" of the process of violence and
the "dehumanizing" of armies that flow from the interposition of space and
mechanical-automatic devices between the attacker and his target.90 Both the
1611 (1952), which declares it to be the "policy of the United States that no military,
economic, or financial assistance shall be supplied to any nation unless it applies an embargo
on such shipments [of strategic materials] to any nation or combination of nations threat-
ening the security of the United States, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and all countries under its domination." The act requires the termination of all military,
economic or financial assistance to any nation that "knowingly permits" such shipment;
however, the President may direct the continuation of aid, if the shipments are not of
"arms, ammunition, implements of war, and atomic energy materials" and if he determines
that "cessation of aid would clearly be detrimental to the security of the United States."
Once terminated, aid can be resumed "only upon determination of the President that
adequate measures have been taken by the nation concerned." No case has occurred where
a recipient of United States aid intentionally exported arms, ammunitions or atomic ma-
terials to the Soviet Bloc. THE STRATEGIC TRADE CONTROL SYSTEM 1948-1956, 12 (Ninth
Report to Congress on Operations Under the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act of
1951, 1957).
On the difficulties of insulating "foreign aid" programs from the rest of the foreign
policy of the donor or grantor country, see Schelling, American Aid and Economic De-
velopment: Some Critical Issues, in INTERNATIONAL STABILITY AND PROGRESS 121 (1957).
On the objectives of United States foreign aid programs, see U.S. FOREIGN AID 11-56
(McClellan ed. 1957).
It hardly needs to be added that provision for donor or grantor control does not
pre-empt the character of the objectives sought by the donor or grantor, which may be
entirely legitimate legally and morally.
88. Cf. STRAusz-HuPt & POSSONY, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 516-19 (2d ed. 1954).
See also KNORR, RUBLE DIPLOMACY: CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN FOREIGN AID (Center of
International Studies, Mem. No. 10, 1956).
89. Cf. MORGENTHAU, PoriTics AMONG NATIONs 351-52 (2d rev. ed. 1954).
90. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLs 339; cf. NEF, WAR AND HUMAN PROGRESs 371-74 (1950);
LIDDELL HART, THE REVOLUTION IN WAIRFAR 32-37 (1947). "The multiplication of machin-
ery has sterlized the romance of war, by diminishing the value of human qualities. Courage
and skill are of little avail against a superiority of machinery." Id. at 117. The process of
depersonalization of the means of war started with the discovery of gunpowder which
marked the beginning of "the technological epoch of war, the hidden impulse of which is
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vast destructiveness and the depersonalization of the process of military vio-
lence may be expected to affect significantly many of the fundamental policies of
the law of war. For instance, the further diminution of face-to-face confronta-
tion between contending troops may result in the reduction of the "principle
of chivalry" to vestigial import for all save the historian of the law of war.91
From the foregoing brief and impressionistic references to the categories of
means of policy, it should be evident that many varying intensities of coercion
may be obtained, and that various types and degrees of destruction will result,
from differing uses of different instruments or combinations of instruments.
The possible range is from the mildest to the most intense coercion, from
minor damage to the prestige of the opponent state, for instance, to its perman-
ent physical liquidation. The intensity of the coercion which a participant
applies and the level of destruction that it seeks or secures bear a close relation
to the nature and scope of the objectives it sets for itself. The relationship is
approximately one of direct proportionality: the more comprehensive and
ambitious the objective is, the higher tend to be both the degree of intensity
of coercion which must be applied and the level of destruction effected to
achieve such objective, for the greater will be the target's resistance.92 Par-
ticipants ordinarily tend to apply a degree of coercion and quantum of destruc-
tion roughly proportionate to the scope of their objective and the value they
assign to it. The obvious implication for legal policy would seem to be that
the elimination of the human element both physically and morally, intellect alone remain-
ing." FuLLER, ARMAMENT AND HISTORY 77 (1945).
91. Cf. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS 337.
92. This is one of the principal lessons to be derived from Clausewitz's thinking, which
stressed that the political objective must dominate and delimit both the immediate military
aim and the military effort. Clausewitz wrote: "The smaller the sacrifice we demand from
our adversary, the slighter we may expect his efforts to be to refuse it to us. The slighter,
however, his effort, the smaller need our own be. Furthermore, the less important our
political object, the less will be the value we attach to it and the readier we shall be to
abandon it For this reason also our efforts will be the lighter. Thus the political object
as the original motive of the war will be the standard alike for the aim to be attained by
military action and for the efforts required for this purpose." VON CLAusEwxTz, ON WAR
9 (Jolles transl. 1943).
Cf. MAURICE, BRITISH STRATEGY: A STUDY OF THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES
OF WAR 73 (1929) : 'War being a political act, the political object must govern the other
objects of war. The political object may be such as to require the complete conquest of
the enemy; or it may be obtained if the enemy is compelled to sue for peace on terms
satisfactory to the Government; or the object !may be to induce other powers to join as
allies; or it may be to cause the enemy to abandon the purpose for which he went to war.
Each of these objects influences variously the amount of force required to gain the object
and the method of employing that force." Maurice offers historical examples of the opera-
tion of this principle. Id. at 73-76. See also CoRBErr, SOME PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME
STRATEGY chapters 3, 4 (1919) ; LMDELL HART, STRATEGY chapters 21-22, especially at 369-70
(1954); NicRmsoN, CAN WE LIMIT WAR? 32-33 (1934).
This lesson from Clausewitz on the predominance of the political objective has not
been lost on Soviet political and military strategists. See GARTHOFF, SoviEr MILITARY
DociimN 12-13 (1953).
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limitation of the degree of coercion and destruction depends in great measure
upon limitation of objectives.93
Apart from the corporal dissolution sought by Rome and inflicted by Scipio
on Carthage, it is difficult to point to historical examples of totally unlimited
belligerent objectives and applications of the absolute maximum of destruction.
Some instances may be noted, however, where the objectives of participants
and the degree of destruction they applied approached the upper extremes
of theoretical ranges of comprehensiveness and intensity: the wars of Genghis
Khan, the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the French
Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, and the two World Wars furnish ready
examples. Where the objective is more modestly defined and valued and
where violent destruction is not specified as an end in itself, the coercive use
of instruments of policy is commonly designed, not to destroy the enemy, but
rather to modify the expectations entertained by the effective decision-makers
in the enemy state and to create new expectations of net advantage in adopting
the policies demanded by the acting participant.94 Prominent among the moti-
vations of participants is, of course, a desire not to provoke retaliatory destruc-
tion which necessarily raises the costs of achieving an objective. Coercion and
destruction in excess of the amount necessary to reconstruct the expectation
structure of the enemy elite represent inefficient and wasted expenditures of
force and constitute an invitation to costily retaliation. Underlying the pro-
cesses of coercion is a fundamental principle of economy. Concise exposition
of this principle is offered by Professor Osgood:
"It [the principle of economy of force] prescribes that in the use
of armed force as an instrument of national policy no greater force
should be employed than is necessary to achieve the objectives toward
which it is directed; or, stated in another way, the dimensions of military
force should be proportionate to the value of the objectives at stake."95
93. "The decisive limitation upon war is the limitation of the objectives of war."
OSGOOD, LIMITED WAR: THE CHALLENGE TO AMERICAN STRATEGY 4 (1957). See also
FUaRNss, AmERicAN MILITARY POLICY 114, 127-30 (1957) ; KISSINGER, NUCLEAR WEAPONS
AND FOpGN POLC 87, 140-41 (1957) ; Kaufmann, Limited Warfare, in MILITARY POLIcY
AND NATIONAL SECURITY 102, 126-27 (Kaufmann ed. 1956) ; Brodie, More About Limited
War, 10 WORLD PouTncs 112 (1957).
94. The Spanish-American War of 1898 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 have
been suggested as examples of the limitation of war by restriction of political objec-
tives. NICYERSON, CAN WE LIMIT WAR? 32 (1934). The Korean War of 1950 is another,
more recent, illustration.
95. OSGOOD, op. cit. supra note 93, at 18. Compare the particularized application of
"economy of force!' as a principle of military strategy and tactics in GARTHOSY, SOVIET
MILITARY DOCTRINE c. 7 (1953) ; MAURICE, op. Cit. supra note 92, c. 6; Brown, The Prin-
ciples of War, 75 U.S. NAvA INsTITUTE PRoc. 621, 630-31 (1949).
The specific limitations imposed upon conduct by application of a principle of economy
in force must vary with both purpose and the segment of time into which purpose is pro-
jected. Force that is unnecessary for a limited objective may be necessary for a more
comprehensive objective, and force that is economic in the short run may be most uneco-
nomic in the long run.
The objection is sometimes made that a formulation in terms of economy in force
lacks realism because it assumes that men act only from rational and conscious expecta-
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To the student of history, the coincidence of "economy of force" as an under-
lying principle of the rational application of coercion with "military necessity"
as a basic principle of the law of war will be apparent.
Claims
It is, of course, the claims and counterclaims which the contending partici-
pants make against each other about the lawfulness or unlawfulness of their
various coercive practices which are of most immediate and detailed concern
to an inquiry into law. For it is these opposing claims as to the requirements
of authority which, in many differing particular contexts, constitute the
specific controversies to which authoritative decision-makers must respond in
search of resolution. A categorization of such claims must therefore be achieved
tions and do not err. The usefulness of a principle of economy in force is not, however,
dependent upon any such assumption. It may be agreed that men act from unconscious
as well as conscious motivation, that they often err, and indeed that all events are subject
to an unknown degree of chance variation. The only assumption necessary to the useful-
ness of a formulation in terms of economy in force is the assumption that men may, by
modification of their conscious attitudes, in some measure anticipate through time the
probable effects of alternative courses of action and thus either maximize their gains or
minimize their losses. See BRoss, DESIGN FOR DEcisioN (1953); KNIGHT, RIsE, UNCER-
TAINTY AND PROFIT (1921); SPROUT & SPROUT, MAN-3ILIEU RELATIONSHIP HYPOTHESS
IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1956).
The usefulness of formulations in terms of economy in force extends to various intel-
lectual tasks. Past applications of coercion may be described in terms of the actors'
objectives and calculations of proportionality, and comparison may be made of effects
achieved. The hypothesis of economy in action for the maximization of gains and mini-
mization of losses may also be applied to processes of coercion, as of persuasion, to stimulate
comprehensive and detailed inquiry about variables in context which do in fact affect
choices. Formulations in terms of economy in force, specifically related to community
perspectives both of purpose and proportionality, may, further, be projected into the future
as appropriate criteria for authoritative decision. Whatever successes the law of war
has in the past achieved, and there have been some, are testimony to the efficacy of this
effort.
It is sometimes suggested that men shape the proportion of their violence not so much
from perspectives of economy, or of humanitarianism, as from fear of reprisals. The short
answer is that minimizing risks of reprisal is precisely an aspect of economy in force. An ap-
plication of force that results in the applier's sustaining retaliatory destruction can scarcely
be described as economic. In terms of effects upon the humanitarian goals we recommend,
moreover, it does not matter too much whether decision to limit destruction is based upon
calculation of long-term self-interest, whether for preserving potential assets or minimizing
risks of retaliation, or upon humanitarianism for fellow man. The contemporary world
arena is so tight that none of the scorpions is likely to forget the danger from the others
or entirely to ignore a practical humanitarianism which includes the self. To have the
prescription and application of law dependent upon a nice interrelation of reciprocities
and potential retaliations is no new found halliday. MALINOwSKI, CRIME: AND CUSTOM IN
SAVAGE SociErY (1926). The fact that the same participants in the world arena
who on some occasions are belligerents are on other occasions authoritative decision-
makers merely facilitates the transformation of the principle by which self-interest is cal-
culated into the community expectations about common interest which are called inter-
national law.
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which will enable an inquirer to identify both uniquely applicable policies and
uniquely determining conditioning or explanatory factors in the recurring
types of controversy. For tentative, working purposes, the following seven-
fold set of broad groupings, which move from the initiation through the
management to the termination of coercion, is suggested. The focus is primar-
ily upon the military instrument, and claims are paired in terms of assertion
and opposition.
Initiation of Coercion
In this type of problem, 6 the primary claim is that, to achieve objectives,
coercion of high intensity, which ordinarily means the destructive use of the
military instrument, may lawfully be initiated. Frequently, it may be more
accurate to speak of a claim lawfully to intensify drastically the degree of
coercion already being applied by and between the claimant and the target.
The opposing claim is that such anterior coercion or intensification is not
lawful and that unlawful violence gives a right to respond in self-defense
with counterviolence.
Participation in Coercion
Here, two types of problems are posed by two distinguishable sets of oppos-
ing claims. In the first set, one claim is that states other than the initiator
and the target, as members of international governmental organizations, are
required to, or may lawfully, participate in community action organized to
repress coercion and violence designated as unlawful. This is opposed by
the claim that nonparticipation in community intervention, "neutrality,"
is permissible. In the second set, the claim that third states which escape
involvement refrain from participation in augmenting the bases of the enemy's
war-making power is paired against the claim that participants refrain from
interfering with the nationals, resources and operations, of nonparticipants.
Management of Combat Situations
The problems here are created by the opposing claims of the contending
belligerents about the detailed modalities of the violence by which they seek
forcibly to deprive each other, by capture or destruction, of bases of power
and to secure compliance with terms. In more detail, the claim is to apply
a certain quantum of violence through the employment of certain combatants
and certain weapons in certain areas of operation against certain objects of
attack. The countering claim is that such violence is unnecessary, dispro-
portionate or pointless, and therefore inhuman and unlawful, or in cor-
96. Our reference here is to the fact of resort to coercion. In the second article
in this series, appearing in the American Journal of International Law under the title "The
Initiation of Coercion: A Multi-Temporal Analysis," we seek to show that there is really
no separate general legal policy problem of initiation or commencement of war as that
problem has been commonly conceived and dealt with by commentators in the past.
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responding detail, that certain persons are illegitimate combatants, that cer-
tain weapons are impermissible, that combat operations may not be conducted
in certain areas and that certain objects are legally immune from attack and
capture or destruction.
Captured Enemy Territory
The set of contraposed claims here consists, on the one hand, of the claim
to control and utilize enemy territory, captured through successful combat,
as well as the peoples and resources there situated, and thereby to sustain
and augment the captor's own means of carrying on combat in other still
unoccupied areas; on the other hand is the claim that the loyalties, human
dignity, private property, relationships and fundamental institutions of
peoples in the captured territory be respected and maintained.
Captured Enemy Personnel
The captor state's claim is to control and utilize captured enemy personnel
so as to secure their continued neutralization as elements of enemy power
and to promote the captor's own war effort. The claim in opposition is
for maintenance and protection of the lives, well-being and loyalties of such
personnel.
Management of Noncombat Situations
The principal claim of participants is so to define, control and utilize "enemy"
persons and property in their respective territory as to maximize their own
capabilities for exercising violence and to insure against secret utilization
by the enemy. The broad negating claim is that the loyalties, property and
other human rights of the "enemy" persons in a belligerent's control be
recognized and respected.
Termination of Coercion
On this concluding type of problem, the major contraposed claims include,
on one side, claims that the process of coercion has been authoritatively
terminated and the contending participants disengaged, that captured bases of
power, personnel and resources must be restored, and that relations between
participants be "normalized" by resumption of the process of persuasion and
friendly intercourse. The claims on the other side may be generally to con-
tinue coercive practices, in varying degrees of deceleration, to retain control
over captured enemy personnel, resources and other fruits of coercion, to
establish controls on the defeated participant and to recoup the costs of co-
ercion. The duration of the termination phase or the rate of deceleration
of coercion, and the precise claims and counterclaims asserted in such phase,
may be deeply affected not only by the nature of the objectives which the
successful participants sought but also by their expectations as to the emerg-
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ing configurations of power in the world arena. The years since 1945 have
amply shown that the termination phase may coincide with the initial stages
of a new cycle of coercion during which may take place a reinterpretation
of identifications and objectives by the successful participants and a realign-
ment and regrouping that may cut across the lines drawn in the preceding
process.
THE PROCESS OF DECISION
The process of legal decision through which the world public order seeks
to subject coercion to community controls may, like the factual process of
coercion, be perhaps most conveniently and comprehensively described in
terms of certain established decision-makers, seeking certain common objec- .
tives, under all the varying conditions of the world arena, by the employment
of certain methods or procedures in the prescription and application of
authoritative community policy.
Decision-Makers
The authoritative decision-makers established by the public order of the
world community for resolving controversies about international coercion are
substantially the same as those established for other-"peacetime"-problems.
Reflecting the decentralized structure of decision-making in the international
community, they include not only the officials of international governmental
organizations and judges of international courts, military and arbitration
tribunals but also the officials of nation-states, whether participant or non-
participant in the coercion process. Such authorized nation-state officials who
respond to claims to exercise coercion may of course be the same officials who,
at other times and in another capacity, assert claims to apply coercion; they may
alternately be claimants making claims on their own behalf and decision-makers
assessing the claims of others. This dualism in role and function," in a de-
centralized and primitively organized arena, permits reciprocity to operate
as a sanctioning procedure and promotes recognition of the common interest
97. See George Scelle's conception of the dual capacity-didoublement fonctionnel--of
officials of states: as organs of their respective national communities and as organs of the
international conmunity. Scelle, Le Phunonhne Juridique du Ddoublement Fonctionnel,
in RECHTSFRAGEN DER INTERNATIONALEN ORGANISATION: FESTSCHRIFT FOR HANS
WEHBERG 324 (1956). Cf. Kelsen's notion that "states as acting persons are organs
of international law, or of the community constituted by it," a notion tied up with the
"dynamic decentralization of the universal legal order," i.e., the fact that "general inter-
national law does not establish any special organs working according to the principle of
the division of labor" but instead "leaves it to the parties to a controversy to ascertain
whether one of them is responsible for a delict, as the other claims, and to decide upon,
and execute, the sanction." KRmsEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 327, 351 (1945).
See also KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECUITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 12, 38 (1957);
KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 21, 25 (1952); Gross, States as Organs
of International Law and the Problem of Autointerpretation, in LAW AND POLITICS IN
THE WORLD COMUNITY 59, 67, 70-74 (Lipsky ed. 1953).
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in self-restraint. Conspicuous among decision-makers is, of course, the mili-
tary commander who must on occasion, and at least in the first instance, pass
upon the lawfulness both of his own proposed measures and of measures be-
ing taken against him.98
Objectives
The policy objectives sought by such authoritative decision-makers in the
resolution of conflicting claims respecting coercion are many and complex and
of varying levels of generality. On one level of abstraction and realism, certain
fundamental objectives may be noted.
First is the prevention of alterations in the existing distribution of values
among the nation-states by processes of unilateral and unauthorized coercion
and the promotion of value changes and adjustments by processes of persuasion
or by community-sanctioned coercion. Contemporary expression and reitera-
tion of these most fundamental policy purposes 99 are found in the constitutional
documents of international governmental organizations, which commonly set
forth both prohibitions of resort to force or the threat of force and commit-
ments to settle disputes by pacific means, 00 in the decisions of the war crimes
98. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMsY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE f1 497(d)
(FM 27-10, 1956), which requires commanding officers to assume responsibility for retali-
ative measures "when an unscrupulous enemy leaves no other recourse against the
repetition of unlawful acts." The decision of the commander to resort to reprisals "may
subsequently be found to have been wholly unjustified," in which case the responsible
officer subjects himself to "punishment for a violation of the law of war." A similar
provision is found in DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 301 (a)
(1955); see TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 372-73 (1957).
99. Earlier expression is to be found in LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT arts. 10, 12, 13,
15, and in the Pact of Paris. In the Pact of Paris, the parties stated that they were
"convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by
pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process." In the High Command
Trial, 12 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 70 (1949), the tribunal articulated
the fundamental policy embodied in the Pact of Paris: "The nations that entered into
the Kellogg-Briand Pact considered it imperative that existing international relation-
ships should not be changed by force. In the preamble they state that they are 'per-
suaded that the time has come when . . . all changes in their relationships with one
another should be sought only by pacific means.' This is a declaration that from that time
forward each of the signatory nations should be deemed to possess and to have the right
to exercise all the privileges and powers of a sovereign nation within the limitations
of International Law, free from all interferences by force on the part of any nation.
As a corollary to this, the changing or attempting to change the international relation-
ships by force of arms is an act of aggression and if aggression results in war, the war
is an aggressive war."
100. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 3, 4; id. arts. 33, 37; ORGANIZATION OF AMER-
ICAN STATES CHARTER arts. 5(e), 5(g), 15, 16, 18, 22 (text in SUBCOMMITTEE ON Dis-
ARMAMENT, SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, DISARMAMENT AND SECUurY:
A COLLECTION OF DOCUMENTS 1919-1955, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 160-62 (1956)). See also
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, arts. 1, 2 (1947) (text in id. at 650) ;
American Treaty on Pacific Settlement, art. 1 (1948) (text in id. at 654) ; North Atlantic
Treaty, art. 1 (1949) (text in id. at 530) ; Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, art.
1 (1954) (text in id. at 612) ; Arab League Pact, art. 5 (1945) (text in id. at 618) ; War-
[Vol. 67: 771
THE LAW OF WAR
tribunals, and in the affirmation by the United Nations of the "Nuremberg
Principles."' 01
A second major objective is the reduction to the minimum, when the pro-
cedures of persuasion break down and violence is in fact resorted to, of un-
necessary destruction of values. This overriding policy has in the past con-
sisted mainly of securing as much humanitarianism as is realistically possible
in the mutual application of violence ;102 it may in the future come to consist,
in barest minimum, of the preservation of the earth as a habitable abode for
man and the continuation of human social processes as we know them now.
This basic common policy pervades all the detailed prescriptions of the jus in
bello which seek to define, with varying degrees of specificity, the permissible
maximum of violence and destruction in particular types of situations. It finds
its most explicit and recent embodiment in the conventions for the protection
of war victims which in effect are human rights conventions for contexts of
violence. 03
The regulation of the conduct of coercion and violence in such manner as to
permit and facilitate the restoration of the processes of persuasion is a third
objective.10 4 There is more than sarcasm in a comment of Mr. Dooley upon
the Second Hague Conference of 1907: "This made th' way clear f'r th' dis-
saw Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, art. 1 (1955) (text in
id. at 551).
The most explicit expression of the broad policy objectives is, of course, to be found
in the preamble and statement of purposes of the United Nations Charter.
101. U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. No. 95(I), GEN. Ass. OFF. Rsc. 1st Sess., Plenary 55
(1946). See also the "Essentials of Peace" Resolution, U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. No. 290(IV),
GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 4th Sess., Plenary 261 (1949).
102. In the preamble of Hague Convention No. IV of 1907, Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land, the parties declared that they were "animated by the desire to
serve, even in this extreme case [of an appeal to arms], the interests of humanity and
the ever progressive needs of civilization," and that the provisions of the annexed regula-
tions were "inspired by the desire to diminish the evils of war, so far as military require-
meats permit." The texts of the Convention and regulations are reprinted in DEARTMT
OF THE ARMv, TREATIES GOVERNING LAND WARFARE 5-17 (Pamphlet 27-1, 1956).
In DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE f[ 2 (FM 27-10, 1956),
the purposes of the law of war are expressed as: "(a) Protecting both combatants and
noncombatants from unnecessary suffering; (b) Safeguarding certain fundamental human
rights of persons who fall into the hands of the enemy... (c) Facilitating the restoration
of peace." These same purposes are put in slightly different phraseology in DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY, THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE ff 200 (1955); see TUcKER, op. cit. supra
note 98, at 363. The modest character of this policy objective is underscored by Professor
Winfield: 'War is... essentially a brutal and inhuman affair, however we view it. The re-
mark is trite enough, but it must be emphasized in order to understand that the Laws of War
can at best do no more than modify the brutality and inhumanity of it; they cannot eliminate
those characteristics." WINFIELD, THE FOUNDATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 59 (1941). See also 2 WESTLAxE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1907).
103. Cf. Kunz, The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, in LAW AND PoLITIcs
IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 279, 283 (Lipsky ed. 1953).
104. See DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFAE ff 2 (FM 27-10,
1956); DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, THE LAW OF NAVAL WAFAREn f 200 (1955).
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cussion iv th' larger question iv how future wars shud be conducted in th'
best inthrests iv peace."10 5 Underlying the formulation of detailed rules on the
permissible limits of violence are at least two assumptions, one of which is that
unrestrained, gratuitous destruction of values so tends permanently to acer-
bate and embitter the relations between the opposing participants as to make
the return to peace-short of a Carthaginian peace-extremely difficult if not
impossible. The other is that extermination, peace of the Carthaginian variety,
is not a permissible objective of international violence; if it were, all legal
limitations would be entirely pointless.
On another level of abstraction and realism, reference may be made to such
objectives as the maintenance or furtherance of varying contending systems or
conceptions of world public order, compatible, in theory or in specific interpre-
tation, in greater or lesser degree with the values of a free society. The variation
in systems or conceptions of world public order is observably both "vertical"-
through time-and "horizontal"-through differing areas of the world at a
given time. "Vertical" variation 106 is perhaps most dramatically illustrated in
the changes, over the last century or so, in conceptions of the requirements of
world public order exhibited in the formulation of the distinction between per-
missible and nonpermissible resort to coercion and of the corollary notion of
permissible discrimination between belligerents by neutrals. The doctrines of
the last century on "measures short of war," on war as a "prerogative right"
of sovereign states, on the "juridical equality" of belligerents and on the neu-
tral's "duty of impartiality," in substantial effect permitted the relative strength
of participants to determine issues between them ;107 decision-makers, in other
words, honored the assertion of exclusive rather than inclusive values. In
105. Quoted in Boggs, National Claims in Adjacent Seas, 41 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 185,
208 n.29 (1951).
106. See, generally, Vinogradoff, Historical Types of International Law, 1 BMLI-
OTHECA VISSERIANA 3 (1923).
107. Thus, with respect to reprisals as "measures short of war," it has been observed
that "in modern times [after the eighteenth century] the effective use of reprisals is
confined to the Greater Powers in their relations with the smaller .... Reprisal . . .
is only practised against small or weak Powers by others which fear little harm from
the utmost step they can take. So confident, indeed, are they of the superiority of the
force they can bring to bear that they take it for granted that the State against which
they have proceeded will quickly bow to the logic of facts, and, not making a difficulty
of its wounded dignity, will hurry on to concessions in order to secure relief from the
measures of coercion." Maccoby, Reprisals as a Measure of Redress Short of W~ar,
2 CAm. L.J. 60, 69 (1924). Some publicists have regarded the doctrine of reprisals, in
permitting relative power to resolve issues, as embodying a policy of limiting the extent
of, and involvement in, violence. See HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 434 (Higgins ed.
1924); HOLLAND, Lrrmas TO THE TinES UPON WAR AND NEuTAu ITv, 1881-1920, 14
(3d ed. 1921). See also HiN uAI sii, FORCE IN PEACE 73-74, 87-88, 93-94 (1933) ; 2 WEST-
LAKE, INTERxATIONAL LAW 52 (1907) : "A war between civilised states is begun because
one at least of the parties makes some demand with which the other does not comply, or
some complaint of which the other gives no explanation regarded by the first as satis-
factory. International law says its last word on that point when it pronounces the demand
or the complaint to be legitimate or illegitimate, and, if possible, offers arbitration. If the
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contrast, in contemporary prescriptions attempting to insure that force be em-
ployed only in response to unlawful force, emphasis is placed upon more inclusive
values. "Horizontal" variation, or the simultaneous plurality of demanded
systems or conceptions of world public order, is a candid fact of international
life.'08 The antagonism and competition between the major systems or con-
ceptions-frequently described in such broad terms as, on one hand, "western,
Christian, liberal-democratic" and, on the other, "Marxist, totalitarian, popu-
lar-democratic"-reflect basic power conflicts in the world arena. It is no dark
secret that decision-makers who are proponents of a totalitarian world public
order constantly assert and promote their totalitarian goals by appropriate
specific interpretations in concrete cases.
The more specific policy objectives of different authoritative decision-makers
and the precise operational meanings they give to the more abstract goals of
community policy can of course be determined only by the detailed study of
particular decisions through time about major recurring problems. The range
of specific objectives and interpretations will be indicated in some detail at
a later point.'0 9
Conditions
The conditions under which authoritative decisions are taken obviously
include all those same variables of the world power process that affect the
process of coercion. Among the factors that bear immediately upon the pre-
parties are not content with this, the want of organisation in the world of states compels
the law which was concerned with their dispute to stand aside while they fight the quarrel
out." "The outbreak of war removes the controversy out of which it arose from the
domain of law. It will be settled at the peace on such terms as the superiority of force
decides ... ." Id. at 29.
10S. Cf. STONE, LEGAL CoNTRoLs 57-64, who somewhat understates the point when
he writes that "the hypothesis that there are at least two international communities and
legal orders cannot yet, however, be regarded as proved." See also SMITH, THE CRIsis
IN THE LAW oF NArTIoNS c. 2 (1947) ; Kunz, Pluralismo de Sistemas Legales y de Valores
y el Derecho Internacional, 3 RPvisTA DR DERECHO V CIENClAS SocIALzs 33 (Argentina 1956-
57) ; Schwarzenberger, The Impact of the East-West Rift on. International Law, 36 TRANS-
AcT. GROT. Soc'" 229 (1950) ; Wilk, International Law and Global Ideological Conflict:
Reflections on the Universality of International Law, 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 648 (1951). Cf.
also the related observations made by Lyon-Caen, International Law and the Co-existence,
in a State of Peace, of States With Opposing Political Systems, 79 JOURNAL DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL 49, 55 (1952), who emphasizes that "the structure of the world is no
longer homogeneous in character; there are now several types of States," and urges that
"international law must adjust their co-existence." In this connection, see the important
point made by de Luna in Fundamentacti6n del Derecho Internacional, 60 REvISTA DEL
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 210, 248 (Cuba 1952) : "Todo derecho, como fen6meno cultural
que es, se afirma y cae con una determinada cultura. Y como el derecho internacional pre-
tende regular la comunidad humana entera, presupone un minimo de unidad cultural del
mundo para poder subsistir. Ahora bien, esta unidad en nuestros dias no existe, ha sido
rota en mil pedazos, porque no hay cultura donde no hay principios comunes a que apelar,
y es evidente que hoy el mundo, en lo cultural como en lo politico, estA por lo menos
dividido en dos bloques."
109. See text at notes 141-237 infra.
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scription and application of community policy are common expectations as to
the character and efficiency of the technique and technology of violence. 110
It may be recalled, for purposes of illustrating the impact of such expecta-
tions on the structure of prescription, that historically only weapons regarded
as obsolete, marginal or indecisive, and militarily inefficient-weapons which
did not or could not be expected to yield a substantial net military advantage
after discounting the concomitant destruction of values, such as poisoned arms
and expanding bullets-have successfully been proscribed."1  The continuing
failure, despite their awesome destructiveness, to achieve authoritative com-
munity prohibition of the use of basic energy weapons, the military ineffective-
ness of which has still to be demonstrated, lends confirmation to historical
experience.
Expectations of particular decision-makers as to the probable effectiveness
of, or compliance with, projected regulation constitute another factor affecting
the prescription and, more particularly, the application of policy in specific
110. "[The Hague Regulations] were written in a day when armies traveled on
foot, in horse-drawn vehicles and on railroad trains; the automobile was in its Ford
Model T stage. Use of the airplane as an instrument of war was merely a dream. The
atomic bomb was beyond the realms of imagination. Concentration of industry into
huge organizations transcending national boundaries had barely begun. Blockades were
the principal means of 'economic warfare.' 'Total warfare' only became a reality in the
recent conflict. These developments make plain the necessity of appraising the conduct
of defendants with relation to the circumstances and conditions of their environment.
Guilt, or the extent thereof, may not be determined theoretically or abstractly. Reason-
able and practical standards must be considered." The Flick Trial, 9 LAw REPORTS OF
TmALs OF WAR CRIMINALS 23 (1949).
111. RoYSE AERIAL BOMBARDMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WAR-
FARE 141-46 (1928) ; STONE, LEGAL CONTROLs 551; Borchard, The Atomic Bomb, 40 Am.
J. INT'L L. 161, 165 (1946). The experience of the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and
1907 is particularly significant in this regard. At the 1899 Conference, it was proposed
that no propellant powders more powerful than those already in use be allowed. See
Russian Circular of Jan. 11, 1899, in 2 THE HAGUE: PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND
1907, 3-5 (Scott ed. 1909). The proposal was unanimously rejected after Captain Crozier
of the American delegation pointed out the possibility of invention of more powerful
powders which, by causing less injury to the gun, would be more efficient and economical.
See Report of Captain Crozier to the U.S. Commission, 2 id. at 29. A Russian proposal
to outlaw submarine torpedo boats, submitted to the 1899 Conference, could not com-
mand unanimity, 2 id. at 367-68; some demonstration of its military effectiveness had
been made in the Sino-French (1884) and Sino-Japanese (1895) wars, see HUIoBRO
ToRo, EL SUBMARINO ANTE EL DEREcHO INTERNACIONAL 16 (1936). The proposal was
not repeated at the 1907 Conference, the Russo-Japanese (1904) war having shown con-
clusively its military efficiency. The only restriction approved was that torpedoes which
had missed their targets and thus were militarily valueless must become harmless. Hague
Convention No. VIII, art. 1[3] (1907).
As to expanding bullets, RoYsE, op. cit. supra at 141-42 n.53 observed that they were
not only injurious to the rifle barrel, but were also inaccurate at the distance
at which battles were fought and had been discarded for the much more accurate
steel-nosed bullets. Expanding bullets flatten easily upon contact with the human
body and tear great jagged wounds; they cause needless suffering without pro-
ducing a compensating military advantage. As to poisoned arms, these had not been
used since the bow and arrow and spear had become obsolete.
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cases."' Such expectations in turn frequently depend on at least two other
related factors. One factor is the decision-makers' estimate of the amount of
effective power available to support an application of policy. This estimate
is itself a function of their appraisal of the structural features of the world
arena existing at a given time;113 in less abstract terms, the decision-makers
seek to anticipate who will support, who will attack and who will ignore the
decision if one is taken. The other is the estimation of decision-makers of the
possible costs of making and enforcing a decision. Costs may take the shape
of expanded involvement, measured in terms of both the number of opponents
and the geographic locale of violence, and of grievously increased destruction
of values. The operation of these factors has been demonstrated in the Ko-
rean,1 1 4 and in the Suez and Hungarian cases. 115
112. The wide discretion given to the Security Council by art. 39 of the charter,
and to the General Assembly by art. 11 and the "Uniting For Peace" resolution,
leaves these organs ample opportunity to take this factor into account. A similar
point was made by Judge Lauterpacht with respect to the Assembly of the League of
Nations: "[T]he factors which may legitimately enter into the exercise of discretion
are not only the scope and nature of the acts of force with which the League is confronted,
but also the general political situation, including the actual prospects of the effectiveness
of the League's action following upon the finding that resort to war has taken place."
Lauterpacht, "Resort to War" and the Interpretation of the Covenant DiTring the Man-
churian Dispute, 28 Au. J. INT'L L. 43, 54 (1934).
113. Cf. Wright, The Prevention of Aggression, 50 id. at 514, 516 (1956). In
1937, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, explaining in the course of
a debate in the House of Commons the failure of the League Assembly, the Brussels
Conference and Britain to adopt definitive sanctions against Japan, then conducting large-
scale military operations against China, stated: 'We were told that in the Far East
to-day we ought to be upholding the rule of law. . . . If Hon. Members opposite are
advocating sanctions . . . I would remind them that there are two possible forms of
sanctions-the ineffective, which are not worth putting on, and the effective, which means
the risk, if not the certainty, of war. I say deliberately that nobody could contemplate
any action of that kind in the Far East unless they are convinced that they have overwhelm-
ing force to back their policy.
"Do right Hon. Gentlemen opposite really think that the League of Nations to-day,
with only two great naval Powers in it, ourselves and France, has got that overwhelming
force? It must be perfectly clear to every one that that overwhelming force does not
exist." Quoted in 1 SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1937, 292-93 (Royal Institute of
Int'l Affairs 1938).
114. GOODRICH & SImONs, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTER-
NATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 365 (1955). In the Assembly discussions on the draft
of the resolution condemning the People's Republic of China as an aggressor, the Syrian
representative argued that adoption of the draft resolution would not end the Korean
War but would be more likely to extend it and that, should the war be extended, the
United Nations would have to fight a population of about 800 million. The Indian dele-
gate said that he would vote against the draft for the reason that it would prolong hostilities
in Korea indefinitely and might expand the conflict into a global war. See 1951 Y.B.
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 217-24. GOODRICH & SIMONS, op. cit. supra, point out that con-
siderations such as these resulted in delaying the condemnation of the People's Republic
of China.
115. In the Suez case, the resolutions of the General Assembly calling for a cease
fire and withdrawal of Israeli, British and French forces from Egyptian Territory, U.N.
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Still another factor influencing the prescription and application of policy
is the state of expectations of various participants as to the possibilities of
effective decision-making by the organized world community, the dependa-
bility, in other words, of reliance upon world community intervention. It is
common knowledge that low estimates of such possibilities, induced by the
adoption of the Yalta voting formula among other things, led to the insertion
of article fifty-one in the charter of the United Nations, which recognized
individual and collective self-defense, and since then, to the elaboration of
the permission of the collective self-defense in numerous treaties establishing
regional organizations." 6 The realism of such estimates will continue, it may be
Gen. Ass. Res. Nos. 997, 999, 1002, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 1st Emer. Spec. Sess.,
Plenary Meeting and Annexes, Agenda Item No. 5, at 33-34 (1956), were supported by
both the United States, the Soviet Union and most of the other member states. Together
with other factors, such support resulted in compliance with the resolutions.
In the case of Hungary, the resolutions condemning the Soviet armed repression of
the Hungarian people were much more strongly worded, U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. Nos. 1004,
1005, 1006, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 2d Emer. Spec. Sess., Annexes, Agenda Item No. 5,
at 6-7 (1956) ; but the polar powers confronted each other in opposition, and realistic ex-
pectations of effectiveness were minimal. Doubts as to the probable effectiveness of the
resolutions were expressed by Indonesia, among others, whose representative said: "Senti-
ments of sympathy, of anger and of condemnation of one another have been expressed....
We respect all those sentiments and feelings, many of which, indeed, we share. If, how-
ever, we ask the Assembly to take a decision, the prime consideration should be whether,
after the adoption of [Res. 1004] . . . on 4 November, the adoption of another draft
resolution would really contribute further to the solution of the situation, even though
it might satisfy our sentiments and feelings. . . . With all respect to the sentiment and
principles which are expressed in this draft resolution, in all fairness we do have honest
doubts whether this draft resolution, if adopted, would have the effect it seeks to achieve."
Id. at 67. See also the statements of the representatives of India, Ceylon and Burma,
id. at 68, 71, 72.
The so-called "double-standard" of the United Nations is largely attributable to the
differential operation of these factors in different situations. There is less than adequate
appreciation of this fact in Green, The Double Standard of the United Nations, 11 Y.B. OF
WORLD AFFAIRS 104 (1957). Compare Hoffman, Sisyphus and the Avalanche: The United
Nations, Egypt and Hungary, 11 INT'L ORGANIZATION 446 (1957), which offers perceptive.
discussion of these factors.
It may be observed, in addition, that in the current debate on the question of "defining
aggression," one of the arguments against definition is that under conditions of prevailing
expectations of possibly excessive costs of enforcing a decision, a "definition of aggression"
may be "more dangerous than useful" and that it may be sound, even essential policy
to "refrain from branding as an aggressor one of the parties to the dispute." See the
statements of the Netherlands representative, U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc. 8th Sess., 6th
Comm. 7-8 (1953).
116. See BEcx=r, THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, THE BRUSSELS TREATY, AND THE
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1950); GOODRICH & HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 297-99 (2d rev. ed. 1949); Bebr, Regional
Organizations: A United Nations Problem, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 166 (1955) ; Kelsen, The
North Atlantic Defense Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations, 19 AcTA SCANDI-
NAVICA JURIS GENTIUM 41 (1949); Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-
Dfense Under the Charter of the United Nations, 42 Am. J. INT'L L. 783 (1948) ; Kunz,
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expected, to be of intense relevance both for participants deciding on an appro-
priate response to coercion and for external decision-makers passing upon
the lawfulness of a participant's claim to respond to coercion under the name
of self-defense.1 17
Methods
The methods by which authoritative decision-makers attempt to regulate
the process of coercion include certain special functions or procedures by
which they continually formulate, reformulate and apply policy with respect
to the various major types of claims to initiate and exercise or avoid coercion.
In most comprehensive statement, such policy functions or procedures might
be described to include those of intelligence, recommending, prescribing, in-
voking, applying, appraising and terminating." 5 In the interests of brevity,
and because of the lack of institutional specialization in the performance of each
of these functions in the law of war, as in international law generally, emphasis
here will be confined to prescription and application.
Prescription
The mor6 obvious method by which the law of war is prescribed is by
explicit agreement of the participants, as in great international conventions
like those of the Hague and Geneva. It is commonly recognized, however,
that the method of explicit agreement, particularly in the field of management
of combat, has never been able to achieve much more in formulation than a
Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations,
41 Au!. J. IN'L L. 872 (1947).
117. The operation of these expectations may be illustrated by the decision of the
British government to resort to armed force in Suez. The discussions in the House of
Commons afford some insight into the considerations involved in the issuance of the
ultimatum to the Israeli and Egyptian governments. Mr. Maitland said: "We have heard
the Leader of the Opposition ... [propose] that nothing should be done until the Security
Council had reached a decision.
"This proposition is put forward within a matter of days of another resort to the Security
Council which produced no decision at all. It is put forward after some years of resort
to the Security Council in many other matters that have produced no decision either. It
is put forward in the light of the fact that on the one occasion when the Security Council
did reach a decision nobody did anything about it." 558 H.C. Dan. (5th ser.) 1351-52
(1956).
The Foreign Secretary was even more explicit: "There is a fundamental point which
this House and other countries will have to face. We have created a system of international
law and order in which we have to face the fact that the Security Council is, first, frustrated
by the veto and, secondly, that it cannot act immediately. In a sense, the policeman has
his hands tied behind his back. He has to wait a long time before he is allowed to play
his part....
"We say that in the present international system, where the Security Council is subject
to the veto, there must be the right for individual countries to intervene in an emergency
to take action to defend their own nationals and their own interests." Id. at 1377.
118. See McDougal, International Law, Power and Policy: A Contemporary Con-
ception, 82 HAGUE REcUEL 137, 177-78 (1953).
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general restatement of pre-existing consensus about relatively minor prob-
lems. Negotiators, seated about a conference table contemplating future wars
and aware of the fluid nature of military technology and technique, imagine
too many horrible contingencies, fantastic or realistic, about the security of
their respective countries to permit much commitment.
Much more effective than explicit agreement in the prescription of the law
of war has been the less easily observed, slow, customary shaping and de-
velopment of general consensus or community expectation. Decision-makers
confronted with difficult problems, frequently presented to them in terms of
principles as vague and abstract as "the laws of humanity and the dictates
of the public conscience" 1 9 and in terms of concepts and rules admitting of
multiple interpretations, quite naturally have had recourse both to the ex-
perience of prior decision-makers and to community expectation about re-
quired or desired future practice and decision. The myth is that when certain
practices are repeated or mutually tolerated over a period of time by a sub-
stantial number of decision-makers, in the context of certain common per-
spectives of "oughtness" or "authority," a certain customary rule or principle
of law emerges.120 On a more realistic level, the function of this myth is to
permit and authorize a decision-maker to achieve a more rational balancing of
past experience, contemporary realities and future probabilities without ap-
pearing to create new policy. The process of customary development, con-
sidered as one of continual, creative readaption or reinterpretation of given
prescription, whether conventional or customary, is particularly marked when
it is in response to patterns of interaction, such as blockade and submarine
and air warfare, which are themselves, because of altered conditions and fast-
developing technology and technique, in a process of profound and rapid
change.121 In such cases, the rate of attrition or obsolescence of particular
inherited rules may be accelerated and the emergence of new ones hastened. 1 22
119. Preamble, Respecting the Laws and Ciestoms of War on Land, Hague Convention
No. IV (1907). The tribunal in the Krupp Trial, 10 LAw REPORTS OF TLA.Ls OF WAR
CaINALs 133 (1949), declared that the preamble was "much more than a pious declara-
tion," that it was a "legal yardstick" to be applied when specific conventional provisions
did not cover specific cases.
120. For formulations of the myth with particular reference to the law of war, see
Trial of Altstotter, 6 LAv REPORTS OF TRALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 35-38 (1948) ; Trial of
List, 8 id. at 53 (1949) ; Trial of Von Leeb, 12 id. at 68, 69-70 (1949).
121. SMITH, THE CasIs IN THE LAW OF NATIoNs chapters 1-5 (1947). The technical
device commonly used in the last two World Wars for bridging the gap between traditional
prescription and contemporary practice was that of reprisals. The principal difficulty with
this device is not so much its lack of complete ingenuousness as that it purported to leave
the structures of formal doctrine intact, supposedly unaffected by the insistent pressure of
changed conditions and the imperatives arising from these conditions. See STONE, LEGAL.
CONTROLS 355 n.39, on the "legislative function" of reprisals. The central problem, which
need not be obscured by disingenuous labels or by the requirements of propaganda warfare,
is one of determining realistic expectations of probable future practice and decision. Cf.
Rowson, British Prize Law, 1939-1944, 61 L.Q. REv. 49, 57 (1945) ; SMITH, op. cit. supra
at 16.
122. Cf. Trial of Altstotter, 6 LAw REPORTs OF TaIAs OF Wa CaI INALS 35 (1948).
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From this perspective, if by "law" one means to make any operational refer-
ence to probable or realistically expected decision, the continued characteriza-
tion by some commentators of certain pre-1914 prescriptions as law, despite
their practically universal nonobservance in two World Wars, 123 may at best
be harmless nostalgia. Such pre-1914 prescriptions may indeed possibly be
regarded as "authority" in some cases in the future; but if they are, it will
not be because they were once prescribed by certain earlier decision-makers
for a bygone world, but because future decision-makers decide that they embody
precisely the detailed limitations upon violence thought appropriate, in com-
mon interest, for future wars, total or limited, nuclear or nonnuclear.
Application and Sanction
The application of the prescriptions of the law of war to specific problems
may be by any of the officials indicated above, international or national, and
occurs in a variety of contexts-from general assemblies and international
tribunals to foreign offices and battlefields. So great is the common interest
of all participants in the observance of the law of war conceived to be that certain
traditional principles on allocation of jurisdiction confer upon the courts of all
belligerents-perhaps all states belligerent or nonbelligerent 124 -- and not merely
those of the belligerent in whose territory the acts were committed or whose
nationals are involved, power to try individuals held before them for violations
of that law.' 25 Reflecting the same unity of interest, the municipal codes,
statutes, ordinances and regulations of many states embody into their national
law, for administration as other national law is administered, prescriptions
123. See, e.g., TUCKER, THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 305, 315-17 (1957),
discussing the lawfulness of the establishment of war zones by means of mine fields and of
"long-distance" blockades.
124. See Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33 CALIF. L. REv.
177 (1945) ; 15 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 26 (1949). See also Trial of
Altstotter, 6 id. at 37-38 (1948).
125. TUCKER, op. cit. supra note 123, at 154-55; Baxter, The Municipal and Internation-
al Law Bases of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 390-92 (1951);
Brand, The War Crimes Trials and the Laws of War, 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 414-16
(1949). In Trial of List, 8 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINAi.s 54 (1949), the
tribunal said: "An international crime is such an act universally recognized as criminal,
which is considered a grave matter of international concern and for some valid reason
cannot be left within the exclusive jurisdiction of the state that would have control
over it under ordinary circumstances. The inherent nature of a war crime is ordinarily
itself sufficient justification for jurisdiction to attach in the courts of the belligerent into
whose hands the alleged criminal has fallen .... [War crimes] are punishable by the
country where the crime was committed or by the belligerent into whose hands the criminals
have fallen, the jurisdiction being concurrent."
See the 1949 Geneva Conventions which require each party to search for persons alleged
to have committed "grave breaches" of the conventions and to "bring such persons, regard-
less of their nationality, before its own courts." Wounded and Sick Convention, art. 49;
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Convention, art. 50; Prisoners of War Convention, art.
129; Civilians Convention, art. 146.
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about the conduct of warfare and nonparticipation in warfare which, if not
always identical, are at least comparable in policy with the prescriptions of
the community of states.
1 26
Sanctions for enforcement raise perhaps the only issue, in application, which
requires special elaboration. The opinion has been so often urged that the law
of war is not law at all that it may be worthwhile to observe that the effective
sanction which supports the law of war is the same sanction which supports
all law: the common interest of the participants in an arena. 127 The common
interest which sustains the law of war is the interest of all participants in
economy in the use of force-in the minimization of the unnecessary destruc-
tion of values. Unnecessary destruction of values constitutes uneconomical
use of force not only because it involves, by definition, a dissipation of base values
which yields no military advantage ;128 it will also, by operation of the con-
dition of reciprocity, result in the offending belligerent sustaining a positive
disadvantage in the shape of at least an equal amount of destruction of its
own values. By stimulating hatred in the enemy and strengthening his will
to resist, it will in addition frequently compel the expenditure of much larger
amounts of force than will otherwise have been necessary to secure the
same objective. 1 29 Economy in the use of force is thus a matter of shared
interest in self-restraint, and it is this general sanction which finds its detailed
expression in all the varying procedural modalities of collective measures for
redress by international organizations, including the employment of all instru-
ments of coercion, of war crime trials during or after war by international
or national courts and military commissions, of reprisal procedures in the course
126. See, e.g., Uniform Code of Military Justice, 64 STAT. 108 (1950), 50 U.S.C. §§
551-741 (1952); DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE (FM 27-10,
1956) ; DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE (1957) ; UNITED KING-
DO-M, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW (9th ed. 1956) ; CODES DE JUSTICE Mi iTAIRE: ARE tS
DE TERE ET DE MER (Petits Codes, Dalloz ed. 1957).
National statutes and regulations on neutrality are collected in JESSUP & DEAF, NEU-
TRALITY LAWS, REGULATIONS AND TREATIES (1939).
127. Cf. CORBETT, LAW AND SOCIETY IN THE RELATIONS OF STATES 13 (1951).
128. Indication of the kind of calculations in which economy of force manifests itself
may be found in CAGLE & MANSON, THE SEA WAR IN KOREA 333-34, 352-53 (U.S. Naval
Institute 1957). "The cost of a 5-inch shell at the end of the Korean pipeline was approxi-
mately $200," Admiral Gingrich, commander of Task Force 95, is reported to have said,
and "unless it did that much damage, we were hurting ourselves more than the enemy."
Id. at 352.
129. The results of the policies of Nazi Germany in occupied areas of the Soviet Union
during the second World War offer excellent illustration. The unbelievably savage and
ruthless treatment of Soviet prisoners of war and the civilian population drove the inhabitants
and stragglers from the Red Army to join the partisan movements, which correspondingly
grew in effectiveness until they controlled large areas behind German lines. The German
policies of absolute terror and extermination also resulted in the forfeiture of the opportuni-
ties offered by the nationalistic aspirations of the Ukrainians and Bylorussians. and
by their hopes for a better and freer life under Hitler's "New Order." A recent compre-
hensive study is DALLIN, GERMAN RULE IN RUSSIA 1941-1945: A STUDY OF OCCUPAxION
POLICIES (1957).
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of hostilities and of diplomatic negotiations or interpositions with respect to
claims for damages.
Compelling testimony to the effectiveness of the sanction of self-interest
comes from the German archives made public at Nuremberg in the form of
certain memoranda prepared by the "Operational Staff of the Armed Forces
[Wehrmacht]."13° These documents commented upon and assessed a proposal,
made apparently at the last stages of the war, that Germany denounce its
international obligations concerning the conduct of war. After listing the
international conventions to which Germany was a party, the documents
reviewed in minute detail the possible consequences of denunciation, methodic-
ally calculating expected advantages and disadvantages, and uniformly con-
eluded that the disadvantages far outweighed possible advantages. In the
course of its discussion, one of these remarkable documents stated:
"(1) Strictly formally, a denunciation of the agreements is not possible.
The conventions concerning P.W. and wounded provide for no denunc-
ation, the Hague Convention admits a denunciation only if one year's
notice is given.
"(2) On the basis of the practice of states in the wars of the last
centuries, there exists the 'International Law of Usage' which cannot
be done away with unilaterally. It comprises the latest principles of a
humane conduct of war; it is not laid down in writing. To respect it is
however considered a prerequisite for membership [in] the community of
states. (Prohibition on misusing the flag of truce, killing of defenseless
women and children, etc.)
"Consequently Germany will by no means free herself from this essen-
tial obligation of the laws of war by a denunciation of the conventions on
the laws of war. '1 3
Recently, there has been much discussion of the existence of a "nuclear
stalemate," comprised, it is said, of a relative parity between the two "super-
powers" in capacity to inflict annihilating destructions on each other through
"saturation" with nuclear explosives, and of a common military inability
either completely to defend against contemporary delivery systems or com-
pletely to destroy the other's capabilities for retaliation. The implications of
such a "stalemate" have also been considered in terms of the necessity, in view
of the exorbitant costs of total war, of a strategy of "limited war."'132 The
130. Memoranda Nos. 313/45, Feb. 20, 1945, 1859/45, Feb. 21, 1945, 1825/45, Feb. 20,
1945, in NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 894-905 (Supp. A 1947).
131. Memorandum No. 313/45, Feb. 20, 1945, in id. at 895.
132. See, e.g., MILITARY POLICY AND NATIONAL SEcuRITY (Kaufmann ed. 1956);
KISSINGER, NucL.wA WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POICY (1957) ; OSGOOD, LIMITED WAR: T3E
CHALLENGE TO AmEmCAN STRATEGY (1957) ; ON LIMITING ATOmiC WAR (Royal Institute
of Int'l Affairs 1956); Aron, A Half-Century of Limited War?, 12 BULL. ATomiC SCIEN-
TISTS 99 (1956); Buzzard, Slessor & Lowenthal, The H-Bomb: Massive Retaliation or
Graduated Deterrence, 32 INTERNATIONAL Arab. 148 (1956); Hoag, Nato: Deterrent or
Shield?, 36 FOREIGN AFF. 278 (1958); King, Nuclear Plenty and Limited War, 35
id. at 238 (1957) ; Kissinger, Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age, 34 id. at 349 (1956) ;
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reference commonly given to "limited war" has been that of exercises of mili-
tary violence in which the participants mutually limit their objectives to deter-
minate ones susceptible of negotiated settlement and in which the aggregate
destruction of values is kept at a correspondingly low level by reciprocal limita-
tions upon weapons, areas of operations or objects of attack. The point of
present emphasis is that the possibilities of "limited war" appear to depend in
large measure upon observance of the same principle which, as indicated before,
traditionally has sustained a law of war, the principle of economy in the ex-
ercise of force. Thus, Professor Osgood states the point of theory involved
succinctly:
"[A]s an examination of the interaction between military means and
political ends will show, the proportionate use of force is a necessary
condition for the limitation and effective control of war."' 33
"In the light of this proportion between the dimensions of warfare and
its susceptibility to political control, the importance of preserving an
economy of force is apparent. For if modern warfare tends to exceed the
bounds of political control as it increases in magnitude, then it is essential
to limit force to a scale that is no greater than necessary to achieve the ob-
jectives at stake. By the same token, if war becomes more susceptible
to political control in proportion as its dimensions are moderated, then the
economy of force is an essential condition of the primacy of politics in
war. "
13 4
Similarly, Professor Kissinger makes explicit the application of this principle
to the contemporary hope that, if there must be war, it be only limited war.
"The argument in favor of the possibility of limited war is that both sides
have a common and overwhelming interest in preventing it from spreading.
The fear that an all-out thermonuclear war might lead to the disintegration
of the social structure offers an opportunity to set limits to both war and
diplomacy."' 35
If, then, the assumption of "nuclear stalemate" and the hope for limited war
only are more than illusion, there will continue to be, in the principle which
establishes their contact with reality, some sanction for a law of war.
The Role of Rules
With more general reference to the whole process of authoritative decision,
one point already mentioned may perhaps bear further emphasis. Observers
have too often assumed that it is the function of inherited legal rules to point
definitively and precisely to certain preordained conclusions. The difficulty
with this assumption is that it seeks to impose too great a burden upon man's
Slessor, The Great Deterrent and Its Limitations, 12 BuLL. ATomic ScIENTISTS 140 (1956);
Teller, Alternatives for Security, 36 FoREIGN AFF. 201 (1958). But cf. de Seversky,
A Forecast and a Warning: No More Little Wars, This Week Magazine, March 23, 1958,
p. 8.
133. OSGOOD, op. cit. mpra note 132, at 18.
134. Id. at 26.
135. KiSsiGE, NUcLEAR WEONS AND FoREImG PoLICY 144 (1957).
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frail tools of thought and communication and an impossible rigidity upon both
the processes of decision and social change. The fact is that the rules of the
law of war, like other legal rules, are commonly formulated in pairs of com-
plementary opposites and are composed of a relatively few basic terms of highly
variable reference.' 36 The complementarity in form and comprehensiveness
of reference of such rules are indispensable to the rational search for and appli-
cation of policy to a world of acts and events which presents itself to the decision-
maker, not in terms of neat symmetrical dichotomies or trichotomies, but in
terms of innumerable gradations and alternations from one end of a continuum
to the other; the spectrum makes available to a decision-maker not one inevit-
able doom but multiple alternative choices. The realistic function of those
rules, considered as a whole, is, accordingly, not mechanically to dictate specific
decision but to guide the attention of decision-makers to significant variable
factors in typical recurring contexts of decision, to serve as summary indices
to relevant crystallized community expectations 137 and, hence, to permit creative
and adaptive, instead of arbitrary and irrational, decisions.
The most comprehensive study of this process of decision, established by the
public order of the world community for regulating international coercion and
for minimizing the destruction of values in such coercion, would require the
sustained systematic performance, with respect to each of the seven major
types of controversies outlined earlier, of the several intellectual tasks we have
noted as indispensable to policy-oriented inquiry. These may be briefly restated
136. The phenomenon of polarity in the syntax of prescriptions is by no means unique
to the law of war, nor even to international law generally. See CARDozo, Paradoxes of
Legal Science, in SELECrED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDozo 252 (Hall ed.
1947). The same phenomenon has been more recently observed in the field of constitutional
law: "His [Thomas Reed Powell's] thinking was infused also, as I have suggested, by the
principle of polarity, finding in each of two opposing propositions an element of validity
which when combined will produce a more serviceable guide than either principle standing
alone. Interstate commerce must not be taxed by the states; interstate commerce may be
made to pay its way. A state may exclude a foreign corporation from local business; a
state may not condition the admission of a foreign corporation on its relinquishment of a
constitutional right. The power to tax involves the power to destroy; the legislative motive
for a tax is immaterial. In the control of public carriers a state may not regulate interstate
commerce; a state has undoubted power to protect the safety of its inhabitants. These
abstractions, arrayed in intransigent hostility like robot sentinels facing each other across
a border, can become useful guardians on either hand in the climb to truth if they can be
made to march together. Somehow the lifeblood of the concrete problem tempers the me-
chanical arrogance of abstractions." Freund, Thomas Reed Powell, 69 HARv. L. REv.
800, 802-03 (1956).
Application has also been made of the notion of polarity in the more rarefied region of
legal philosophy. See CoHEN, REASON AND LAw -4, 6-7 (1950).
137. Each particular rule, however, points to certain specific factors and policies, and
the significance of any specific factor or policy in a given case depends upon its inter-
relation with other factors and policies, including the presence or absence of such other
factors and policies, in total context. Cf. the formulation of the functions of rules or
principles of interpretation in The Law of Treaties, in HAAVAm REsEARcH oN INTERNA-
TioNAL LAw 937-38 (1935).
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as including: the detailed clarification of the world community policies at stake in
the prescriptions and procedures about permissible and nonpermissible coercion
and the lawfulness or unlawfulness of particular exercises of coercion; the
identification and description of trends in decisions with respect to all such
problems and of the shifting constellations of variables that bear upon decision;
the critical projection of observable trends and the estimation of the probable
shape of future decision; the appraisal of both trends in the past and probable
developments in the future in terms of their consistency with clarified policies;
and the search for alternatives in prescription and procedure better designed
to secure the preferred goals of maximum human dignity and minimum de-
struction of human values.
All this essay attempts, however, is briefly to observe, with respect to each
of the several types of controversies, some of the fundamental policies which
authoritative decision-makers have in the past labored to secure in passing
upon the lawfulness of specific claims to exercise or defend against coercion,
and to make certain suggestions, tentative and impressionistic, as to possible
lines of further clarification of the requirements of rational community policy
with respect to the various types of particular controversies. 138 As the factors
that affect decision in the world arena shift toward inclusive rather than ex-
clusive determination of community policy, the basic policies at stake in char-
acterizations of coercion as permissible or impermissible may, hopefully, be
clarified to the advantage of a public order of freedom and the complementary
policies appropriate in each type of controversy may be more sharply delineated
and balanced in favor of humanitarianism. The principal difficulty in past efforts
to clarify and formulate such policies has stemmed largely from conditions of
decentralization in the world arena. The elementary degree of organization of
authority and centralization of effective power, in the very arena of interaction
for the regulation of which policies are sought to be prescribed and applied, 130
has thus put the highest premium upon the effective competence of each state
by its own unilateral decision and action to preserve and defend its security.140
This characteristic decentralization, exhibited most obviously in the lack of
specialized institutions for the continuous and effective clarification and appli-
cation of community policy about coercion, has infected with formidable am-
biguity both the characterization of unlawful coercion and the detailed pre-
scriptions of the fundamental policy of minimum destruction of values. Decen-
tralization has thus resulted in the relatively heavier weighting of the set of
policies, such as those embodied in self-defense and military necessity, con-
ferring upon participants a broad unilateral discretion to secure and perpetuate
138. We propose to deal at greater length and in detail with each of the major prob-
lems or types of controversies in subsequent essays. In the present essay, the treatment
of each problem or type of controversy will necessarily be only illustrative.
139. See KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-39 (1957).
140. The decentralization of the international system, a condition under which each
state was responsible for its own defense, made it necessary at times to have recourse to
anticipatory self-defense. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 231 (3d ed. 1948).
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their exclusive values, rather than upon the complementary set of policies
emphasizing the more inclusive claims of minimum destruction and humani-
tarianism. As conviction of the common interest in postponing Armageddon
grows, and slow, if tortuous and scarcely observable, progress is made toward
more effective organization and centralization in the world arena, the hope that
may be held out is that the set of policies embodying the restraint of coercion
and the promotion of humanitarianism may rise in the balance and that the
scope of permissible coercion may gradually be attenuated and more exacting
standards of humanity formulated and applied.
MAJOR PROBLEMS AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES: THE COMMON INTEREST IN
MINIMUM DESTRUCTION OF VALUES
Community Prohibition of Resort to Coercion
The most difficult problem which today confronts world public order is
that of characterizing and preventing unlawful violence. The history is familiar
how over the centuries, through bellum iustum, the covenant of the League of
Nations, the Pact of Paris, the judgments at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and the
charter of the United Nations, the public order of the world community has
at long last come to a prohibition of certain coercion as a method of international
change and to a distinction between permissible and nonpermissible coercion.1 41
It is equally well-known that before this prohibition and distinction were
achieved, and the supporting principles of community concern and collective
responsibility institutionalized, 42 however weakly, traditional doctrine recog-
nized in each state an uncontrolled faculty, as a sovereign competence and
prerogative, to prosecute its rights, real or imagined, by recourse to coercion
and violence.1 43 Such doctrine of course reflected the then dominant patterns
of multipolarity and power balancing in the world arena and the completely
decentralized and unorganized character of the community of states, as well as
the atomistic conceptions of state security and the limitations of the available
military technology.
The basic complementary policies embodied in the contemporary prescriptions
on recourse to coercion are reasonably clear. In its prohibition of certain co-
141. See MARTIN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY: A PROGRESS REPORT (1952); PomPE, AG-
GRESSIVE WAR, AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME (1953); WEHBERG, THE OUTLAWRY OF WAR
(Zeydel transl. 1931); Komarnicki, La D~finition de l'Aggresseur dans le Droit Inter-
national Moderne, 75 HAGUE RECUEIL 1 (1949) ; Tucker, The Interpretation of War Under
Present International Law, 4 INT'L L.Q. 11 (1951) ; Von Elbe, The Evolution of the Con-
cept of the Just War in International Law, 33 Am. J. INT'L L. 665 (1939) ; Waldock, The
Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81 HAGUE
REcuE-. 455 (1952).
142. See HOGAN, INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE PRINCIPLE
OF CONCERN IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1955).
143. See SEOTWELL, WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 14 (1929); cf.
POmPE, op. cit. supra note 141, at 138-52; 1 WRIGHT, A STUDY OF WAR 331, 335-41 (1942) ;
McNair, Collective Security, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 150, 151 (1936) ; Nussbaum, Just War
-A Legal Concept?, 42 MICH. L. REV. 453, 476 (1943).
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ercion, the community attempts to effect a policy of promoting change through
procedures of peaceful persuasion. The assumption that underlies this policy
is that coercion and violence, necessarily entailing the destruction of values, are
not suitable instrumentalities for asserting and prosecuting claims for change. 44
In characterizing certain other coercion as permissible, the community seeks
quite rationally to utilize coercion as an instrument of order by authorizing its
use for community police actions, and acknowledges the still low degree of
organization attained by permitting individual and collective self-defense as a
response to unlawful coercion. 145 The technical legal concepts by which such
policies are sought, sometimes summed up as an attempt to secure and maintain
a "community monopoly of force,' 46 are equally complementary: for character-
izing nonpermissible coercion, there are such phrases as "war of aggression,"
"crimes against peace," "threats to the peace," "breach of the peace," "acts of
aggression," "threat or use of force," "intervention," and so on; for designating
permissible coercion, the terms are "self-defense," "collective self-defense,"
"police action," "enforcement measures," "reprisal," and so forth.
In the framing of the United Nations Charter, the deliberate choice was
made to keep these technical characterizations as ambiguous as they appear. 147
For the past decade, however, a tremendous resurgence of agitation for their
clarification has appeared. The principal effort has so far centered about a
"definition of aggression," upon the assumption that if aggression is clarified,
self-defense and justifiable police action will not be far behind. Many definitions,
both official and unofficial, have been offered in many bodies, both official and
unofficial. Some definitions are enumerative in approach, attempting a catalogue
of concrete situations of aggression and reciting such "first shot" items as a
declaration of war, invasion, bombardment, landing of troops and supporting
of armed bands.148 Others are generic or catchall formulations seeking to cover
144. Thus, the Nuremberg Tribunal, echoing Dubois's "omne bellum in se Inalum et
illicituin," quoted in Possony, Peace Enforcement, 55 YALE L.J. 910, 912 (1946), said:
"War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerents alone
but affect the whole world.
"To initiate a war of aggression . . . is the supreme international crime differing
only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the
whole." Opinion and Judgment, in NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 16 (1947).
145. Cf. KELsEN, op. cit. supra note 139, at 25.
146. KELSEN, PRINCIPL.S OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-15 (1952).
147. See Report of the Rapporteur (Boncour) of Comm. 111/3 to Comm'n III of
the San Francisco Conference, 12 U.N. CONF. INT'L ORG. Docs. 505 (1945) ; GOODRICH &
HAM RO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMlENTS 263-66 (2d
rev. ed. 1949).
148. The example par excellence of an enumerative definition is that proposed by the
Soviet Union, found, in its more recent form, in U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.77/L.4 (1957).
The Soviet draft definition finds its prototype in the London Conventions for the Definition
of Aggression of 1933, 147 LEAGUE Op NATIONS TREATY SERIES 67,77 (1933) ; 148 id. at 211,
and in the Draft Act prepared by the 1933 Geneva Disarmament Conference, Committee on
Security Questions, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments [1933],
Politis Report, 2 CONF. Docs. (1935.IX.4) 679-90 (1935).
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any threat or use of force by one state against another, in any manner, open or
covert, and whatever the weapons, for any purpose other than for self-defense
or police action.' 49 Still other definitions endeavor to combine the enumerative
and generic approaches.' 0  Amid all this intellectual contention, one strongly
held view-the present official position of the governments of the United States
and the United Kingdom-is that all attempt at definition is futile, that all
definitions would restrict the freedom of decision-making organs of the United
Nations to determine aggression from the particular and peculiar circumstances
of each instance of coercion.51
It is of course as futile to seek a reificatory, absolutist and all-sufficing defini-
tion of aggression as of any other legal concept or word.152 But the impossibility
of absolute precision does not necessarily render complete confusion desirable.
In this most fundamental problem of all, as in lesser problems, legal principles
might be formulated which would serve the same function that other legal
principles serve-that of bringing to the focus of attention of a decision-maker
relevant factors in context which should rationally affect decision. 5 3 From
149. See, e.g., the draft definitions that were submitted to the International Law Com-
mission by Mr. Alfaro, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/L.31, at 27 (1951); Mr. Amado, U.N.
Doc. No. A/CN.4/L.6 (1951); Mr. Cordova, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/L.10 (1951); Mr.
Yepes, U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/L.12 (1951). See also the Iraqi draft definition, U.N.
Doc. No. A/AC.77/L.13, Annex II, at 5-6 (1957) ; Alfaro, La Cuesti6n de la Definici6n de
la Agresi6n, 59 RmVlSTA DE DEciro INTERNAciONAL 361 (Cuba 1951).
150. The draft definitions proposed in 1956 by Iran and Panama, U.N. Doc. No.
A/AC.77/L.13, Annex II, at 4-5 (1957); Paraguay, id. at 3-4; The Dominican Republic,
Mexico, Paraguay and Peru, id. at 9-10, are the more recent examples. Earlier ones include
the formulations submitted by Mexico and Bolivia. U.N. Doc. No. A./AC.66/L.11, Annex
(1953).
151. See the statements of the representative of the United States (Mr. Klutznick) in
the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. No. A/C.6/SR.519, at 14-18
(1957), and of the representative of the United Kingdom (Mr. Vallet), U.N. Doc. No.
A/C.6/SR.523, at 2-5 (1957). See also Fitzmaurice, The Definition of Aggression, 1
INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 137 (1952).
152. Cf. Dias, Mechanism of Definition as Applied to International Law, 1954 CAM.
L.J. 215, 219.
153. It is sometimes suggested that the clarification of legal principles has no signifi-
cant part to play in the prevention of catastrophic violence. The prevention of such violence,
the argument runs, must depend upon new dispositions of effective power and not upon
rearrangements of authoritative words.
This argument underestimates the degree to which a careful clarification of authoritative
community goals may aid in securing the necessary sustaining dispositions of effective
power. One of the lessons of contemporary science about human behavior is that it helps
in creating the conditions necessary for the achievement of a goal to have the goal more
sharply delineated. The clarification in detail of distinctions between lawful and unlawful
coercion will not, of course, of itself establish all the necessary conditions for restraint of
unlawful coercion. But it may perform the very necessary task of outlining the major
contours of the effects sought-in terms of which alternative choices in the rearrangement
of effective power and in the adoption of new modalities in practice must be appraised.
The clarification of community goals about "aggression" need not retard and might even
stimulate the establishment of more effective institutions for the performance of various
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this perspective, the basic task is one of categorizing such variable contextual
factors with respect to the distinction between permissible and nonpermissible
coercion. Inquiry of the kind recommended above into the processes of coercion
and decision suggests that such a categorization might include interrelated
factors like the following:
(a) The chronological factor of priority in resort to coercion of substantial
degree, not in terms simply of the "first shot" but of all modes of coercion. 15 4
(b) The occasion for the coercion-whether the purpose exhibited by the
initiator, objectively ascertained, is to attack and acquire values held by the
target-state or to conserve and protect its own values, and whether the initiator
seeks exclusive or inclusive values.
(c) The type and intensity or the consequentiality of the coercion threat-
ened or exercised. 155
necessary policy functions, the adoption of more effective programs in economic develop-
ment and trade, the more general promotion of human rights and freedom of inquiry
and communication and the creation of progressively more comprehensive regional
organizations.
154. The element of priority in time has been stressed by Spiropoulos, who regards
it as "logically inherent in any notion of aggression. Aggression is presumably: acting as
first." U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/44, at 65 (1951). See also the statements of Politis in
Records of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armamwnts, 2 MINuTEs
OF THE GEN. CoMM'N 500 (League of Nations, Ser. B 1933). Priority can, of course,
be determined only within a specific delimited time sequence. The delimitation of the rele-
vant time sequence is primarily a function of the definor's choice of the material causative
factors. To give in all cases exclusive significance to the "first shot"--to overt military
violence-may be grossly to underestimate the potentialities of all the contemporary modes
of exercising coercion, both military and nonmilitary. On the "first shot" test, Judge
Moore dryly observed that "the law does not require a man who believes himself to be
in danger to assume that his adversary is a bad shot." 6 Moon , COLLECTED PAPERS 445
(1944).
155. There was some appreciation of the relevance of this factor in the discussions in
the 1956 Special Committee. Certain delegates argued that "since certain degrees could
be said to exist in the use of force and not all of them were serious enough to describe
as aggression.., the use of force had to be sufficiently serious to constitute aggression."
It was urged, in particular, that "frontier incidents" would have to be excluded from the
possible forms of aggression. U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.77/L.13, at 19 (1957). Similarly,
many delegates advanced the view that "economic or ideological aggression did not entitle
individual States to the same defensive action as did armed attack," id. at 22, the premise
being, it appears, that "economic and ideological aggression" do not exhibit the same
intensity of coercion as does "armed attack."
Recognition of the importance of the factor of consequentiality, as well as of the
complementary factor of proportionality, seems implicit in the proposal of the Netherlands
representative that the Committee address itself to defining and clarifying the term "armed
attack" as used in U.N. CHARTER art. 51. "The crucial point," in the view of the Nether-
lands representative, "was to determine the cases of the use of armed force in which a
State might go to war in self-defense." He observed further that in cases of "border
incidents," a state could resort to "limited action in self-defense," based on its function
"to maintain law and order in its territory." U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.77/L.13, at 42 (1957).
See also id. at 49, 58, 59; and the view of the Iraqi delegate that the Soviet draft definition
"lacked a distinction between acts of force which did constitute aggression and acts of
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(d) The realism of expectations created in the target-state by the intensity
and proportions of the coercion threatened or exercised as to the necessity,
or imminence of necessity, of resort to countercoercion for the maintenance
of its freedom of decision-making and of its territorial base.5 6
(e) The type and intensity or degree of proportionality of the coercive
response of the target-state to the coercion initiated against it.
(f) The relative willingness of the contending participants to accept com-
munity intervention for the cessation of violence and nonviolent procedures
for settlement. 15 7
(g) The type and purpose of the decision demanded from an authoritative
decision-maker.' 58
(h) The probable effectiveness and costs of decision.' 59
force which did not," and that "the gravity of the act and of the situation in which it was
happening should be taken into account," id. at 50.
156. Cf. PomPE, AGGRESSIVE WAR, AN INTERNATIONAL CRImE 102-04 (1953), whose
views were adopted and elaborated by the Netherlands representative in the 1956 Special
Committee. The Netherlands representative urged that the criterion distinguishing armed
attack from other uses of force not entitling the target state "to take the action provided
for in Art. 51 [was] ... the use of force in such circumstances that the victim-State had
no means other than military to preserve its territorial integrity or political independence.
In case the use of force was such that United Nations intervention could provide sufficient
protection, an armed attack within the meaning of Article 51 did not exist." U.N. Doc
No. A/AC.77/L.13, at 63-64 (1957). See also R61ing, On Aggression, on International
Criminal Law, on International Criminal Jurisdiction, 2 NEDERLANDS TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR
INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 167 (1955); The Report of De Brouckkre, in Documai'Ts OF
THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, LEAGUE OF NATIONS
ser. III, pt. 93, at 100-01 (Doc. No. C.740.M.479.1926.IX) (1926); U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.
66/L.11, at 20 (1953).
157. U.N. CHARTER art. 40 authorizes the Security Council, for the purpose of pre-
venting "an aggravation of the situation," to "call upon the parties concerned to comply
with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable," and to "take account
of failure to comply with such provisional measures." The same power has been exercised
by the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. See U.N. Gen. Ass.
Res. No. 378(V), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 5th Sess., Plenary 308 (1950), entitled "Duties
of States Upon Outbreak of Hostilities." Cf. Professor Wright's suggestion that refusal "to
accept an armistice proposed in accordance with a procedure which [a state] has accepted
to implement its no-force obligation" may be taken as a test of aggression. Wright, The
Concept of Aggression in International Law, 29 Am. J. INT'L L. 373, 395 (1935). See also
Wright, The Test of Aggression it; the Italo-Ethiopian War, 30 id. at 45 (1936).
158. The discussions in the General Assembly and in the 1953 and 1956 Special Com-
mittees on the question of defining aggression indicate growing recognition that criteria
of aggression may differ as the types and purposes of decision differ. See, e.g., U.N.
Gen. Ass. Res. No. 599(VI), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rac. 6th Sess., Plenary 368 (1952);
U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. No. 688(VII), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REc 7th Sess., Plenary 408
(1952); U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.66/L.11, at 34-35 (1953); U.N. Doc. No. A/AC.77/L.13,
at 36 (1957). See also PomPE, op. cit. supra note 156, at 66-71, 95-115; STONE, LEGAL
CONT 0Ls 331, 333, conceding that criteria for purposes of "peace enforcement against
states" and criteria for purposes of "punishment of individuals" may vary, but denying that a
"workable definition" is available to meet either purpose.
159. See notes 112-15 supra and accompanying text.
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Still another factor, somewhat less obvious, perhaps deserves no less at-
tention: the anticipated impact of a proposed decision on the values of the
system of world public order to which the decision-maker adheres. The debates
in the United Nations show clearly that representatives of states adhering to
a totalitarian world public order consistently assess proposals on this basis.
From a perspective which postulates the desirability of maintaining and fur-
thering a public order honoring human freedom, the suggestion may be ventured
that so long as competing systems of world public order remain, it may at best
be simple Utopian idealism for decision-makers committed to nontotalitarian
conceptions of world public order to reject that factor as of no relevance at
all.160
Different decision-makers with different responsibilities do and must, of
course, weight varying factors differently in differing contexts. The function
of the United Nations representative in preventing or repressing aggression
and in activating the machinery of collective security, the function of the official
of a nation-state in deciding upon the necessity of countering coercion and
the function of the judge on an international tribunal charged with allocating
criminal liabilities after the cessation of violence are obviously quite different.
The judge imposing penalties may have to consider many mitigating and per-
haps exculpating circumstances; he may require a high degree of proof
without weakening any deterrent effect of criminal sanctions. But in a world
in which the major powers are continuously observing each other and calcu-
lating every change and proposal for change in terms of possible effects upon
relative fighting potential, ready to act upon the split second with all con-
temporary instruments of vast destruction, 1' 1 the United Nations representa-
160. This proposal that a decision-maker take into account the anticipated impact of
alternatives in decision upon the values of the system of world public order to which
he subscribes has encountered the objections that it ignores that "justice is blind" and
requires a decision-maker to abandon impartiality for identification with one or the other
of the contending participants. The answer is that the symbol of justice as a blind goddess,
balancing scales evenly between unknown parties, comes from the assumed relevance of
analogy to a completed legal system-that is, to municipal systems, exhibiting a single
inclusive public order and a high degree of consensus among members about how values
should be shaped and shared. The analogy scarcely appears apt when it is considered, as
we have emphasized, that the contemporary world arena exhibits not one completed, in-
clusive public order but a number of incomplete, exclusive, contending orders, each with
its own perspectives about law and about how values should be shaped and shared. The
rational course for a decision-maker subscribing to the values of freedom, who locates
himself in time and conceives his task to be that of moving an incomplete public order of
freedom still further toward completion in practice as well as in theory, would appear
to be to appraise carefully the significance of all the factors in any particular context
which may affect movement toward or away from the order he seeks. To permit decision
to be controlled mechanically by the presumed dictates of an inappropriate analogy from
a very different public order, especially when representatives of opposing world orders
do not so handicap themselves, could be suicidal.
161. The possibility and perils of a surprise attack appear to be enhanced as the velocity
and destructiveness of contemporary weapons systems increase. The chilling possibilities
of mistakes in identification may also increase. Hanson Baldwin writes that there
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tive and the nation-state official must be authorized to act quickly and upon
less exacting requirements of proof, if authority is to have any substantial
purpose. The traditional requirements imposed upon resort to self-defense-
a realistic expectation of instant, imminent military attack and carefully cal-
culated proportionality in response-may, in more particular, require some
redefinition to take into account the potentialities of the newer technology of
violence.' 0 2 From this perspective, the emphasis in the United Nations Charter
upon "armed attack" as the precipitating event for the legitimate recourse to
self-defense may appear most unrealistic.
Community Regulation of Participation in Coercion
The consideration of community regulation of participation involves two
closely interrelated but perhaps distinguishable problems: the first requires
a determination of the degree of common responsibility available for the main-
tenance of public order and of the extent to which nonparticipation is per-
missible; and the second requires a determination, in whatever degree non-
participation is permissible, of the relative rights and duties of belligerents
and nonparticipants in particular situations.
With respect to the first problem, the technical doctrines and detailed rules
of nineteenth-century neutrality sought to limit involvement in, and the spatial
extension of, violence. These doctrines and rules were originally formulated
in a multipolar arena of participants of relatively equal power 16 3 and, as al-
have been instances when the United States Strategic Air Command bombers, carrying
nuclear explosives, were ordered on an emergency takeoff after radar screens registered
what appeared to be large numbers of unidentified planes approaching United States
bases. In the case of ballistic missiles, Mr. Baldwin observed that recall after launching
is impossible and that the period of control, in the sense of capacity to destroy the missile
in flight, is measured in minutes. N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1958, p. 16, cols. 5-6.
162. At least two points about contemporary weapons require consideration. One
is that missile weapons make necessary a very short "reaction time"--the time required
for reacting with defensive and offensive measures to enemy attack or threat of attack.
It has been estimated that present radar systems can give at most fifteen to twenty
minutes warning of an attack by means of missiles. Hanson Baldwin, id. Feb. 5, 1958, p.
14, col. 2; International Security: The Military Aspect, in SPECIAL STUDiES REPORT II,
56 (Rockefeller Bros. Fund 1958). Obviously, there may be very little time and op-
portunity for calculation of proportionality. The second point is the possibility that,
under certain conditions, the initial attacks may prove decisive. See Beukema, Warfare
and Military Organization, in MODERN WORLD POLITICS 374, 378 (Kalijarvi ed. 1953).
While this possibility may be curtailed, so far as concerns the superpowers vis-a-vis each
other and to the extent that an "atomic stalemate" exists and is maintained, it cannot be
entirely ruled out, even as between the superpowers. The equilibrium represented by an
"atomic stalemate" is extremely delicate and precarious.
163. See, generally, Jessup & Deak, The Origins, in 1 NzuTRALInY: ITS HISTORY,
ECONOMICS AND LAW (1935) ; Phillips & Reede, The Napoleonic Period, in 2 id. (1936).
The structure of the arena permitted the operation of power balancing of which the possi-
bilities of nonparticipation were a function. See Morgenthau, The Problem of Neutrality,
7 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 109, 112-16 (1939); Morgenthau, The Resurrection of Neu-
trality in Europe, 33 Am. Pol. ScI. REv. 473, 480-83 (1939); Wright, International Law
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ready suggested, were but one expression of an overriding policy of permitting,
in an unorganized and decentralized community of states, the resolution of issues
by the relative strength of the contending participants. The most basic premise
of the whole structure of prescription and doctrine was that recourse to violence
was an exercise of the discretionary competence of a sovereign state and that
other states were not entitled to sit in judgment upon the legitimacy of either
belligerent's cause. 64
Again, however, developments in recent decades have caused once hallowed
doctrines to atrophy. The emergence of a community prohibition upon recourse
to violence, supported by commitments as in the United Nations Charter to
a common responsibility for the maintenance of public order, have destroyed
the more important policy premises of traditional doctrines of neutrality and
raised grave questions of the degree to which shared responsibility can endure
claims of impartiality. The words of the United Nations Charter do authorize
the Security Council 165 and perhaps even the General Assembly, if certain
provisions be appropriately interpreted,16 6 to call upon both member and non-
member states to participate in varying degree in measures designed to repress
violence authoritatively characterized as unlawful.
Nonetheless, to suppose that either claims to nonparticipation or the doc-
trines of neutrality have entirely departed would be extremely rash. Amor-
phous groupings of "uncommitted" states have appeared, and recognition of
the increasingly massive destructive capabilities of contemporary weapons makes
a policy of restricting involvement in coercion and violence seem considerably
more rational than it did not too long ago.16'7 Moreover, most observers agree
that the formal prescriptions of the charter leave many gaps through which
permissible nonparticipation may still assert itself.168 Because of the veto, the
and Power Politics, 2 MEASUR 123, 126 (1951); Wright, The Present Status of Neu-
trality, 34 Am. J. INT'L L. 391, 410-14 (1940).
164. BRIERLY, THE OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 25-26 (1944); 2 OPPENHEIM-
LAUTERPACHT 639, 644; PoLiTIs, NEUTRALITY AND PEACE 4-14, 83-84 (1936) ; Komarnicki,
The Place of Neutrality in the Modern System of International Law, 80 HAGUE REcUErL
399, 411-12 (1952) ; Lauterpacht, Neutrality and Collective Security, 2 POLITICA 133,
146 (1936).
165. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 5, 6; id. art. 25; id. c. VII.
166. U.N. CHaARTER art. 2, paras. 5, 6; id. arts. 10, 11, 12, 24, para. 1. The "Uniting
for Peace" resolution, U.N. Gen. Ass. Res. No. 377(V), U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. R.c.
5th Sess., Plenary 302 (1950), has been the subject of controversy in which much
erudition and exegetical talent have been expended. See, e.g., KELSEN, RECENT TRENDS
IN THE UNITED NATIONS 959-90 (1950); STONE, LmAL CONTROLS 266-78; Andrassy,
Uniting for Peace, 50 Am. J. INT 'L L. 563 (1956). The controversy as to the "constitu-
tionality" of the resolution may have become largely academic. In the Suez and Hungarian
cases, the Security Council itself invoked the resolution and called the General Assembly
into emergency sessions.
167. Cf. Morgenthau, Neutrality and Neutralism, 11 Y.B. OF WORLD AFFAIRS 47, 67-75
(1957).
168. See, e.g., the analyses set out in 2 OPPENEIM-LAUTERPACaT 645-52; TUCKER,
THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRrLTY AT SEA 171-80 (1957); Komarnicki, The Problem
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Security Council may not be able to reach a decision or, if it does, may call for
participation by only a few states or in differing degree. The powers of the
General Assembly have been generally disputed, as well as the powers of the
organization as a whole with respect to nonmembers. A state demanding the ad-
vantages of nonparticipation may, accordingly, still be able to do so in the vest-
ments of respectable authority; that it is able to do so is again but a reflection of
the rudimentary character of the organization observable in the world arena.
Thus, the second problem about participation must often be faced, that of
determining the relative rights and duties of belligerents and nonparticipants.
Traditionally, authoritative decision-makers have sought to reconcile and ac-
commodate the contraposed policies of military effectiveness, in terms of per-
mitting a belligerent to effect the isolation of its opponent, and of minimizing
unnecessary disruptions of the value processes of nonparticipating states.1 69
The reconciliation is achieved through complementary concepts: on the one
hand, "rights of belligerents," "duties of neutrals," "angary and requisition,"
"blockade," "contraband," "unneutral service" and "ultimate destination";
on the other, "rights of neutrals," "duties of belligerents," "inviolability of neu-
tral territory," "ineffective blockade" and "freedom of the seas." Some of these
technical doctrines and the detailed policies they embody conceivably will
survive into the future. What is certain, however, is that to whatever degree
they do survive, they will be refashioned by specific practical interpretations to
fit the special conditions and demands of future wars, with their own peculiar
limits or lack of limits.
One further point that perhaps may be given emphasis is that here, as with
the problem of impermissible resort to coercion, a decision-maker sharing the
values of a nontotalitarian world public order might again rationally take into
account the probable consequences for such values of any particular decision
demanded. Neither the unfortunate circumstance that the United Nations
cannot reach a "binding" decision in a particular case nor the inability or un-
willingness of some states to assume a full share of responsibility for the mainte-
nance of public order requires a state to demand all the rights and assume all the
duties of traditional neutrality. A resolution of the General Assembly, coupled
with the general commitment of members embodied in article 2(5) of the
of Neutrality Under the United Nations Charter, 38 TRANSACT. GROT. Soc'Y 77 (1952) ;
Lalive, International Organization and Neutrality, 24 BaIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 72 (1947);
Taubenfeld, International Actions and Neutrality, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 377 (1953). The
possibility of permanent neutrality for a member also exists, where such neutrality is ac-
cepted by the permanent members, as in the case of Austria. See Kunz, Austria's Per-
manent Neutrality, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 418 (1956); Verdross, Austrias Permanent
Neutrality and the United Nations Organization, 50 id. at 61.
169. Cf. Jessup, Today and Tonwrrow, in 4 NEuTRA.Irv: ITS HISTORY, EcoNomics
AND LAW 12-13 (1936); Morgenthau, Neutrality and Neutralism, 11 Y.B. oF WoRLD
AFFAIRS 47, 52, 53 (1957). In chapter two, Professor Jessup makes the point that economic
motives and interests frequently underlie the respective claims and countering claims
of belligerents and neutrals. See also CASTRREN, THE PRESENT LAW OF WAR AND NEU-
TRAm TY 425-27 (1954).
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charter, may be construed to authorize a state to appraise the lawfulness of each
belligerent's cause and accordingly to discriminate in its demands.170 In such
decision and discrimination, the effects of any resolution urged on the values
of a world public order honoring freedom need not be left unconsidered.
Regulation of the Conduct of Hostilities
In the regulation of hostilities, the patterns of specific controversy to which
authority must respond are established by the reciprocal claims of the partici-
pants to apply violence against each other's bases of power, by employing certain
combatants and weapons, in certain areas of operation, against certain objects
of attack.
For resolving such controversies, authoritative decision-makers bring to bear
the familiar complementary policies of military necessity and humanitarian-
ism.1 71 In all the many varying contexts, these polar policies struggle for
recognition and ascendancy or compromise: permissible destruction is character-
ized in such technical terms as "combatant," "unprivileged belligerency," "mili-
tary objective," "permissible weapon," "war booty" and "legitimate repris-
als"; nonpermissible destruction is described in such terms as "noncombatants,"
"civilian immunity," "open city," "nonmilitary objective" and "unlawful
confiscation."
The key concept in this structure of doctrine is of course that of military
necessity, which affects both the formulation of general prescriptions and their
concrete application in particular instances. In a form of statement which adds
a few words to the general principle of economy in the exercise of force, this
concept may be said to authorize such destruction, and only such destruction,
as is necessary, relevant and proportionate to the prompt realization of legitimate
belligerent objectives.'7 2 Since it is not feasible, as a practical matter, to quantify
170. See MARTIN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY: A PRoGRass REPORT 146 (1952) ; 2 OPPEN-
HEIm-LAUJTERPACHT 652; Komarnicki, The Problem of Neutrality Under the United
Nations Charter, 38 TRANSACT. Gaor. Soc'y 77, 85-86 (1952); Woolsey, The Uniting
for Peace Resolution of the United Nations, 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 129, 134 (1951). Even
the failure of the Assembly to arrive at a recommendation need not mean lack of formal
authoritative bases for permissive participation and discrimination. Residual bases may
be available in art. 51 of the charter and the Pact of Paris. See 2 OPPE HEIU-LAUTER-
PACHT 651; Lalive, supra note 168, at 81-82; Komarnickd, The Place of Neutrality it
the Modern System of International Law, 80 HAGUE RECUEiL 399, 480-82 (1952).
171. Explicit recognition of the complementary, rather than contradictory, character
of these principles may be found in DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE
1111 220(a), (b)- (1957), quoted in TUCKER, op. cit. supra note 168, at -369 n.11. See
also Dunbar, The Significance of Military Necessity in the Law of War, 67 JuriD. REv.
201, 212 (1955).
172. Comparable formulations abound in the literature. See, e.g., HALL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 83 (Iiggins ed. 1924): "When violence is permitted at all, the amount which is
permissible is that which is necessary to attain the object proposed. The measure of the
violence which is permitted in war is therefore that which is required to reduce the enemy
to terms." 3 Pmamu op, CoMMENTARIEs UPoN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (3d ed. 1885):
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and precisely to measure the amount of destruction necessary, the fundamental
policy embraced in this concept must be modestly expressed as the minimizing
of unnecessary destruction of values. Because the law of war is designed for
the benefit of all mankind and not merely of certain belligerents, most observers
agree, further, that this most basic policy of the minimum unnecessary destruc-
tion of values applies to all forms of hostilities, irrespective of the characteri-
zation of the resort to violence as lawful or unlawful ;173 of the formal character
of one or the other participant as an intrastate rebel group or unrecognized
government or authority, 174 or an international organization ;175 of the intensity
"The great principle upon which all these rules are framed, is that of, on the one hand,
compelling the enemy to do justice as speedily as possible, and, on the other hand, of
abstaining from the infliction of all injuries both upon the subjects of the enemy, and
upon the Government and subjects of third powers, which do not, certainly and clearly,
tend to the accomplishment of this object." BrRKENHMAD, INTERNATIONAL LAW 218
(Moelwyn-Hughes ed. 1927) : "The general principle must always be observed that only
such violence is permissible as is reasonably proportionate to the object to be attained."
173. Lauterpacht, Rides of War in an Unlawful War, in LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
WORLD COMMTUNITY 89 (Lipsky ed. 1953) ; Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of
the Laws of War, 30 BaT. Y.B. INT'L L. 206 (1953). In the first article, Judge
Lauterpacht expressed certain qualifications as to the applicability of the law of war in
an unlawful war, at least one of which-that only "laws of warfare in the strict sense
of the word," as distinguished from rules relating to the acquisition of title to property,
are so applicable-he discarded in the second article. See also TUCKER, op. cit. supra
note 168, at 4-11; Kunz, The Law of War, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 313, 317-19 (1956). As
to the decisions of the war crimes tribunals on this point, see, e.g., Trial of List, 8 LAW
REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 34, 59 (1949) ; Trial of Altstotter, 6 id. at 1, 52
(1948) ; Trial of Von Leeb, 12 id. at 1, 123-26 (1949) ; Re Christiansen, case No. 121,
DUTCH SPECIAL COURT AT ARNHEM, ANNUAL DIGEST (1948).
174. While in traditional law, recognition by the legitimate government of the belliger-
ency of the rebel groups has been regarded as a formal condition for the applicability
of the law of war, there is recent awareness that the fundamental policy of minimum
unnecessary destruction of values is independent, in its application, of a formal recog-
nition of belligerency. Thus, although the 1949 Geneva Conventions do not purport to
be applicable as such in civil wars, they set forth minimum standards to be observed by each
party to an "armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties." Art. 3 of all .four Conventions.
Again, art. 13 of the Wounded and Sick Convention, and art. 4 of the Prisoners
of War Convention, include, among the persons entitled to their protection, "members
of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a Government or an authority not
recognized by the Detaining Power."
175. See JESsuP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 213 (1948); 2 OPPENHEIm-LAUTER-
PACHT 224-25; Baxter, The Role of Law in Modern War, 47 PROc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L
L. 90 (1953) ; Kunz, The Law of War, 50 Am. J. INT'L L. 313, 319-20 (1956). See also
Taubenfeld, International Armed Forces and the Rules of War, 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 671,
676-79 (1951), who, however, makes the cryptic statement that "all in all, it cannot be
said that the laws of war, in their old form, are prima facie binding on international
forces on a strictly legal basis." Compare Wright, The Outlawry of War and the Law
of War, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 365, 374-75 (1953) ; Committee on Study of Legal Problems
of the United Nations, Should the Laws of War Apply to United Nations Enforcement
Action?, 46 Paoc. Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. 216 (1952).
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of the violence and its extension in time and space ;71 and of recognition or
nonrecognition of the existence of a technical state of war.
177
The basic difficulty in this fundamental policy principle of military necessity
is reasonably obvious. It contains an inherent and infinitely manipulatable ob-
scurity in its reference to the "legitimate" objectives of violence.178 The basic
principles and most of the prescriptions on the management of hostilities were
first formulated before the public order of the world community, by imposing
a prohibition upon resort to violence and distinguishing between permissible
and nonpermissible violence, began to seek to regulate the objectives of violence.
Thus, in their formulations of the principle of military necessity, commentators
have frequently referred to belligerents' objectives in terms of military aims
so expansive as to cover every possible objective: "the overpowering and utter
176. Kunz, The Law of War, 50 AM. J. IN L L. 313, 321 (1956); see GRoB, THE
RELATIlvY OF WAR AND PEACE 217-18 (1949).
177. Article 2 of all four 1949 Geneva Conventions declares the Conventions applic-
able to "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between
two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized
by one of them." This provision apparently does not cover a situation, such as the Sino-
Japanese hostilities in 1937, where both parties refuse to acknowledge the existence of
a state of war. See Kunz, The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, in LAW AND
POLICS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 305 (Lipsky ed. 1953). But see Yingling &
Ginnane, The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 46 Am. J. INT'L, L. 393, 394 (1952).
178. The obscurity is rooted in the difficulty in distinguishing the total political
objectives of a belligerent in resorting to coercion from specific military objectives
sought in the course of conducting hostilities. The total political purposes of a belligerent
may be characterized as impermissible in the sense that the initial resort to coercion
is regarded as unlawful. This does not mean, however, that authoritative decision-makers
either do or should deny to such a belligerent, because of the nonpermissible character
of its total purposes, the application of the principle of military necessity in determining
the lawfulness or unlawfulness of specific acts done during the course of hostilities. Com-
pare Wright, The Outlawry of War and the Law of War, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 365, 371
n.28 (1953). The problem of determining whether a state has by its total political pur-
poses and acts breached the community prohibition upon resort to violence is very different
from the problem of determining the responsibility of individuals for specific acts of destruc-
tion. Though failing in its efforts to prevent unlawful resort to violence, the general com-
munity of states may still seek to secure a policy of minimizing unnecessary destruction of
values during hostilities and, for that end, impose the same standards of humanitarianism up-
on both the belligerent exercising lawful defense or engaging in police action and the aggres-
sor-belligerent. In some limited contexts of active combat, a distinction may be drawn,
in appraising the necessity for specific acts of violence, between total political purposes
and specific limited operational military objectives, such as the capture and occupation of
a particular locality and the advance to or retreat from a particular line or zone, and
necessity measured against those specific limited military objectives. See, e.g., United
States v. List, 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINAi.S BEFORE THE NURMIBERG MILITARY TRI-
BUNALS 759, 1295-97 (1949) ; United States v. Von Leeb, id. at 462, 541, involving charges
of unnecessary devastation, where the necessity for the devastation was measured against
the specific military purpose of successful retreat in the face of advancing Russian forces;
the accused were found not guilty. In other contexts, however, the distinction becomes
difficult to make. Consider the continuing debate about the legal justification of strategic
bombardment and of the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
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defeat of the enemy,"' 79 "complete surrender,"' 80 "complete submission"' 8'1
or "victory. '1 8 2 But the world arena presents little agreement on the legitimate
objectives of coercion and violence and substantial agreement is unlikely so
long as rival systems of world public order, totalitarian and free, compete for
supremacy. The further clarification of the detailed limits of permissible
violence in the conduct of hostilities must await still further clarification of
permissible objectives in resort to violence.-8 3
The best that can be done by way of clarification is to review the compromises
between military necessity and humanitarianism which earlier authoritative
decision-makers have effected in the various types of controversies arising out
of the conduct of hostilities and to suggest alternatives in compromise which
may be more compatible with the values of a free society in the world arena
probably emerging. Detailed clarification could extend into volumes; this essay
can only touch quickly a few major points.
Combatants
Decision-makers have sought to protect combatants against surprise18 4
and to limit the involvement of individuals in war and their subjection to direct
179. 2 OPPENHIr-LAUTERPACHT 225.
180. Downey, The Law of War and Military Necessity, 47 Am. J. INTeL L. 251, 254
(1953).
181. 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1801 (2d rev. ed. 1945). The old War Department
Field Manual, FM 27-10, DEPARTMENT OF WAR, RULES OF LAND WARFARE ffff 22-23
(FM 27-10, 1940), used the same term. The new FM 27-10, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
LAW OF LAND WARFARE ff 3 (FM 27-10, 1956), states that "The law of war ... requires
that belligerents refrain from employing any kind or degree of violence which is not
actually necessary for military purposes." DEPARTMENT OF THE NAvY, THE LAW OF NAVAL
WARARE ff 220 (a) (1957), on the other hand, speaks of military necessity as permitting
"a belligerent to apply only that degree and kind of regulated force, not otherwise pro-
hibited by the laws of war, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy
with the least possible expenditure of time, life and physical resources."
182. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS 351.
183. It is obvious enough that any particular quantum of instrumental violence can
be appraised as necessary or unnecessary, not in vacuo, but only in context and in relation
to a determined purpose or objective. If characterization of violence in terms of lawfulness or
unlawfulness depends upon appraisal of necessity, the purpose or objective must be relevant in
that characterization. The problem of indicating the purpose or objective against which
necessity is to be measured, however, is not eliminated by frequently difficult distinctions
between military purposes and ultimate political purposes. Military purposes are not fixed
constants; they are, at least in broad outline, determined and controlled by the character
and scope of the political purposes of the belligerent. See note 92 supra. The narrower
or broader the scope of political objectives characterized as permissible, the narrower
or broader will be the legitimate military purposes; and as legitimate military purposes
are narrowed, the quantum of violence necessary for their achievement, and hence, in
general principle, lawful, tends to diminish. See note 178 su1pra; cf. TucKER, THE LAW
OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA 49 (1957).
184. Belligerents are, it is said, entitled to know who their enemies are. See THE
GERMAN WAR BOOK 61 (Morgan transl. 1915); Cowles, Recent Practical Aspects of the
Laws of War, 18 TuL L. REv. 121, 133 (1943). See also WINFIELD, THE FOUNDATIONS
.ND FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (1941).
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attack' by confining permissible combatancy, carrying with it a right to
admission to prisoner-of-war status upon capture, generally to a well-defined
category of individuals-members of the public armed forces of participating
states exhibiting certain prescribed indicia. The realism of this policy may differ
as future wars are total or limited.
Areas of Operation
The delimitation of permissible areas of operation is based on deference to
claims of nonparticipant states to "inviolability" of their territory, waters and
airspace. However, the nonparticipant's tolerance of, or inability to prevent,
unilateral violation of its territory may convert such territory into a permissible
area of operation.18 6 The recent Geneva Conventions and contemporary dis-
cussions of limited war raise the' possibility of establishing, by mutual agree-
ment, zones of immunity in the territories of participants for the special pro-
tection of certain classes of individuals.8 7 The policy of limiting the involve-
ment of states and individuals in war is here again evident.
Weapons
The permissible or nonpermissible character of the employment of a particular
weapon or mode of attack has in broad principle been made by decision-makers
to turn upon the proportionality between the deprivation of values incidental
to the use of the weapon or mode of attack and the military advantage accruing
to the belligerent user.'88 As already mentioned, only weapons whose use has
resulted in incidental value deprivations obviously superfluous and grossly
disproportionate to the ensuing military advantage have been characterized as
185. The immunity from direct attack accorded by traditional law to the noncom-
batant individual assumed that that individual was a harmless nonparticipant. Farwicx,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 554 (3d ed. 1948) ; HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW (Higgins ed. 1924);
3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1799 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
186. See 3 HYDN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 2337-39, 2340-41 (2d rev. ed. 1945) ; 2 OPPEN-
-HEIM-LAuTERPAcHT 678-80; SMITH, TEE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 145 (2d ed.
1950). See also Coenca Brothers v. German State, case No. 389, ANNUAL DIGEST (1927-
28); The Anna Maria, case No. 174, ANNUAL DIGEST (1946); The Tinos and other
vessels, in GARNER, PRIzE LAW DURING THE WoRa WAR 228-30 (1927). The last two
cases involved conversion of neutral waters into a permissible area of operations for
purposes of exercise of the right of capture.
187. See art. 23 of the Wounded and Sick Convention, arts. 14, 15 of the Civilians
Convention, and the Draft Agreements relating to Hospital Zones and Localities annexed
to both conventions.
188. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 635-36 (Higgins ed. 1924), who also observed that
"the amount of destruction or suffering which may be caused is immaterial if the result
obtained is conceived to be proportionate"; GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
WORLD WAR 282 (1920); 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1813-18 (2d rev. ed. 1945);
SpAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 76-77 (1911). Conventional expression of the general
principle involved is found in the Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 and art. 23 (e) of
the Hague Regulations.
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nonpermissible and effectively outlawed.'8 9 Since such weapons are by definition
militarily inefficient-value deprivations necessitate the expenditure of force-
the compromise in favor of military necessity is obvious.
In particular, it may be noted that the argument about the supposed non-
permissible character of nuclear weapons is derived principally by analogy
from earlier prescriptions about poisonous gas, poisoned arms and other weapons
causing disproportionate suffering. 00 Analogies are important, however, only
so far as the policies they suggest are relevant; and analogies here suggest only
the requirements, again, of compromise between military necessity and humani-
tarianism. In the context of the contemporary world arena, a very strong case
would have to be made to establish that no possible uses of nuclear and thermo-
nuclear weapons could conceivably be within the scope of military necessity for
objectives legitimate by standards making reference to human dignity. The
very difficulty in securing explicit agreement about the effective control of such
weapons must suggest expectations of their military effectiveness and the perils
of relying upon any alleged limitations derived from analogies. The rational
position would appear to be that the lawfulness of any particular use or type
of use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons must be judged, like the use of
any weapon or technique of warfare, by the level of destruction effected-in other
words, by its reasonableness in the total context of a particular use.191
Objects of Attack
Under traditional doctrines, belligerents have been granted a wide discretion
in selecting and attacking the opponent's bases of power-human, material or
institutional-which, in substantial degree, are being used for belligerent pur-
poses. When the purposes of attack have been achieved, however, and the
189. See text at note 111 supra. The determination of what value deprivations may
be designated as "incidental" may, of course, present perplexing difficulties. These difficul-
ties include the demarcation of the boundaries of a physical target and the variable capa-
bility of weapons and modalities of attack for confining destruction within such boundaries.
Where the target selected is not possessed of spatial dimensions, such as "enemy morale,"
the possibility of determining the incidental character of deprivations may reach the
vanishing point.
190. See Sack, ABC-Atomic, Biological, Chemical Warfare in International Law,
10 LAw. GUILD Rv. 161 (1950). STONE, LEGAL CONTROLs 343, states that "radio-active
substances are clearly 'poisonous' or at least 'analogous substances' in any functional
sense" and that they "in a sense, cause injuries and inevitable death beyond the needs of
military operations." See also SPAIGHrT, AnR PoWER AND WA RIGHTs 275-76 (3d ed.
1947) ; foore, The Present State of International Law, in REPORT OF THE 46TH CONFER-
ENCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AssociATioN 12, 31 (1954).
191. Cf. TucxRm, op. cit. supra note 183, at 55, who distinguishes between uses "against
military objectives in the proximity of the non-combatant population" and uses "exclusively
against military forces in the field or naval forces at sea." It may also be noted that
the yield of nuclear explosives is subject to control and that low-yield weapons adapted
to tactical uses are now commonplace. See REINHARDT & KINTNER, ATomic WhA~oNs
IN LAND COMBAT (1953). We share the common humanitarian hope that such weapons
may eventually be outlawed. The humanitarian realist must recognize, however, that suc-
cessful outlawry will depend upon consensus and effective multilateral implementation.
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objects of attack deprived of their character as effective bases of enemy power,
the principle of humanitarianism becomes applicable and makes further violence,
already militarily unnecessary, impermissible. 19 2 Such is the principal burden
of the recent Geneva Conventions.
Special questions have sometimes been raised about the law of air warfare-
in particular, about legal limitations on strategic bombardment-in connection
with this problem of permissible objects of attack. While the determination
of what, in specific contexts, may legitimately be regarded as a military objective
involves some difficulties, air warfare would not appear to present any unique
issues: the purpose and level of destruction obtained are of prime importance to
legal policy, not the modality of delivery. The advent of ballistic missiles, which
can be launched from the surface or beneath the surface of land or sea and from
the air, will perhaps serve to underscore the irrelevance of traditional distinc-
tions about modality of delivery.0 3 It is possible, nevertheless, that all modali-
ties of destruction, not merely strategic air power, may remain subject to one
overriding inhibition which Judge Lauterpacht has described as "an absolute
rule of law." He writes:
"[I]t is in [the] prohibition, which is a clear rule of law, of intentional
terrorization-or destruction-of the civilian population as an avowed or
obvious object of attack that lies the last vestige of the claim that war
can be legally regulated at all. Without that irreducible principle of re-
straint there is no limit to the licence and depravity of force .... It is clear
that admission of a right to resort to the creation of terror among the
civilian population as being a legitimate object per se would inevitably
mean the actual and formal end of the law of warfare. For that reason, so
long as the assumption is allowed to subsist that there is a law of war,
the prohibition of the weapon of terror not incidental to lawful operations
must be regarded as an absolute rule of law." 194
The essentially modest character of this "absolute rule" needs no underlining.'0 5
192. Arts. 23(c), (d) of the Hague Regulations; HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 473
(Higgins ed. 1924) ; 2 OPPENHEim-LAUTERPACHT 338; 2 WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW
165 (Keith ed. 1944). On the criminality of refusing quarter, see The Abbaye Ardcnnc
Case, 4 LAw REPORTS OF TIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 97 (1948) ; Trial of Von Ruchteschell,
9 id. at 83 (1949).
Even Clausewitz, who is not commonly accused of being a humanitarian, wrote: "The
military forces must be destroyed, that is to say, put into such a condition that they can
no longer continue to fight. We take this opportunity to explain that ... the expression
'the destruction of the enemy's military forces' is to be understood only in this sense."
VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 19 (Jolles transl. 1943).
193. It may be, however, that intercontinental ballistic missiles when combined with
high-yield dirty thermonuclear warheads cannot, with the present low capabilities of guid-
ance systems for precision, be used without forfeiting all possibilities of keeping some
limits on destruction. Such weapon systems may reduce the conception of purpose and
level of destruction-reasonableness in the total context of particular uses-to marginal
utility.
194. Lauterpacht, The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War, 29 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 360-69 (1952).
195. One difficulty is that, conceding the lawfulness of certain political and strategic
objectives, certain forms of "terrorization," such as terror bombing, when carried out
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Reprisals and Superior Orders
A more comprehensive presentation than can be attempted here would survey
the detailed policies and decisions on the various defenses which an individual
accused of violating the law of war may interpose to shield himself from criminal
punishment-such as "military necessity" in its most specific sense, reprisals,
official capacity and superior orders. Perhaps reprisals and superior orders,
however, merit a few words.
Reprisals may be described as violent measures which would otherwise be
unlawful, invoked as a response to and a sanction against the prior unlawful
violence of the enemy. While reprisals have frequently been the subject of
extravagant claims, it is a mistake to regard the doctrine of reprisals as a
denial of law or of the possibility of law. 19 The world public order, on the
contrary, authorizes reprisals as a last desperate measure to secure law-
conforming behavior. The first effort of such order is to prevent change by
violent procedures; when that effort fails, resort is next had to the law of war
to minimize the inevitable destruction of values; when observance of the law
of war breaks down, the only immediate recourse of the injured is to reprisals
in the hope of creating expectations in the enemy of the desirability of a return
to observance of that law. Other decision-makers may, of course, have an
opportunity to review the judgment of the acting belligerent as to the propriety
of the occasion and proportionality of the response in reprisal, but in a world
arena, organized as at present, no effective alternative to such immediate ad-
ministration of reciprocities in benefit and injury is apparent.
The somewhat vague formulation of principle governing superior orders
represents what clearly is a compromise between the requirements of main-
taining military discipline in armies 19 and the necessity of securing enforce-
ment of law through the imposition of individual criminal responsibility. Were
both official capacity or "act of state" and superior orders, as formulated in
under certain circumstances and within certain limitations, might conceivably result in
less aggregate destruction of values than other alternatives in the application of violence.
It has also been difficult in practice to distinguish the effects of the bombing of cities
for purposes of destroying military installations and transportation and communications
systems from those of bombing for purposes of terror. Where nuclear explosives are
used, it may be even more difficult to make this distinction.
196. It comes too close to such a view to say, as Professor Hyde did, that "when
opposing belligerents reciprocate in dealing With each other as the law forbids, their
conduct is extra-legal and finds no proper place in a system of law purporting to govern
the conduct of States at war." 3 Hv-F, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1841 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
See also STONE, LE:GAL CONTROLS 354, where the sweeping statement is made that belliger-
ents' duty to observe the law of war is "not absolute but conditional" on reciprocation.
Compare Westlake's view that the unlawful acts of its enemy do not loose a belligerent
from law but entrust it with a right to redress of a violated obligation. 2 WESTLAKE,
INTRNATIONAL LAW 114-15 (1907).
197. See Trial of Von Leeb, 12 LAW REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRimI ALs 73
(1949).
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their most absolute assertions, s9 8 unconditionally accepted as absolving de-
fenses, there would be little left of a law of war; for superior orders would
result in an indefinite regressive transmission of responsibility until the very
apex of the authority and control structure in the belligerent state is reached," 9
while "act of state" would serve to shield those who stand at the top of the
structure. The present flexible doctrine has at least the virtue of authorizing
a decision-maker to take into account in any particular situation relevent vari-
ables, such as the patency or obscurity of the illegal character of the order, the
relative positions in the hierarchy of command of both the superior issuing the
order and the subordinate complying with it, the time of the commission of the
offense and the specific tactical military situation at such time.200
Belligerent Occupation
In this context, one of the participants has so far succeeded in his active
exercise of violence as to acquire, establish and solidify effective control over
portions of the territory of the other. The reduction of enemy territory and
of its people and resources to the firm possession of a belligerent deprives the
enemy of their use as effective bases of power. The occupant then seeks to police
and utilize the captured bases of power so as to sustain and augment his own
means of carrying on combat in still unoccupied areas. In this time period,
after successful invasion but before final victory, the expectations of all parties
about future permanent authority in the area are obscure; but some temporary
authority must be conceded, and the inhabitants, for whom life must go on,
present against the occupant counterdemands for continuity and minimum
dislocation of their value processes.
Here again, as in the context of active combat, the basic policy consistently
sought by authoritative decision-makers is an equilibrium between the require-
ments of military necessity and humanity, or the minimum unnecessary destruc-
tion of values. The applicable prescriptions on the one hand concede authority
to the occupant to safeguard his military security by policing the occupied area
and punishing inhabitants who commit hostile acts directed against him and,
198. See, e.g., Manner, The Legal Nature and Punishment of Criminal Acts of Violence
Contrary to the Laws of War, 37 Am. J. INTi'L L. 407, 416-18 (1943) ; Schick, War Crinl-
inals and the Law of the United Nations, 7 U. TORONTO L.J. 27, 45 (1947-48).
199. See Trial of Von Leeb, 12 LAw REPoRTs oF TRIALS OF WAR CRIumiNALS 71
(1949); Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of War Crines, 21 BUr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 58, 70 (1944). See also GLIUECI, WAR CrIiNALs: THEIR PRosEcUTION
AND PUNISHMENT 141 (1944) ; Berger, The Legal Nature of War Crimes and the Prob-
lem of Superior Command, 38 Am. POL. Sci. Rsv. 1203 (1944); Sack, Punishment of
War Criminals and the Defence of Superior Orders, 60 L.Q. REv. 63 (1944); Wright,
War Crimes Under International Law, 62 L.Q. REv. 40, 45 (1946).
200. See, e.g., Trial of Von Leeb, 12 LAw REPRTs oF TRIALs OF WAR CRIMINALS 71-
74 (1949) ; Trial of Masuda, 1 id. at 71 (1947), 5 id. at 18-19 (1948) ; Trial of Greifelt, 13
id. at 1, 69 (1949); Trial of Milch, 7 id. at 42 (1948). See also Dunbar, Some Aspects of
'the Problem of Superior Orders in the Law of War, 63 JuDM. REv. 234, 251, 253-55, 261
(1951).
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on the other hand, require him to respect the lives, loyalties and, in general,
the human dignity of the inhabitants. In like manner, while the relevant pre-
scriptions permit the occupant to secure the satisfaction of his military needs
out of the resources and labor of the occupied territory, they simultaneously
restrict the permissible extent and character of that utilization in deference
to the domestic needs and loyalties of the inhabitants. The familiar technical
terms for incorporating one set of policies include "belligerent occupation,"
"maintenance of vie publique," "war treason" and "requisitions and contribu-
tions"; the opposing policies are expressed by "premature annexation,"
"usurpation of sovereignty," "unlawful alteration of fundamental institutions,"
"unlawful subversion of allegiance" and "disproportionate requisitions and con-
tributions."
For some illustration of the details of the continuing complementarity of policy
and prescription, some of the more important provisions of the 1949 Geneva
Civilians Convention, which supplements the 1907 Hague Regulations in concise
formulationof both inherited principles and new prescriptions, may be mentioned.
The Civilians Convention prohibits the cruder forms of violence and brutality,
such as extermination, murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation and
scientific experiments ;201 vicarious punishment, such as collective penalties, re-
prisals against inhabitants and their property and the taking of hostages ;202 and
individual deportations and mass forcible transfers of the population to the home
country of the occupant.20 3 The Convention enjoins respect for "the persons
[of the inhabitants], their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions
and practices, and their manners and customs" and demands special protection
for women against rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent
assault.20
4
At the same time, however, the Convention permits the occupant to take
such measures of control and security in regard to the inhabitants as may be
"necessary as a result of the war." 20 5 For "imperative military reasons," for
instance, the occupant may require the total or partial evacuation of a given
area 206 and "for imperative reasons of security," he may confine the inhabi-
tants to assigned residences or intern them.2 0 7 More generally, the occupant
is permitted by the Convention to subject the inhabitants to regulations essential
to the security of the occupant and the members and property and communica-
tions of the occupation forces or administration, 20 8 and to punish with imprison-
201. Art. 32. For general surveys of the Civilians Convention, see Gutteridge, The
Protection of Civilians in Occupied Territory, 5 Y.B. oF Wo=n AFFAIRs 290, 297-308
(1951); Gutteridge, The Rights and Obligations of an Occupying Power, 6 id. at 149,
160-69 (1952).
202. Arts. 33, 34.
203. Art. 49, para 1.
204. Art. 27.
205. Ibid.
206. Art. 49, para. 2.
207. Art. 78.
208. Art. 64, para. 2.
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ment or death, after judicial proceedings complying with certain minimum pro-
cedural standards of fairness, 20 9 those who violate such regulations.
Among the more pressing problems in this area is the treatment of inhabitants
who join guerrilla or partisan forces or resistance movements. Guerrilla forces
and their operations have in the past been characterized by mobility, stealth
and secrecy, and an ability to sink at will into the protective anonymity of the
civilian population. 210 It is these characteristics of guerrilla techniques that occu-
pants have found vastly annoying, dangerous and difficult to counter. Pre-
sumably because of the peculiar danger to the occupant's security posed by
guerrilla forces, both traditional law and the Geneva Civilians Convention have
left the occupant free to visit death on captured inhabitants who are members
of such forces.21 :1 All that the Civilians Convention does is to require a previous
judicial determination of the fact of participation in guerrilla activities.212
The 1949 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention does now include among
the categories of captured persons entitled to prisoner-of-war treatment mem-
bers of "organized resistance movements belonging to a Party to the conflict
and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occu-
pied. '213 The revolutionary character of this rule is, however, less real than
apparent. For the same convention requires members of organized resistance
movements to exhibit all the indicia of legitimate combatancy-responsible com-
mand; a fixed, distinctive, recognizable sign; open carrying of arms; and ob-
servance of the laws of war. Compliance with all these requirements without
members of guerrilla or resistance movements discarding their character as
209. Arts. 65-77 constitute a rough and ready code of criminal law and procedure
applicable in cases of violations of the occupant's security legislation.
210. For description of guerrilla techniques and tactics, see LEVY, GUERRILLA W.XR-
FARE (1942); MixscHE, SECRET FORcES: THE TECHIQUE OF UNDERGROUND MOVEMENTS
chapters 2, 3 (1950).
211. The tribunal in Trial of List, 8 LAW REPOR TS OF TRIALs OF WAR CRIMINALS 34,
58 (1949), asserted that "in no other way can an army guard and protect itself from the
gadfly tactics of such armed resistance" and that "members of such resistance forces must
accept the increased risks involved in this mode of fighting." The war crimes tribunals
commonly held that civilians not exhibiting the indicia set forth in art. 1 of the Hague
Regulations were not permissible combatants and that their execution, as such, did not
constitute a war crime. See, e.g., Trial of Von Leeb, 12 id. at 85-86 (1949) ; Trial of
Ohashi, 5 id. at 27-29 (1948) ; Trial of Bruns, 3 id. at 21 (1948).
212. See arts. 64-75. Article 68 does limit the imposition of the death penalty to
cases of espionage, "serious acts of sabotage" and "intentional offenses which have caused
the death of one or more persons," and adds the condition that "such offenses were pun-
ishable by death under the law of the occupied territory in force before the occupation
began."
The requirement of judicial determination of participation in guerrilla activities had
been laid down by the war crimes tribunals. The execution of persons charged with
sabotage and guerrilla warfare, without such previous determination or trial, was pun-
ished as a war crime. See, e.g., Trial of Shiiwhara, 5 LAw REPoRTs OF TRIALS OF WAR
CRimINALS 32 (1948); Trial of Motosuke, 13 id. at 129-30 (1949); Trial of Hisakaml,
5 id. at 70 (1948) ; Trial of Altstotter, 6 id. at 96-104 (1948).
213. Art. 4(A) (2).
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secret underground forces seems difficult indeed. 214 Thus, whether a consistent
application of the fundamental community policy of minimizing unnecessary
destruction of values would not require the reassessment of the position in law
of resistance movements, and possibly their legitimation and admission of mem-
bers to prisoner-of-war status, still appears open to question. Experience in
previous major wars would seem to point both to the military effectiveness of
resistance movements in immobilizing and compelling dispersion of occupation
troops, and in disrupting the highly complex logistics of modem war, and to
the minimal deterrent value of expectations of death upon capture. 215 If the mili-
tary utility of partisan war does substantially outweigh the value deprivations
incident to capture and if the threatened value deprivations are, in point of fact,
ineffective to secure the occupant against guerrilla attacks by inhabitants,
the assertion might be made with some degree of plausibility that such depriva-
tions of values are unnecessary and pointless. 216 The realism of any new line
of compromise between the competing policies will, of course, differ as future
wars are total or limited.
Prisoners of War
Since prisoners of war constitute bases of enemy power already effectively
neutralized by capture, the further direct application of violence against them
214. Cf. SToNE, LEGAL CONTROLS 565. See also Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged
Belligerency": Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 327-28, 336-37
(1951) ; Ford, Resistance Movements in Occupied Territory, 3 NEDERLANDS TIyDSCeaIvr
VOOR INTERNATIONAAL RECHT 355, 379 (1956).
215. See, e.g., FURNISS, AMERICAN MILITARY POLICY 413-23 (1957) ; STONE, LEGAL
CONTROLS 564; Donovan, Secret Movements, Espionage and Treachery, in MODERN
WORLD POLITICS 308, 324 (Kalijarvi ed. 1953); Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Bel-
ligerency": Spies Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BeT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 334 (1951);
Kueder, "Territorial War": The New Concept of Resistance, 32 FOREIGN AFF. 91
(1953) ; Papagos, Guerrilla Warfare, 30 id. at 215 (1952). For an account of the guerrilla
or resistance movements in occupied Europe during the second World War, see HITLER'S
EUROPE, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1939-1946, 327-37 (Italy), 419-34 (France),
561-68 (Poland), 650-72 (Yugoslavia) (Royal Institute of Int'l Affairs 1954). See also
DALLIN, GERMAN RULE IN RUSSIA 1941-1945: A STUDY IN OCCUPATION POLICIES (1957).
The very intensity and widespread character of guerrilla war in the occupied countries
testify to the weak deterrent effect, if any, of execution and torture upon capture. Neither
the German nor the Japanese occupation forces were particularly lenient with captured
guerrillas or partisans. The current experience of the French armies in Algeria and their
continuing inability-despite fierce repressive measures-to stop Algerian guerrilla rebels
tend to sustain the point made.
216. Of course, the more effective guerrilla warfare becomes the more insistent be-
comes the occupant's interest in effectively combatting it. What we suggest is that denial
of prisoner-of-var rights may be an uneconomical and inefficient way of dealing with
guerrillas. Cf. the observation in STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS 567 n.25, that "a belligerent
may often find it preferable to offer guerrillas the privileged status of prisoners of war
if they surrender, rather then to expend the resources necessary to overcome and destroy
them by force." See also VON GLAHN, TiaE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY 52 (1957) ;
Baxter, So-Called "Unprivileged Belligerency": Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28
BeT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 337 (1951).
1958]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
would result in a destruction of values without military significance. 217 None-
theless, the captor-belligerent does assert claims to exercise coercive control
over prisoners of war for certain purposes, such as the maintenance of his mili-
tary advantage through their continued neutralization and the utilization of their
labor. On the other hand, the captive personnel as well as their home state make
countering demands for enjoyment of certain minimum values during captivity.
That the prescriptions applicable here, codified in the 1949 Geneva Prisoners
of War Convention, represent once more an attempted balancing of the same
polar policies sought by authoritative decision-makers in other contexts is clear.
The Geneva Convention seeks to extend the humanitarian benefits of prisoner-
of-war treatment by attempting to catch as many as possible in its categorization
of those entitled to such treatment. The categories include, aside from members
of the regular armed forces, militias, volunteer corps and guerrillas who exhibit
the prescribed marks of permissible combatants, the armed forces of an un-
recognized power, civilian contractors and aircraft crews, war correspondents,
members of labor and welfare units, crew members of merchantmen and civil
aircraft and participants in a levee en nWsse.218 But deferring to the security
needs of the captor power, the Convention leaves it free to deny prisoner-of-war
status to spies, saboteurs, deserters from its own forces, traitors and perhaps
parole violators. Similarly, while the Convention requires that prisoners of war
must at all times be humanely treated and protected from mental and physical
violence and immunized from reprisals, 219 prescribing in minute specification
the details of the required standard of treatment, prisoners of war are declared
subject to the laws, regulations and orders of the captor power, violation of
which renders them liable to disciplinary or penal, judicial sanctions. 22 0 Again,
though the Convention obliges the captor power to respect the loyalties and
human dignity of the captured personnel, it permits the captor to augment his
resources by exacting compulsory labor from prisoners of war for certain pro-
jects which, while not of a distinctly military character, are of substantial value
to his over-all war effort.221
Among the problems of contemporary interest involving prisoners of war
is that of compulsory repatriation. The Convention states that captured per-
sonnel "shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of
hostilities. '222 During the Korean armistice negotiations, a very large number
217. Under the general principle of military necessity, as that principle was formulated
above, there can, of course, be no necessity for killing prisoners of war who have ceased
to be effective units of enemy power. It is perhaps for the purpose of shielding this rule
of general protection from eroding exceptions that operational necessity which may in
varying degree be generated by pressure from forces other than the captured personnel
is not accepted as a defense to a charge of killing such prisoners. See, e.g., Trial of Thiele
and Steinert, 3 LAw REPORTs OF TRIALs OF WAR CR mINALS 56 (1948). See also DEPART-
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of communist prisoners held by the United Nations Command refused to be
repatriated to North Korea and the People's Republic of China. Mr. Vishinsky
demanded the repatriation of each and every prisoner including the unwilling and
insisted vehemently that article 118 was a "clear" and "categoric formula," a
"principle of international law," which needed no interpretation. 223 He pointed
at the same time to article seven, which provides that prisoners "may in no
circumstances renounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the
present Convention." The position officially taken by the United Nations was
that neither the general prescriptions of international law nor the particular
ones of the Geneva Convention required the United Nations forcibly to re-
patriate prisoners in fact unwilling to go home. The submission has been made
that this stand is sustained by a realistic conception of the nature and functions
of the familiar principles of interpretation and by the independent right of states
to grant asylum and that it is the conclusion compelled by a deep commitment
to humanitarianism and the goal values of free world society. 224 Such submis-
sion seems persuasive. No set of words can, apart from context, have any one
"clear," "unambiguous" or "literal" meaning that of itself compulsorily de-
termines decision, whatever the particular circumstances may be. A rational
theory of interpretation must recognize that treaty words acquire meaning in
specific controversies only from context and in terms of the major purposes
and demands of the parties to the treaty.225 There is no question that the major
purpose of articles 118 and seven was humanitarian in character-for the
benefit of the prisoners, to prevent abuse by coerced retention or waiver-and
that forcible repatriation despite the prisoners' well-founded expectations
of severe deprivations upon return does not serve that purpose.
Enemy Persons and Property Within a Belligerent's Territory
The problem arises largely with respect to enemy persons and property found
within the territory of a belligerent or its allies upon the outbreak of hostilities.
The characterization, it is important to note, is of "enemy" persons and property
and not of "alien nationals." Recognition is developing that the niceties of
"nationality" law, devised for other purposes, have less relevance to purposes
of control of an enemy's bases of power than factual loyalties and group mem-
bership which transcend both national boundaries and technical niceties.226
223. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. Rzc. 7th Sess., 1st Comm. 37 (1952-53).
224. Charmatz & Wit, Repatriation of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Con-
vention, 62 YALE L.J. 391 (1953). See also Gutteridge, The Repatriation of Prisoners
of War, 2 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 207 (1953); Mayda, The Korean Repatriation Problem
and International Law, 47 Am. J. INT'L L. 414 (1953); Schapiro, Repatriation of De-
serters, 29 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 310 (1952).
225. For amplification and documentation of this theme, see McDougal & Gardner,
The Veto and the Charter: An Interpretation for Survival, 60 YALE L.J. 258 (1951).
226. See DomxE, TRADING WITH THE ENEMY IN WoaLD WAR II, 46-51 (1943).
See also LArImTE, THE INTEINMENT OF ALIENS 35 (1940), who, speaking primarily of
the refugees from Nazi Germany, urged that "we discriminate, not between Britons and
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Upon control of enemy persons found in a belligerent's territory, interna-
tional law would appear to interpose but few limits. Complementary policies
are here again contraposed and compromised in terms of the security needs of
the belligerent 227 and of the human rights of the individual. Whether even
in time of peace, however, the alien national is entitled to protection by stand-
ards of civilized justice or merely to equal treatment with nationals is still
debated. For nationals of the belligerent, the common assumption is that inter-
national law offers no protection, other than in relatively obsolete doctrines
of humanitarian intervention. When violence breaks out, restraints may a for-
tiori be even more modest, unless the Nuremberg judgment be thought to afford
some degree of protection by its limited concept of crimes against humanity.228
The recent unprotested practice of states presents such measures as the reg-
istration and compulsory detention of aliens, or detailed regulation of their
activities, and, in some instances, even sterner measures for nationals.2
29
The 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention does seek to establish a modicum of
human rights for alien nationals caught in the hands of belligerents,280 but it
yields, as was of course necessary, to the security interests of the belligerent
as determined, in the first instance, by the belligerent himself.
2 3
'
The protection which international law affords to enemy property found
in a belligerent's territory is disputed. Unquestionably, a belligerent may seize
and apply such property to its purposes during war. Whether international
law imposes upon the belligerent a duty either to restore or to pay for such prop-
erty after the termination of hostilities, however, has recently been questioned. A
number of reputable writers have, in surveying past practices, been able to
find such a duty.232 But this finding seems to represent both a somewhat selec-
'aliens,' or between 'friendly aliens' and 'enemy aliens' in the present way, but between
those who stand for freedom and those who stand for tyranny in every country. This
division cuts right across all nationalities. The real 'aliens' are the 'Nazis of the soul'
of all countries, including our own .... Our real friends are not to be determined by tests
of birthplace, nationality or language, but by their past and present conduct in the struggle
against authoritarian forms of government."
See also the United States' Emergency Detention Act of 1950, 64 STAT. 1019 (1950),
50 U.S.C. §§ 811-26 (1952), which authorizes, in cases of an "internal security emergency"
brought about by invasion, declaration of war or insurrection in aid of a foreign enemy,
the apprehension and detention of any person "as to whom there is reasonable ground
to believe that such person probably will engage in, or probably will conspire with others
to engage in, acts of espionage or sabotage"; the United Kingdom's Emergency Powers
(Defence) Act, 1939, 2 & 3 GEo. 6, c. 62, § 1(2) (a).
227. STONE, LEGAL CoNToLs 443-44.
228. See Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 (1946).
229. The cause c~l~bre is, of course, the detention and relocation of Japanese-Ameri-
cans in the second World War. See Rostow, The Japanese-American Cases-A Disaster,
54 YALE L.J. 489 (1945) ; Note, Alien Enemies and Japanese Americans: A Problem of
Wartime Controls, 51 id. at 1318 (1942).
230. Arts. 13-46.
231. See, e.g., arts. 5, 41.
232. Borchard, The Treatment of Enemy Property, 34 GEo. L.J. 389 (1946) ; Jessup,
Enemy Property, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 57 (1955) ; Sommerich, A Brief Against Confiscation,
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five reading of past practice and a projection of future decision which appears
highly optimistic when the variables which are likely to affect such decision
are considered. It would seem most difficult to find, in realistic observation of the
varied practice and opinion in the past, a crystallized community expectation of a
duty to return property.23 3
The basic policies are commonly posed in terms of the inviolability of private
property and individual rights and the encouragement of the worldwide circu-
lation of capital on the one hand, and of the interests of the belligerent and the
maintenance of certain standards of world order on the other. Such basic policies,
all in a measure persuasive, are best debated not in the abstract but with refer-
ence to specific controversies in context. Among the many different factors
in a particular context which might rationally affect policy choice may be
listed such items and considerations as: the types and characteristics of owners
of claimed property; the prior use of the property, as an instrument of eco-
nomic warfare or otherwise; the degree to which the property was controlled
by the enemy state; the type of world public order the enemy state seeks to
establish, totalitarian or free; the relation of the war waged to the public order
of the organized community; possible future uses of the property and its re-
lation to the security of the state; and any needs for recoupment for war damage
by the enemy. When such factors are reviewed in particular context, the possi-
bility of a realistic determination of the probable effects of alternative decisions
upon both commerce and security is enhanced.
Termination of the Process of Coercion
In terminating the process of coercion, belligerents seek to disengage them-
selves and return to persuasion as a mode of interaction. Factually, the context
of decelerating coercion may present the participants in many differing degrees
of intensity of combat, in many different postures of relative victory and defeat,
in many different degrees of consensus, both tacit and explicit, about the cessation
of coercion and subject in varying degree to the intervention of third states
or international organizations.
In so complex a process, many difficult legal problems naturally arise from
the contraposed claims of the participants. Between belligerents, problems arise
over the timing of the cessation of hostilities, the repatriation of prisoners, the
11 LAW & CONTrMP. PROB. 152 (1945). See also CAsTmPN, THE PRESENT LAW OF WAR
AND NEUTRALITY 118-19 (1953); Reeves, Is Confiscation of Enemy Assets in the National
Interest of the United States?, 40 VA. L. REV. 1029 (1954); Wright, War Clain:
W/hat of the Future?, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 543 (1951).
233. See CORBETT, LAW AND SOcIETY IN THE RELATIONS OF STATES 216 (1951); 2
OPPENHEIM-LAUTERPACUT 326-31; STONE, LEG.AL CONTROLS 435; Report of the Special
Committee to Study the Dirksen Bill, in SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL' AND COMPARATIVE
LAW, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, PROCEEDINGS 52 (1955); Rubin, The "Inviolability" of
Enemy Private Property, 11 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 166 (1945). See also SCHIsGALL,
THE ENEMY PROPERTY ISSUE (Public Affairs Pare. No. 246, 1957), which collects the
arguments for and against return.
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restoration of territory and property taken, the cession of territory and property,
responsibility for unlawful destruction and violence, the resumption of treaty
obligations and peaceful procedures generally, and so on. Between belligerents
and nonparticipants, the questions concern responsibility for unlawful destruc-
tion, the repatriation of property looted and smuggled by the enemy and the
restoration of normal peaceful intercourse. Private individuals and groups,
acting sometimes across and sometimes within national boundaries, contest the
continuing enforceability of agreements, the restoration of property taken and
transferred by the enemy and the interpretation of "duration of war" clauses
in private agreements. Between individuals and belligerent states, freedom from
personal restraint, amnesty, the release or return of property sequestered or
vested and the liquidation of various internal wartime controls are relevant
questions. And between different branches of the government within the same
state, decisions to continue or terminate extraordinary war powers must be
made.
The sources of policy upon which authoritative decision-makers will draw
for the solution of such diverse controversies are many and varying. It is futile
to subsume all these problems, of such different policy import, under a few
vague principles about the "termination of war,' '234 as is commonly done.23 r
About many of these problems, international law has had little or nothing to
say, and decision is appropriately founded in national law. Even for problems
appropriately regarded as in the domain of international concern, however,
there has been very little development of customary international law. Practice,
apart from explicit agreement, has been so diverse that contention abounds on
most problems as to what authoritative expectation requires. The result has
been that belligerents, in so far as their foresight and degree of consensus
234. See, e.g., CAsTmN, op. cit. supra note 232, at 132-37; 2 OPPENHr-LAuTERPACHT
596-620; STxoE, LEGAL CONTRoLs 639-46.
235. On the parallel subsumption of disparate problems under the label of "the com-
mencement of war," see McDougal & Feliciano, The Initiation of Coercion: A Multi-
Temporal Anwlysis, 52 Am. J. INT'L L. 241 (1958). Just as discussions on the commence-
ment of war have frequently been concerned with determination of the beginning of a
"state of war," so discussions on the termination of war have commonly centered on ascer-
tainment of the cessation of the "state of war" The most that efforts at clarification of the
different "termination" problems have thus far achieved is the recognition that the "date
of termination of a war according to a particular State's municipal law" does not neces-
sarily coincide with the date of termination "under international law." See STONE, LGAL
CONROLs 643; Hudson, The Duration of the War Between the United States and
Gernany, 39 HARv. L. REv. 1020 (1926) ; Kunz, Ending the War With Germany, 46 An.
J. INT'L L. 114, 118-19 (1952); Note, Judicial Determination of the End of the War,
47 CoLum. L. Rav. 255 (1947), distinguishing between "termination of war under inter-
national law," "termination of wartime legislation" and "effects of termination of war on
private legal relations."
For surveys of cases on "termination of war" for various municipal purposes, see
Roberts, Litigation Involving "Termination of War," 43 Ky. L.J. 199 (1955); Note,
Ternination of a War, 4 Wyo. L.J. 115 (1949). See also French, The End of the War,
15 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 191 (1947).
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have permitted, have sought to prescribe for termination problems by agree-
ment as explicit as possible in truces, armistices 238 and treaties of peace.237
The most important law governing the termination of coercion is thus, perhaps,
those fundamental principles for the interpretation of agreements mentioned
in the discussion of repatriation of prisoners of war. The continuing importance
of such principles might be further demonstrated by reference to the contro-
versy between the Egyptians and Israelis as to the meaning of their uneasy
armistice.
THE COMMON INTEREST IN AN INCLUSIVE PUBLIC ORDER OF FREEDOM
In projecting these broad outlines of policy-oriented inquiry, and in offer-
ing certain possible clarifications of some of the more fundamental policies,
we have sought neither to minimize nor to exaggerate the potential role of
law in controlling and regulating international coercion. The contemporary
world arena exhibits, unfortunately, all too many factors which tend to con-
fer upon the attitude of cynical disenchantment with law at least the appear-
ance of realism:
neither the leaders nor the peoples of the world have yet clarified a common
interest in economizing the use of force or in establishing appropriate institu-
tions for securing such interest;
the public order presented by the world arena is composed not of a single
inclusive order, moved by common policies, but of several competing, exclusive
orders, moved by the most disparate policies;
the policies which move some of these contending world public orders reject
not only the values of human dignity, implicit in the principle of economy
of force, but even the very distinction between means and ends;
contemporary technology makes possible a concentration and application of
naked force hitherto inconceivable even in meglomania's wildest dreams; and
so on.
The cumulative import of contemporary scientific analysis and observation
of factors affecting individual and collective choices is, however, that over a
period of time most men do and can act to maximize their values, conscious
and unconscious, and that such values include, if not a large measure of humani-
tarianism for their fellow man, at least a demand for self-preservation. 238 The
236. See, generally, MAURICE, THE ARuIST cs OF 1918 (1943) ; Graham, Two Armi-
stices and a Surrender, 40 Am. J. INT'L L. 148 (1946); Graham, Arrnistices-1944 Style,
39 id. at 286 (1945).
237. See, generally, Fitzmaurice, The Juridical Clauses of the Peace Treaties, 73
HAGUE REcUEIL 259 (1948) ; Metzger, The Liberal Japanese Peace Treaty, 37 CoRNELL
L.Q. 382 (1952).
238. See note 95 supra. See also PERSONALITY IN NATURE, SOCIETY AND CULTURE
(Kluckholn, Murray & Schneider ed. 1955); PAsoNs, THE STRUcTURE oF SOCIAL
AcToIN (2d ed. 1949); STAGNER & K~ARvosx , PSYCHOLOGY (1952). That men generally
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world arena, fortunately, exhibits certain factors, countervailing the pessi-
mistic, which suggest that the hope of an increasing role for authority in the
control and regulation of international coercion is not entirely illusion:
the peoples of the world, and especially their leaders, have begun to recognize
the imperative need to establish at least minimum controls to lessen the risk
of their common destruction by miscalculation or inadvertence, whatever the
system of world order demanded;
the peoples of the world may be observed further, beyond demand for survival,
to express increasing common demands for many shared values and increas-
ingly to exhibit recognition of their common interdependence in the achieve-
ment of such values;
despite the contending public orders, there is a slow trend toward inclusive
rather than exclusive determination of global policy on some problems, as
well as some movement toward the expansion and improvement of specialized
institutions for the performance of policy functions;
some observers are beginning to perceive that the almost inconceivable con-
centration of force made possible by modern technology might, by appropri-
ately shared perspectives, be brought to the support, rather than the destruc-
tion of an inclusive public order; and so on.
From these tentative initial clarifications of a common interest in survival
and other values could come a more comprehensive and creative clarification
of the common interest of all peoples of the world in effective community
monopolization of force behind an inclusive public order of safety, freedom,
and abundance and in a wide sharing of responsibility for the maintenance of
such order. From such comprehensive clarification of common interest could
come the detailed initiatives and dispositions of effective power necessary to
invention and establishment of the appropriate institutions and procedures
for securing and preserving such interest. To these ends, lawyers may most
effectively contribute, in performing their special roles in the clarification of
common interest and invention of alternatives, not by the repetitive reiteration
of overoptimistic faith in inherited ambiguous technicalities, but by the
systematic application of certain important emphases:
that clarity in thought requires a careful distinction of the processes of coer-
cion from the processes of authoritative decision;
that rationality in decision and recommendation demands that one pierce
through technical rules and concepts to the underlying fundamental policies
tend to act to maximize their values is a premise basic in contemporary theories of eco-
nomic analysis, see LITTLE, A CRITIQUE OF WEIYARax EcONOMICS (1950); SA-MUELSON,
FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1948) ; and in the theories of games and of decision-
making, see THE POLICY SCIENCES (Lerner & Lasswell ed. 1951); LucE AND RAIFFA,
GAMES AND DECISIONS (1957) ; VON NEWMANN & MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND
ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR (3d ed. 1953) ; Lasswell, Current Studies of the Decision, Process:
Automation Versus Creativity, 8 WEsT EN Poi. Q. 381 (1955).
[Vol. 67: 771
THE LAW OF WAR
and continually appraise such rules and concepts in terms of contemporary
and projected policies;
that both relevant policies and technical rules are commonly and necessarily
formulated in pairs of opposites and that the appropriate function of such
formulations is not to dictate decision but to guide decision-makers to all the
factors in a context which should be taken into account in making rational
decision; and, finally,
that responsible decision-makers who share the values of a free society may
appropriately give effect to such values not only in their formulation of
principles but also in their specific interpretations and applications.
It is by the consistent maintenance of these emphases, in the employment of
all his special intellectual skills for inquiry into the basic specific problems of
international coercion, that the lawyer who values human dignity may make
his richest contribution to moving the general community of mankind from
its present incomplete and disorganized structures and processes of authority,
harassed by contending exclusive orders, toward a more inclusive world public
order in which the values of a safe, free and abundant society are honored not
merely in theory but in practice.
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